

MILITARISM AND FOREIGN POLICY IN JAPAN

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS volume was written in the form of an essay as one of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Yale University, U.S.A. From its very nature, therefore, it can be no more than a mere outline of the subject with which it sets out to deal.

Both in the United States and in Europe an ever-increasing interest is being shown in the apparent influence which the Army and Navy exert upon the government and foreign policy of Japan. This influence has been stressed in every treatise on the government of Japan. Yet its importance as a factor in the formulation of her policy would seem to justify an attempt to analyse its causes and effects, and to explain an attitude so often misinterpreted by the rest of the world.

Undoubtedly many diverse factors influence the trend of a nation's foreign policy. This volume may, however, elucidate that particular factor which is apparently so pronounced in Japan, and may be a small contribution towards the better understanding of a country which, in little more than half a century, has risen from a state of isolation to a position of political and industrial eminence.

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INTRODUCTION

IT is a bold task to undertake the discussion of the problems of any country without an intimate knowledge of its language, its people and its customs. It is perhaps too bold a task to enter upon a study of Japan, since the East is a comparatively unknown quantity to the Occidental whose judgment may be warped by an inclination to apply the standards of the West to the problems of the East. Any conclusions which may be reached by an Occidental must, therefore, be regarded with apprehension; it would seem more politic that they should be regarded in the light of suggestions which may be food for thought.

In the last four years there have been constant reminders that the conduct of government in Japan has not been carried on according to Western democratic ideas. Reports from Japan have suggested that the Army and the Navy exert an influence far stronger than the services of any nation in post-war Europe could possess under the various forms of Western government. It is the task of this essay to set forth the occasions upon which that influence has been apparent and to suggest reasons for its existence. With this object it has been necessary to discover the particular elements which have made Japan a happy hunting-ground for undemocratic and chauvinistic influences and have so shaped Japanese ideology that such influences have been acceptable, or have, at least, met with scant opposition. This search has led to a study of the legacies of Japanese history,

of national beliefs, and of the effects of foreign influences. Yet a discussion of these elements, though it provides data for a background against which there might well be a chauvinistic appeal, fails to lead to any definite conclusion. The quest for reasons for such an appeal and for the particular influence which the Army and the Navy are able to exert at the present time involves more practical considerations. It is necessary to discern why democratic institutions have not attained the important place they have occupied in Western countries, and why no measure of democratic control has ever been established over the direction of national policy.¹ For just as research into the ideology of the Japanese people may reveal the background for a chauvinistic appeal, so may research into the political organization of the country suggest reasons why the Army and Navy have attained their present influential position. It is the object of this essay, therefore, to endeavour first of all to set forth the reasons why the Army and the Navy have attained to a position from which they may, if they so wish, exert a very great influence upon the direction of national policy, and, secondly, to ascertain whether they have made use of their position.

With this object in view it has seemed pertinent to discuss in the first chapter (of this essay) those parts of Japanese ideology which may form the background for the appeal of a group which desires to lead the nation along a chauvinistic path.

¹ The reference to "democratic institutions" is to those which existed before the introduction of Dictatorships in European countries in the post-War period.

Space forbids a complete analysis of Japanese ideology, but this chapter will attempt to point out those elements, such as the contributions of feudalism, Bushido and Shinto, and the influence of Western nations, which appear significant in the formation of that background. In the second chapter it is hoped that it will be made clear how the task of any group which desires to influence national policy has been simplified by the failure of democratic institutions to gain control of the machinery of State, partly as a result of the undemocratic nature of the Constitution, partly as a result of the behaviour of the political parties. In the first two chapters there is an intention, therefore, to show that if there is a chauvinistic group which desires to launch the country upon the course it advocates there is a background to which it may appeal, and a political organization which makes effective opposition to its ideas improbable.

In the third chapter the position of the Army and Navy will be considered in an attempt to show that, in consequence of the opportunities afforded them by the Constitution and subsequent ordinances and of the reputation which they have achieved, they are most advantageously placed to influence the national policy of Japan, even along chauvinistic lines if they so wish. In the succeeding chapters the events of the period from the Restoration to the present day will be discussed in order to ascertain whether the Army and Navy have made use of their advantageous position, and, if they have, the effect their influence has had upon the orientation of national policy.

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MILITARISM AND FOREIGN POLICY IN JAPAN

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND FOR A MILITARIST APPEAL

IN a discussion of the contributions which Feudal Japan has made to present-day Japan, there is a danger of becoming too involved in the history of the country, of chronicling events which, though of immense interest, do not bear directly upon the present-day structure. Yet the history of Japan, especially of the feudal era from 1185 to 1868, does provide a wealth of information which may be applied to the interpretation of the Japan of to-day; it has made a deep impression upon the life, the character and the organization of the nation. For the purposes of this essay it is only possible to outline those events which perhaps, by their influence upon the life and character of the people, serve to interpret present-day Japan, its activities, its organization and its reaction to the twentieth century. From that historical background it is possible to attempt to deduce the reasons, or some of the reasons, because obviously not all reasons can be based upon that background, why Japan to-day acts as it does, thinks as it does and behaves as it does.

In an attempt to prove that the militarist spirit is predominant in Japan it would seem natural to search in Japanese history to discover that the

nation has always been bellicose. Such a search, however, encounters instant failure. For, though Japan has had civil and foreign wars, she has been less harried by warfare than the majority of Western nations. Such a situation may seem incredible to an Occidental whose conception of a feudal society conjures up a picture of wars and rumours of wars. Yet, though the feudal ages endured in Japan for nearly seven centuries, two of those seven were times of peace and amity such as no other nation has enjoyed.

The early years of the feudal regime do reveal a series of wars fought to preserve the supremacy of one feudal lord over all others, but the importance of the period lies in the early growth of those institutions which endured until the Restoration, and which left their imprint upon the people. It is impossible, however, to go deeply into the feudal organization which was set up by the Kamakura¹ Government. The feudal institutions of Japan, although significant in minor differences, were striking in their similarity to those of the European system. A division of the rice lands had taken place in the seventh century by the grant of the Emperor. But the court nobility, which gradually found itself too weak to protect its own possessions, came to rely upon the warrior class which had arisen as a result of existing turmoil, and into whose possession the fiefs fell. A military nobility, therefore, assumed leadership in the provinces, and Yoritomo

¹ "Kamakura" denotes the government set up by Yoritomo, the first of the Bakafu. See J. Murdoch, *History of Japan*, Tokyo, 1910, vol. 1, pp. 374-412. See also G. B. Sansom, *Japan. Short Cultural History*, New York, 1931, pp. 265-290, for an excellent description of the growth of feudalism.

by his appointment of his own vassals as constables and as stewards of all Shō, or fiefs, established feudal rule throughout the whole country.¹ Space also forbids a description of the civil wars and intrigues which racked the sixty years following the fall of the Kamakura Government. The Ashikaga, who at length established themselves in the Shogunate, were weaker than their predecessors, so that after an unstable peace in the first half of the fifteenth century there was constant war. The period was marked by the struggles of great houses, sometimes against their peers, sometimes against their vassals. Even the Ashikaga were divided against themselves, so that with their gradual collapse great feudal houses assumed an increased measure of self-government. In the sixteenth century, however, the Shogun's power was resurrected under Nobunaga, Hideyoshi² and Ieyasu, who himself became Shogun. But the process of feudalization continued although the Tokugawa Shoguns made it part of their policy to guard against a feudatory becoming either rich or strong enough to challenge them. Ieyasu, much as William the Conqueror had exacted the Oath of Salisbury, obliged the feudatories to sign an oath of loyalty by which they swore to obey all orders from Yedo. Thus, though there was peace for two hundred and fifty years, there was literally set up a military dictatorship under which the military class was supreme and all other classes served its interests.

¹ K. Asakawa, "Origins of Feudal Tenure," *American Historical Review*, vol. 20, October 1914, pp. 1-23.

² W. Denning, *Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi*, Tokyo, 1904. See also J. Murdoch, *History of Japan*, Tokyo, 1910, vol. 2, pp. 189-386.

The Tokugawa legislation in effect accorded a rigid place in the social scheme to the Daimio, the Samurai and the peasantry, which endured until the Restoration and exerted a considerable influence upon the post-Restoration period. The Samurai gained a large measure of autonomy in like manner to the Daimio who ruled the great fiefs. But just as the latter were responsible to the Shogun for gross misgovernment or disobedience so were the Samurai accountable to their lords for failure in their duty or for disobedience. Both the Daimio and the Samurai, therefore, assumed a sense of responsibility and leadership during the Tokugawa regime, whilst the peasantry, which had no share in the government of the country, learned the elements of village administration and the necessity of the utmost toil and frugality in support of their families.

When pressure from abroad necessitated a more centralized government than feudalism could give, it was the small Samurai class who were fitted to carry it through. Naturally the Daimio were not enthusiastic about the institution of a system which would rob them of their power, whilst the peasantry had no active interest, and certainly no training or experience, in the conduct of affairs outside its own small village communities. The Restoration was, therefore, carried through by the Samurai;¹ they led, and the peasantry, without realizing the significance of the change, followed. Only later when economic conditions had changed did the latter understand what had occurred.

The feudal period, therefore, left behind it a legacy of the submission of the peasantry to the

¹ J. Morris, *Makers of Japan*, London, 1906, *passim*.

leadership of the Samurai class. Yet, though after 1600 there had been two and a half centuries of comparative peace, the Tokugawa Government had been the rule of a military class, so that the Samurai had retained their military character. Prowess in arms had remained an ideal of the Samurai which made them ever ready to defend with the sword what they considered to be right. The reactionary elements were ready to rebel under the leadership of Saigo against the new regime, and fight for the old order.¹ Yet, on the other hand, in spite of the continuity of the military ideal, it is impossible to declare that the feudal period left behind it a legacy of militarism. The military adventures of Japan had preceded the Tokugawa Government; the Mongol invasion had been repulsed late in the thirteenth century;² the northern provinces of the main island, Mutsu, and Dewa, had been reduced at the end of the twelfth century; in the sixteenth century Yezo and Loo-Choo had been conquered. Yet if the rulers of Japan desired to make her a militarist nation there was a historical background which they might interpret to their own advantage. Japan had once repulsed invasion, Japan had once invaded Korea, and for centuries she had possessed a military caste ready to avenge wrong with the sword. The Samurai were worshipped in post-Restoration Japan, because they typified all that was deemed best in the Japanese character; theirs was a type to which all

¹ The Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. See G. E. Ueyhara, *The Political Development of Japan*, London, 1910, p. 83.

² J. Murdoch, *A History of Japan*, Tokyo, 1910, vol. 1, pp. 491-532.

Japanese could aspire. It is obvious, therefore, that by a misreading of history it might be held that the Japanese were a warlike race. Yet the real contribution of history to the background against which militarism and chauvinism might be engendered, might endure and might spread, was the particular social organization and moral philosophy which feudalism had instituted. The hierarchical government of feudalism had formed a society in which one class led, and the others, without questioning the policy, followed. It was unthinkable that the situation should be reversed merely because the Emperor had been restored to his former position and because the feudal regime had been abolished. That division of those who led and those who followed, a lesson established deep down in the feudal system, appears to be, for the purposes of this essay, one of the most important legacies of Japanese history. The reasons for that division are explicable in the light of centuries of feudalism and of the support which Bushido and Shinto have given to a philosophy of loyalty and respect.

A survey of Japanese history, therefore, leads to many conclusions, but most important of all to a realization that feudalism had played a major part in moulding the Japanese character and way of life. Similarly, it is possible to survey the history of Western countries and discern the effect of the feudal era upon the institutions of those countries. But the feudal ages in Western countries lie far in the past, whereas in Japan they have only been dead for half a century. In Japan, therefore, their influence is the more real and the more instrumental

in shaping modern ideology and institutions. Yet history does not reveal the reasons why the contributions of feudalism are perpetuated. It might be thought that with the passage of time their influence would grow weaker, and then pass away, unless there were forces working for their perpetuation. Nor is this speculation ungrounded, for there are ample grounds for believing that such forces are at work, both in the educational and in the religious organization of the country. Viewed in such a light Shinto and Bushido assume an added significance in the formation of Japanese ideology, which it is impossible to pass by.

In 1905 Dr. Inazo Nitobé published a study of Japanese thought, an interpretation of the Soul of Japan, in which he set forth the tenets of the code of ethics which he termed Bushido.¹ In that work he was eager to convince Western readers of the sincerity of Bushido, and in his enthusiasm he may have ventured too far in its glorification as an ethical system. He was at pains to point out the many good qualities which the code embodied, its encouragement of loyalty, patriotism, sense of duty, rectitude and courage, its call for benevolence, politeness, sincerity, honour and self-control. He insisted that it was Bushido which had inspired the promoters of the Restoration to create a new Japan; that it was Bushido which was the motivating spirit behind all the activities of the Japanese people; that Japan owed her position to the spirit of the Samurai who had set a moral standard which,

¹ Bushido means literally "Military-Knight-Ways." Inazo Nitobé, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan*, New York, 1905. See also K. Nukariya, *The Religion of the Samurai*, London, 1913.

as the beau-ideal of the whole race, had permeated the ranks of the lower classes; that Bushido had, in fact, become the aspiration of the nation; and that it was Bushido which would carry the nation forward. "It has been said that Japan won her late war with China by means of Murata guns and Krupp cannon; it has been said that the victory was the work of a modern school system; but these are less than half-truths. . . . What won the battles on the Yalu, in Korea and Manchuria were the ghosts of our fathers, guiding our hands and beating in our hearts. . . . Bushido as an independent code of ethics may vanish, but its power will not perish from the earth."¹ Nitobé, as it has been pointed out, may have been carried away by his eagerness to impress the Western world, but his enthusiasm did not carry him altogether out of the realms of truth. To-day Bushido, although perhaps not clothed in such a clear-cut form as Nitobé described, does play a most important role in forming that Japanese character which the Occidental finds so difficult to fathom. It is still a power to shape the thoughts of the Army, the Navy and the people, because it is more than a code of chivalrous rules;² it sets forth principles which shape modern Japanese conduct, just as the Western conception of right and wrong shapes Western conduct. It was, therefore, no mere code of chivalry of which Nitobé wished to perpetuate the memory,

¹ Inazo Nitobé, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan*, New York, 1905, pp. 189-192.

² M. D. Kennedy, *The Military Side of Japanese Life*, London, 1924, pp. 54-55 and 311. (Captain Kennedy makes mention of the importance attached to Seishin Kyoiku, or Spiritual Training, which teaches the soldier to live up to the standards of the Bushi, the knights of old.)

but rather a code of ethics, in which there were elements of Japanese, Chinese and Indian thought, of Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, Confucianism and Shinto, and without a knowledge of which there can be no understanding of Japanese ideology and character.¹

For a fuller understanding of Bushido it is necessary to inquire more deeply into those elements from which it drew its tenets. Zen Buddhism was an intuitive school of Buddhist meditation, moral discipline and spiritual exercise, which, introduced into Japan about the end of the twelfth century, provided, by its propagation of virile doctrines, an element which Buddhism itself lacked. Its introduction came at a time when a military caste, which was rising to power in administration, needed a religion which trained it in mental firmness and resolute action, since Buddhism was too sentimental, too intricate for the warrior, Shinto too naïve and primitive, Confucianism too formal. Zen, however, showed a way through the perplexities of life and helped to overthrow the obstacles which cumbered the path. It denounced any attempt to form tenets, because such formulation deadened the soul. Rather it aimed at giving an assurance of the discovery in the innermost recesses of the soul of an ultimate reality which transcended difficulties and temporary troubles. It taught that the fundamental unity of existence was to be sought in the inner heart, and that attainment of a moral ideal lay in a moral life, in straightforward action, and in daring conduct unbewildered by circumstances. The soul

¹ Inazo Nitobé, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan*, New York, 1905, pp. 11-22.

was, therefore, no longer troubled by vicissitudes, by calamities and by adversity. "The life of an ideal Zennist may be compared to a solid rock standing in the midst of a raging sea and defying the surging billows. . . . Reflections of moonlight in the waters may be agitated, but the moon itself always remains serene and pure; so the moon of the Zen spirit is undisturbed in spite of its reflections in the waters of human life."¹

From the middle of the thirteenth century Zen became more and more the religion of the warrior. Its simplicity had an overwhelming appeal, and its doctrine gave a firm basis to the mental life of the warrior by the harmonization of spiritual aspirations with practical training in warfare. For, since in intense action calm aloofness was essential, aesthetic refinement was regarded not only as a means for the composure of the mind, but as a natural expression of the soul deriving poise and mental peace from the universe. As Nitobé said, "Zen teaching represented the human effort to reach by meditation zones of thought beyond the range of verbal expression. Its method was contemplative. Its purport to be convinced of a principle which underlies all phenomena, and, if it can, to be convinced of the Absolute itself, and thus to be in harmony with the Absolute."²

Yet the doctrines of Zen Buddhism were not the only contributions to Bushido. Confucian doctrines likewise played an important role in their insistence upon the worship of the family and the exaltation

¹ M. Ancsaki, *History of Japanese Religion*, London, 1930, pp. 210-212.

² Inazo Nitobé, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan*, New York, 1905, p. 11.

of the duty of filial piety. "The law of filial piety is that one should serve one's parents as one serves Heaven. . . . So long as one's parents are living, no enterprise must be undertaken without their counsel and approbation; . . . parents must be obeyed during their lifetime and after their death their son must do as they did." Thus the basis of society in China was the family, which Confucianism lauded. But Confucianism went further and pictured the State as a grand reproduction of the family, of which the Sovereign was the father and model to his people. And as man was naturally inclined to good, and needed only instruction and example to keep him in the right path, so he should follow the example of the Sovereign and fulfil his obligations to the Sovereign. In effect the moral teachings of Confucianism emphasized the order and security which would be obtained by the loyalty of the lower and the benevolence of the upper classes, and contributed to Bushido the five great moral relations which should exist between master and servant, governor and governed, father and son, and friend and friend.

Thus Zen Buddhism and Confucianism made a very great contribution to Bushido, and even Buddhism furnished a calm trust in fate and a submission to the inevitable. But it is wrong to assume that Bushido was a code of rules specially promulgated to regulate the activities of feudal life. It was of slow growth, for, just as in Europe a code of chivalry emerged in the Middle Ages, so in Japan the need for a code of honour and for an organized system of social relations gradually produced a set of ideals which were regarded as the standard by

which men should live. For with the increasing effeminacy and emotionalism of court life in the twelfth century there seemed to those who had avoided its snares to be a need for more virile doctrines. Bushido, with its incorporation of the most suitable principles of contemporary philosophies, filled that place, and set a standard up to which the Samurai desired to live.

Professor Asakawa has pointed out that the Japanese Samurai who practised Bushido were regarded as men largely in the abstract; the more they effaced their own personality and individuality in an attempt to live in accordance with the principles of Bushido the more highly were they regarded.¹ But it is wrong to exaggerate the impersonal side of Japanese character and to dismiss that side of it in which devotion and a sense of honour commanded respect and enthusiasm. That sense of devotion and honour seemed to prevent the Japanese from falling back upon an impersonal view of life, similar to that held by the Chinese, and promoted, on the contrary, an adherence to the path of self-sacrifice.

Bushido was, therefore, originally a code of ideals for a military caste, which in the eighteenth century became a system of practical ethics for a class who were no longer called upon to fight. It was kept alive by those men who reached predominant positions, by those men who, though no longer called upon to fight, grew up under a system of government which had military attributes. Such men negotiated the Restoration, and naturally

¹ K. Asakawa, "Some of the Contributions of Feudal Japan," *Journal of Race Development*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1912, p. 13.

carried their ideals with them into new Japan, and with the diffusion of their ideals amongst the people their standards became those to which all good citizens aspired. It does not seem unnatural, therefore, that the training of a soldier in modern Japan should include spiritual training in the tenets of Bushido.¹ Bushido had been the code by which the warrior of old regulated his life; it was natural that the good citizen and the soldier of new Japan should attempt to follow that example. To-day the Restoration is only seventy years old, and ideals do not vanish in so short a time. Modern Japan, looking back, sees in those ideals a peculiar sanctity which time has only served to increase. For, former generations, which are especially honoured in Japan, where ancestor worship survives, regulated their lives according to those ideals. There are grounds, therefore, for stating that Bushido has become an example for the whole nation to follow. "Bushido should be observed not only by the soldier, but by every citizen in the struggle for existence."²

It would seem, therefore, that Bushido has remained a strong force in Japanese life, in the orientation of Japanese thought and in the formation of Japanese character, and that, though itself a legacy of feudalism, it has tended to conserve those other contributions which the feudal era made to modern Japan; that, though once the code of a

¹ M. D. Kennedy, *The Military Side of Japanese Life*, London, 1924, pp. 54-55, 311. The important place accorded to spiritual training in the army is, of course, more significant in a country which recruits its army by conscription, as Japan does. It means, in fact, that the entire male population undergoes that training.

² K. Nukariya, *The Religion of the Samurai*, London, 1913, p. 51.

small select group, it has permeated the whole nation with its influence. Yet, though it has played an important role, there are other influences which have both perpetuated the memory of feudal Japan and contributed to the formation of the Japanese character and ideology. One of those forces, the Shinto Cult, must be considered further, since, for the purposes of this essay, it would appear to be of the utmost significance.

Shinto, Buddhism and Confucian doctrines had all had their vogues in Japan, but the latter, as interpreted by Chu Hi (1130-1200), became the official philosophy of the Tokugawa period.¹ It may seem strange that this philosophy, which had been neglected in the past, should have been resurrected to an official status,² but, like Zen Buddhism, it provided an element which Buddhism lacked; in its practical approach it had an appeal to the Japanese preference for practical ethics. Moreover, it was particularly attractive to the Tokugawa Government since by its insistence upon a proper relation between master and servant it engendered loyalty to the Government. It preached that man was innately disposed to right conduct though it was necessary for him to study the laws of the universe in order to comprehend virtue, whilst by induction from those laws he would discover that the relationships of natural phenomena had their

¹ The canon of the school was Chu Hi's commentary, *Shisho Shinchu*, and the philosophy became widely known in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through the zeal of Fujiwara Seigwa (1561-1619). See G. B. Sansom, *A Short Cultural History of Japan*, New York, 1931, p. 493.

² In 1633 the Government founded a school for the study of Confucius, later to become the University of Yedo.

counterpart in relationships between individuals. It, therefore, pointed to the loyalty which must exist between the Sovereign and the subject, between the parent and the child, and between the husband and wife. Its central tenet was loyalty, and its definition of evil, which had to be avoided at all costs, was disarrangement or confusion, which could be very easily interpreted, and was so interpreted, to mean the disturbance of, or antagonism to, the ancient order which was represented by the Tokugawa Government. Such ideas of loyalty and subjection were, therefore, most favourable to the existing order, but some new philosophical basis had to be found for the Restoration.

The menace to the Bakafu came towards the end of the eighteenth century when a new school of thought began to resurrect the Shinto religion.¹ Chief amongst the teachers of this school was Moto-ori, whose doctrines invoked the divine origin of the Japanese ruling house and the superiority of Japan over all other nations, since it had given birth to the Goddess of the Sun. She had endowed her grandson with three sacred treasures and proclaimed him and his descendants rulers of Japan for as long as the heaven and earth should endure. Thus Moto-ori and his followers promulgated a philosophy with which it was impossible to harmonize the power of the Tokugawas.

Primitive Shinto had been in existence prior to the introduction of Buddhism, but it had taken the form of a combination of naturalism and super-

¹ J. Murdoch, *History of Japan*, London, 1926, vol. 3, p. 476. Moto-ori edited the *Kojiki* which told of the Divine origin of the Japanese Imperial line.

naturalism which made it an unorganized worship of spirits, or Kami, which, though difficult to translate from the Japanese, would appear to mean something or someone "superior," "sacred" or "miraculous." In early times it seems to have been a polytheism of a crude and widely embracing type. Spirits were imparted, as in the primitive beliefs of other countries, to all natural objects; Kami resided in heaven, in the forests, the rocks, the rivers, in animals and in human beings such as princes and heroes. Yet to a great extent its position as the belief of an agricultural people led to the manifestation of Kami in the fruits of the field, in plants, in corn, in fact in all those natural phenomena which in any way affect the lives and habits of an agricultural people. Thus it was natural that the sun should be worshipped and that the Goddess of the Sun should be chosen as the ancestor of the ruling family.¹ From this unorganized worship of Kami it was a small step to stress the Divinity of the Emperor whose descent from the Sun Goddess was unbroken. The revival of Shinto, under the school of Moto-ori, became, therefore, a point of attack upon the Tokugawa usurpation of the Divine Emperor's position, and in its development of a twofold theory of sovereignty *juri divino* and of an unbroken imperial line, which by its connexion with the gods was more virtuous than all other families and superior to the rulers of other nations, it provided a Heaven-sent basis

¹ The *Kojiki* and the *Nihon-Shoki* (700-800) describe the events of the legendary past. J. Murdoch, *History of Japan*, vol. 3, pp. 477 seq. B. H. Chamberlain, *Kojiki* (trans. from the Japanese), *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, vol. 10, supplement 1882.

for the promotion of imperial rights and for a national claim to be superior to other nations.

The Shinto revival, therefore, played a most important part in encouraging those who brought about the Restoration, for the Confucian philosophy of the Tokugawa period, though it had recognized the worship of the memory of Chinese sages and the propriety of loyalty, had made no attempt to insist upon the Emperor's Divinity or right to dominant authority.¹

After the Restoration support for Shinto seemed assured, since it was to the interest of the State to look upon it with favour, just as the Tokugawa Government had supported a Confucian philosophy. But just as in the past there had been two streams of Shinto, nature worship and ancestor worship, so after the Restoration the distinction remained, and the State tended to emphasize the latter. Shinto was, therefore, divided into Sect Shinto and Official Shinto, and it is of the utmost importance to note the manner in which the State has transformed ancestor worship into a belief which approaches a national religion, but of which the religious aspects are denied and its role as a national philosophy upheld.

Immediately after the Restoration, Buddhism was denied State recognition, and an office for the Shinto religion (Jingisho) was set up above all other departments of the Government.² Buddhism, however, still made progress, so that the Department of Shinto was superseded by a Department of

¹ J. Murdoch, *History of Japan*, vol. 3, pp. 466-496.

² Department of Shinto (September 22, 1871), 1871, *Council of State*, pp. 316-398.

Religion which issued regulations for preaching, by which all religions were ordered to make plain the laws of Heaven and Humanity, in order to propagate principles of reverence and patriotism and to lead the people to respect the Emperor. That the Government was not satisfied with the organization of Shinto institutions was evidenced by legislation of 1882 which differentiated between Shinto Shrines and Churches.¹ This action appears to have been taken because it was thought that if Shinto remained purely a religion, the follower of another religion, by refusing to adhere to it, might therefore fail to honour the Emperor and his ancestors. The differentiation, however, made State Shinto a belief to which all could adhere, whatever their religious beliefs. Christianity alone seemed to conflict because it set up a God with the worship of whom it was impossible to accept the worship of a Divine Emperor. The Christian Churches held that it was ridiculous and unreasonable to lead the people into a worship of a Divine Emperor and a belief in shrines when ancestors might be revered without such ritual. In 1900, however, the religious association of the shrines was completely abolished, and matters relating to them were taken charge of by the Department of Home Affairs, within which a Bureau of Shrines and a separate Bureau of Religions were created.² Thus in effect the Government insisted that the shrines had no religious

¹ See B. H. Chamberlain, *The Invention of a New Religion*, London, 1912. Also W. G. Aston, *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*, London, 1905; D. C. Holtom, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto*, Chicago, 1922. Compare E. Satow, "The Revival of Pure Shinto," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, pt. i, 1874.

² *Home Affairs*, no. 163, April 26, 1900.

connexion; "In spite of what people may think, the Government does not look upon the shrines as being religious in nature, but they merely encourage respect."¹

Tanaka, a lecturer in Shinto and an authority upon that subject, has held that the creed of Shinto, in its national ethical interpretation, may be found in the Imperial Rescript on Education, which calls for a reverence for the Imperial Family, an ardent love of country, the worship of ancestors, and faith in the Grace of Heaven and the help of the Gods.² It is perhaps pertinent to quote from the Rescript, because it does throw light upon that creed. "This is the glory of the fundamental character of our Empire and herein lies the source of our Education. Ye, our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation: extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interest; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne Coeval with Heaven and Earth. So shall ye be not only our good and faithful subjects but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

"The way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by our Imperial Ancestors to be

¹ *Japanese Education* (Bureau of Shrines), 1916, pp. 154-155.

² D. C. Holtom, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto*, pp. 78-79.

observed alike by their descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, our subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue."¹

The day after the Imperial Rescript was issued the Minister of Education sent out instructions concerning the use of the Rescript. "Those who are engaged in education, always obedient to the Imperial Will, must not neglect the duties of culture and discipline, and especially on the days of school ceremonies . . . the pupils must be assembled and the Imperial Rescript on Education must be read before them. Furthermore, the meaning must be carefully explained to the pupils, and they must be instructed to obey it at all times."²

Shinto, Tanaka said, in fact expresses the true spirit of the Japanese people. "The heart of Shinto is Yamato Damashii which, as the national spirit, is the particular endowment of the Japanese people. Ancestors have shown the way and, therefore, the basis and the norm, for the activities of the Japanese people have their origin in the deeds of the sacred ancestors. That is Shinto."³ The deduction may, therefore, be made that military activities, since they have their origin in the deeds of the sacred ancestors, are cloaked with a measure of sanctity. Moreover, worship at the shrines would appear to

¹ October 30, 1890. The text will be found in any textbook on ethics published by the Department of Education. English trans. in D. Kituchi, *Japanese Education*, London, 1909, pp. 1-3.

² "Instructions of the Department of Education," *Section General Regulations*, p. 1, October 30, 1890.

³ See D. C. Holtom, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto*, Chicago, 1922, p. 80.

increase the glorification of war. Of the twenty Imperial Shrines seven are connected with Hachiman, the God of War, the Mars of Japan, whilst all of the eleven deified princes have won military glory, and are worshipped because they personify the idea of devotion and loyalty. In 1871 shrines of special grade for those who had performed special services, particularly military services, were set up.¹ The inclusion of Hideyoshi and Ieyasu can only have been in honour of their devotion to military service, for their loyalty to the Emperor was conspicuous by its absence. There seem grounds, therefore, for saying that the cult of the shrines has tended to magnify the ideal of military service, whilst the fields of art, philosophy and literature have been overlooked.

Shinto, therefore, whether it be a State philosophy or a religion, and the Government's attitude towards it would suggest that it was the former, has held a dominant place in the minds of the Japanese people. It has been identified with Japanese development, and with a reverence for the past and for the Emperor, the Imperial Household and the Imperial Rescripts. It has identified the success of Japan with the Divinity of the Emperor and with the worship of the ancestors. As Ito said, "The Emperor is Heaven descended, he is Divine and Sacred. He is pre-eminent above all his subjects."² Shinto has taught that those subjects owe their success to Divine Will and to the worship of the ancestors. There is a similarity between it and the

¹ See D. C. Holtom, *The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto*, Chicago, 1922, pp. 268-282.

² *Commentaries on the Constitution*, Tokyo, 1889, p. 6.

theory of Divine Right, which once flourished in the West, but Shinto in its introduction of ancestor worship covers a wider field. How wide that field is and how great an influence State Shinto has gained may be gauged from the respect and worship which is accorded to the memory of the ancestors. Thus Admiral Togo after the defeat of the Russian fleet hastened immediately to give thanks to the ancestors who had enabled him to win his victory. Thus too the whole nation besought the ancestors for a Son of Heaven, and during the celebrations in memory of the Battle of Mukden the Emperor himself worshipped at a Shinto shrine. "To-day Emperor Hirohito worships at the Yasukuni Shrine of the National Temple, which enshrines the spirits of all warriors who died on the field of battle."¹ Thus too before the visit of the Emperor of Manchukuo to Tokyo, the city policemen made a pilgrimage to a Shinto shrine to ask help in the performance of their duty of protecting His Imperial Highness.²

In the preceding pages the revival of Shinto under the school of Moto-ori and its growth into a national philosophy have been traced. Just as its revival was a major influence upon the Restoration, so since that time it has been an equally important influence in preserving the *status quo*, in lauding the Emperor, in surrounding him with a cloak of Divinity which calls for the utmost respect and loyalty, in glorifying the ancestors, and in insisting upon the superiority of the Japanese race over all others. That it has deeply affected Japanese ideology is evidenced by the respect which is paid to the

¹ New York Times, March 11, 1935.

² Ibid., April 1935.

shrines to-day. Thus Shinto has fostered the impression that the destiny of Japan is watched over by Divine Powers which will lead her along the paths of success and against which other nations, which are governed by mere mortals, must fight in vain. To the Occidental such an ideology appears incredible, but he forms his opinion without taking account of those factors which have influenced that ideology. The Occidental, if he asks Divine aid, prays, not to a British, a German or an American god, but to a universal God, whilst the Japanese, if he asks aid for his country, prays to a Divinity which watches over the interests of Japan.¹

The legacy of feudalism and the influence of Bushido and Shinto in their formation of an attitude of loyalty and respect and in their insistence upon the Divine origin of the Japanese race would seem to offer opportunities for the machinations of a chauvinistic group which desired to persuade the Japanese people to its own way of thinking. National ideology, inculcating as it does feelings of respect and loyalty, would appear to make the Japanese people easily led, but before the appeal of a militaristic or chauvinistic group can be fully established it is necessary to inquire further into other factors which might weigh the balances in favour of that group. In other countries the memory of the past, the activities of the past, have played a most important part in shaping the trends of the present and the future, and the behaviour of another country has often influenced political growth and the orientation of policy. Both these factors would

¹ The suggested return to the worship of Teuton gods in Germany makes an interesting comparison.

seem worthy of consideration in a discussion of the behaviour trends of Japan. It seems pertinent, therefore, to inquire into the traditional attitude of Japan towards foreign expansion and military adventure and to attempt to discern what Western ideas, if any, may have influenced Japan's attitude towards military adventure.

The early history of the relations between Japan and the mainland of Asia is legendary, but it has been commonly accepted that a Queen of Japan once exacted tribute from Korea.¹ The exploits of Hideyoshi in Korea, in the sixteenth century, have, however, been accorded an important place in Japanese history. In days when no European commanders had had more than 60,000 men in the field at one time Hideyoshi had transported 250,000 men across the sea, an expeditionary force unequalled until the Boer War, and had attempted to carve out an empire on the mainland of Asia. His desire seems to have been not only to annex Korea, but to incorporate China in a vast Japanese Empire. In asking Nobunaga's permission to embark upon the expedition he is reported to have said: "When Kyushu is conquered, if you will grant me the revenue of that island, I will prepare ships and supplies and go over and take Korea. Korea I shall ask you to bestow on me as a reward for my services. and to enable me to make further conquests. For with Korean troops aided by your illustrious influence I intend to bring the whole of China under my sway. When that is effected the three countries,

¹ Empress Jingo, third century A.D. See J. Murdoch, *History of Japan*, vol. 1, pp. 43 and 62. See also the translations of the *Kojiki* and the *Nichongi*.

China, Korea and Japan, will be one."¹ Though Hideyoshi died before his dreams materialized, and no one followed in his footsteps, his ideas were not forgotten and he himself became one of the great heroes of Japan.

The policy of the Tokugawa Government, however, by excluding foreigners from Japan and prohibiting Japanese from going abroad made a conception of imperialist expansion difficult, until the eighteenth-century school of Moto-ori arose to champion the Divinity of the Emperor and deplore the Shogun's usurpation of power. As it has been pointed out, that school stressed the superiority of the Emperor over all earthly rulers, for it held that in foreign countries, where there were no Divine rulers, any mortal who was able seized power. When, therefore, such ideas were current as that the Emperor was the Son of Heaven, and in that capacity should rule the world, it was natural that patriots should be found to champion the position of the Emperor, to fight for the restoration of power to the rightful holder and to call for expansion abroad of the divinely led Japanese people. The nineteenth century witnessed the activities of such patriots, chief amongst them Yoshida Shoin, whose teaching had a great influence upon those who were instrumental in preparing and effecting the Restoration.² Yoshida insisted upon the exaltation of the State in order to make known beyond the seas the glory of Japan and the

¹ Quoted by J. Murdoch, *History of Japan*, vol. 2, p. 305.

² See "A Short Biography of Yoshida Shoin" in R. L. Stevenson, *Familiar Studies of Men and Books*, New York, 1896, pp. 174-190.

great national consciousness of the Japanese people.¹ He realized, however, that Japan could only achieve supremacy if the official cordon could be broken down to allow information concerning the activities of other nations to be obtained, and that two hundred years of isolation could only be made good by the adoption of the discoveries which other nations had made. Yet Yoshida was firm in his contention that Japan, once she had learned the lessons which foreign countries could teach her, should embark upon a policy of expansion by "the opening of the Hokkaido, the taking of Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands; that the Koreans should be compelled to pay tribute to our country as in former times, that part of Manchuria should be taken as well as Formosa and the Loo-choo Islands, and that we should gradually show an aggressive tendency. . . . Japan in order to maintain her independence must have Korea, part of Manchuria, and should have territories in South America and India. The country must get stronger, and the first important thing is to take some territory in the nearest countries."²

Every nation has had its patriots who have played roles of varying degrees of importance in their country's history. Yoshida is remembered in Japan because he urged the restoration of power to the Son of Heaven and advocated the expansion of Japan. His teaching was widely accepted. In

¹ H. E. Coleman, "Life of Yoshida Shoin," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, September 1917. Other patriots were Fujita Toko and Sakuma Shozan. See J. Morris, *Makers of Japan*, London, 1906, pp. 97-118.

² Yoshida Shoin, *Ryukin Roku* (Record of a Baffled Spirit), 1854. Quoted in H. E. Coleman, "Life of Yoshida Shoin," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, September, 1917, p. 161.

1873 when the advocates of domestic reconstruction vanquished the advocates of immediate expansion, it was the teaching of Yoshida which for the moment was thrust into the background.¹ Yet his influence remained. Saigo, the leader of the reactionary movement of 1877, had been his pupil and an admirer of his teaching, and through him Yoshida's ideas were passed on to Toyama who was later to found the Black Dragon Society² which has carried forward the legacy of Yoshida. Prior to 1894 the society advocated the abrogation of the treaties which had been forced upon Japan, and the seizure of Korea and Manchuria. In 1894 and 1904 it was a warm supporter of Japan's foreign wars. In 1914 it put forward a programme of aggressive action, many parts of which were later embodied in the twenty-one demands of 1915.³ Nor has the membership of the Society been one of irresponsible persons, for disciples in political circles have not been lacking. It is significant that Hirota, the present Foreign Minister, was helped through school by the society and that he was instructed in his youth by Toyama.⁴

¹ In 1873 the advocates of expansion were overruled by the advocates of internal reconstruction, under the leadership of Kido and Okubo, by whose victory Japan was launched upon twenty years of peaceful internal reconstruction and consolidation.

² The River of the Black Dragon is the Japanese name for the River Amur in Manchuria.

³ B. L. Putnam Weale, *The Fight for the Republic in China*, New York, 1917, pp. 125-139.

⁴ Toyama's activities are by no means confined to the Black Dragon Society. His latest activity has been the formation of a league in the Diet to oppose Dr. Minobe's theory that the Emperor is an organ of the State. "Last night forty members of the Diet, on the invitation of the notorious patriot, Mitsuru Toyama, formed the Organ Theory Destruction League" (*New York Times*, March 11, 1935).

History, therefore, might be interpreted to provide evidence that in past ages Japan had not only played an important part upon the mainland of Asia, but that she had even exacted tribute from Korea. Hideyoshi could be revered not because he had established internal peace and harmony, but because he had embarked upon a policy of expansion abroad. His exploits and the legendary overlordship over Korea were stressed by patriots who preached the Divinity of the Emperor and advocated the territorial expansion of Japan. The Divinity of the Emperor and the mission of Japan were linked together so that the Restoration was portrayed not only as the return of the Emperor to his rightful position, but as an accession of the Japanese people to a position compatible with Divine leadership. There is no doubt that such an interpretation of Japan's foreign adventures and of her Divine mission could be made to form a background for the appeal of a group which was intent upon launching Japan upon military adventure. It has therefore seemed pertinent to consider that interpretation. Yet, despite it, it is impossible to point to a traditional Japanese policy towards the mainland, although there are undoubtedly certain historical incidents which might be twisted to support the contentions of a chauvinistic group.

So far, in searching in the ideology of the Japanese people for a background against which there might be a chauvinistic appeal, the discussion has been confined to purely Japanese considerations. Yet some mention must be made of the ideas culled from the example of Western nations, which may have increased the sensibility of the Japanese

people to a chauvinistic appeal. When Commander Perry's black ships appeared off the coast of Japan in 1853, European nations had been enjoying, since the Napoleonic Wars, a period of comparative peace. There had been civil wars and small wars for colonial expansion, but for thirty-five years there had been no great European war. Yet the peace which had existed had been an armed peace; there had been no sign that European nations had put away warlike things; peace was maintained by threat of war. In the Far East concessions had already been won from China by the displays of force of Great Britain, France and the United States. In the years following Perry's visit to Japan examples of the influence which a well-organized military nation might exert were frequent. Great Britain maintained her predominance in India by the use of force; Prussia defeated the Austro-Hungarian Empire by superior military organization; France was vanquished by the war machine of the German Empire, Russia was checked in the Crimea by the forces of Great Britain and France. To the Japanese nation, therefore, when it first viewed the activities of the great European nations, it seemed that the battleship, the cannon and the soldier were the most useful and the most used weapons. The ships that came from America to Japan were warships, the ships that came from the south were warships, the ships that came from Russia were warships. Japan itself felt the bargaining power of the shell when Shimoneki was bombarded by British, French and United States warships in retaliation for the over-enthusiastic hostility of the Choshu Daimio, and

later when Kasigathma was bombarded by British warships.¹

Japan had led an isolated existence, but the few contacts she had had with other nations had made an impression upon the life and outlook of the people, and had caused her to imitate that which she considered most important. Thus contact with China had left a legacy of Buddhism, Confucian philosophy, Chinese literature and of respect for military strategy. Contact with the Western world and with the United States led to further imitation, but that which perhaps most deeply impressed her was the militarism of the great nations. To her it seemed that all great nations were militaristic, or conversely that militarism made nations great. Militarism seemed to mean power and the ability to dominate weaker and less militaristic nations. China had been defeated because she had no organized military force, India had become part of the British Empire because she could not present a united military front to the forces of Great Britain. Japanese who went to European countries to study their organization, men who later led the Japanese people through the Restoration and who became leaders in political and military circles, were deeply impressed with the predominance of the military spirit which existed abroad. They stressed the necessity of making Japan strong enough to resist the designs of European nations and to prevent her from becoming another India, China

¹ The Shimoneseki bombardment was in retaliation for the bombardment of foreign ships by Choshu batteries; that at Kasigathma for the murder of a British official by Satsuma retainers.

or Africa.¹ Their contentions gained added force from the military activities of the Great Powers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. With such men, who had seen the predominance of militarism abroad, in the saddle, it seems only natural that Japan should have imitated Western nations, and that from those men the idea that a nation to be strong must be a military power should have infiltrated into the whole nation.

Moreover, that imitation of foreign nations had brought Japan overwhelming success in her wars with China and Russia; when the militarism of the Western world reached a breaking point in 1914, the way seemed open for Japan to work her will in the Far East, just as other nations had done in the past in different corners of the globe. Then suddenly after the Great War, Western nations, reversing their position, declared that they had sinned exceedingly, that for centuries they had followed the wrong path, and that thenceforth war must be outlawed. To Japan their behaviour must have seemed extraordinary, for they were proposing to renounce the weapon which had made them strong, which had enabled them to become Great Powers. At one stroke the truth of the lesson which Japan had learned was denounced by its former exponents. It was all the more bewildering because Japan had put that lesson to good account in her wars with Russia and China and in the Great War. It was a lesson difficult to unlearn. It may have been felt

¹ Most of the men who attained important positions, Saigo, Yamagata, Ito, Kido and Okubo amongst them, in their travels realized the importance of military strength. See J. Morris, *Makers of Modern Japan*, *passim*.

that though Western nations had outgrown that lesson modern Japan was still young enough to appreciate it.

It would seem, therefore, that the apparent adherence of Western nations to militarism in the nineteenth century and in the first decade of the twentieth was not without effect upon Japan when she looked about her to discover the means by which those nations had achieved success. The example of India, China and Africa showed her the fate which might be hers unless she imitated the methods of Western nations. She was like a younger brother who, because he has had less experience of life, looks up to his elder brother, who to all intents and purposes has been successful, sees the reasons for that success and adopts them. Modern Japan, with the example of Western nations before her, set out to become strong, and her ambition, which had permeated the nation, was achieved. Military strength not only preserved her from the fate of India, but within fifty years placed her on a footing of equality with her elder brothers, the Western Powers. It would seem strange if that success had not established an implicit faith in the methods by which it was achieved. Her past experience of the success attainable by military strength must, therefore, be an important part of the background against which the appeal of a militaristic or chauvinistic group may be made.

In the preceding pages an attempt has been made not to analyse the whole ideology of the Japanese people, for space does not permit a complete analysis, but to consider those parts of the ideology

which might form a background for the appeal of a chauvinistic group. It has been seen that feudalism, which only came to an end with the Restoration, made certain contributions to modern Japan. It had set up a society which, although peace was maintained, was military in character, and in which there was an implicit faith in and respect for the leadership of a small select class which had been schooled in a military tradition. Stress was laid upon Bushido and Shinto, because the former is still a live force in Japan to-day to engender an attitude of respect and loyalty, whilst the latter, in its national ethical interpretation, which supports the Divinity of the Emperor and the superiority of the divinely led Japanese nation, has a very real influence upon the thought of the Japanese people. Furthermore, the attitude of Japan towards the mainland of Asia was shortly discussed to discover whether any traditional policy might be appealed to for the furtherance of Japanese expansion. Yet, though two hundred years of isolation make it impossible to declare that there is such a policy, it was seen that there are past exploits upon the mainland which may be appealed to, and which have been so appealed to by nineteenth-century advocates of Japanese expansion. Finally, it was seen that the attitude of Western nations towards militarism at the time Japan began to modernize herself, and the success which they had achieved by forceful measures, and which she later achieved by similar measures, were not without effect upon Japan.

It seems, therefore, that in the ideology and past experience of the Japanese people, there is a

background to which a group intent upon leading the country along a chauvinistic path might appeal. But, as it has been pointed out, it is necessary to search deeper to discover why a group which plays upon this background is able to obtain political power; to discover why democratic institutions have never gained strength enough to combat the influence of such a group. It seems pertinent, therefore, to examine the political growth of the country and the obstacles to democratic control of the machinery of State which allow a group which has chauvinistic tendencies to appeal to that background.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DEFECTS OF JAPANESE DEMOCRACY

IN any country in the world a group which sets out to make its influence predominant will only be successful if it is able to appeal to something inherent in a nation's character. The preceding chapter attempted to set forth the historical and ethical background against which militarism might have an appeal. But mere background is of no effect if a group which fosters militarist intentions is unable to obtain political power. For without that power such a group is forced to work through other groups which may have no militarist intentions. Its task then becomes doubly difficult. A discussion of the political structure of Japan, therefore, seems pertinent in order to show, in the first place, how democratic control of the machinery of State has been impeded by the Constitution, so that it is possible for persons or groups other than those elected to the Diet by the suffrage of the country to play a significant part in the formulation and direction of national policy, and, in the second place, that, though liberal forces have indeed striven to attain political power, their methods have militated against their chances of success, and have discredited them in the eyes of the public.

In the opinion of the Japanese it was natural that Western nations should have constitutions which bridled the powers of their rulers, since those rulers

obtained their power not by virtue of Divine origin, but by their ability to raise themselves above their fellows. It was altogether a different matter to attempt to bridle the power of the Japanese Emperor who was a Divinity, a Son of Heaven. Limitation upon his power appeared an impossibility, for he had received that power from the Sun Goddess who had given to him absolute control over the property and lives of his subjects.¹ His subjects, therefore, had no authority nor power to limit his prerogative or to demand a Constitution, which could only be obtained as a result of his own benevolent and gracious will. Nitobé said of the Constitution that it is, therefore, "an ordinance, in the sense that it is not a contract between the ruler and the ruled; it is unilateral in its origin, in that it is devised without the assent or consent of the governed."² In the words of Count Ito, "the Emperor has been pleased to issue decrees proclaiming the grand policy of instituting a Constitutional form of government, which it is hoped will give precision to the rights and duties of subjects and gradually promote their well-being, by securing unity to the sovereign powers of the Head of the State, by opening a wider field of activity for serving the Emperor and by prescribing, with the assistance of the Ministers of State, the whole mode of the working of the machinery of the State in a due and

¹ For the belief in the Divinity of the Emperor, see H. Ito, *Commentaries on the Japanese Constitution*, Tokyo, 1889, p. 6; B. H. Chamberlain, "Translation of the *Kojiki*," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Tokyo, vol. 10, supplement, 1882; W. M. McGovern, *Modern Japan*, London, 1920, pp. 122-141; S. Uyesugi, "Emperor Worship in Japan," *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, June 26, 1913.

² *Japan*, London, 1931, p. 185.

proper manner."¹ A new school of jurists, of which Professor Minobe is the leader, has, however, rejected the theory of the identity of the Emperor and the State, and conceives of him as "the highest organ of the State," of the State as a legal personality, and of sovereignty as vested in the State although exercised by the Emperor.² Yet the latter opinion was unrecognized by the men who framed the Constitution, which in their eyes could only take the form of a gracious gift, since human beings had no power to impose any check upon a Divinity. In a monarchical or republican form of government, in which popular sovereignty is acknowledged, the Constitution emanates from the people, who delegate part of their sovereign power to the monarch or Chief Executive. In Japan, however, the Constitution could only be a system of self-limitation imposed by the Emperor upon himself. He retained, therefore, all those powers which were not expressly limited, and he alone had the right to initiate and sanction the amendment of that Constitution.³ In the Japanese Constitution, therefore, the sovereignty of the people remained unrecognized, as it had to if the conception of the Divine origin of the Emperor was to continue. It was far from the minds of those who framed it that the Constitution should be more than a benevolent gesture by which the Emperor might bind his people more closely to himself.⁴

¹ *Commentaries on the Constitution*, Tokyo, 1889, p. 1.

² *New York Times*, March 1, 21, 1935. Professor Minobe has recently been forced to resign his seat in the Upper House, and his books on the Constitution have been banned.

³ Article 73 of the Constitution.

⁴ Compare R. Fujisawa, *The Recent Aims and Political Development of Japan*, New Haven, 1923, pp. 54-56.

Count Ito, therefore, turned to the Prussian Constitution for his model because he considered that the principles embodied in it coincided more closely with those which he believed should underlie the Constitution of Japan. And, where the Prussian Constitution was not absolute enough, he tended to follow the example of those of certain smaller German States, the government of which was still in the course of evolution from absolutism to a more democratic type. "With the exception of the Constitutions of some of the German monarchical States, at the time of its promulgation the Japanese Constitution was, perhaps, the most autocratic in the world. In view, however, of the strong monarchical tradition that had come down from time immemorial, firmly rooted in the hearts of the people, and the lack, in Japanese history, of the contractual and democratic factors out of which representative government evolved in England and Europe, the Japanese Constitution must have been regarded by the Japanese as democratic in character."¹

From the standpoint of a Western conception of democracy there were vast gaps in the Constitution, which liberal-minded groups were not slow to realize. In spite of that realization, however, the Constitution has remained without amendment, so that the liberal forces of to-day are faced with difficulties similar to those which faced their predecessors immediately after 1889. Count Ito indeed

¹ Tomio Nakano, *The Ordinance Power of the Japanese Emperor*, Baltimore, 1923, p. 252. For the sources of the Constitution, see *ibid.*, pp. 236-254. For the Constitution, see W. W. McLaren, "Japanese Government Documents," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Tokyo, 1914, vol. 42, pt. 2, pp. 484-495.

spoke the truth when he said that the Emperor by the promulgation of the Constitution merely wished to avail himself of the assistance of the Ministers of State and the advice of the Diet. For the purposes of this essay it is, however, only possible to indicate those articles which have hindered the democratic control of the machinery of State and have allowed forces outside the Diet to retain a very great influence upon the formulation and direction of national policy. And even those articles must be dealt with in a summary manner.

The Constitution did indeed establish a Diet consisting of a House of Peers and a House of Representatives.¹ Yet the democratic control which it might be thought that article would establish was minimized by subsequent articles which gave equal powers to a House of Peers.² The latter House was far from democratic, composed as it was of members of the Imperial Family, the nobility, persons nominated thereto by the Emperor, and representatives of the highest taxpayers.³ Thus, since a bill which has once been rejected by one House may not be brought in again during the same session, the equal voting rights of the two Houses is bound to favour the conservative character of the Upper House.⁴ The Upper House is, therefore, endowed with a practical veto power over all measures, liberal, radical or conservative, passed by the Lower House.

¹ Article 33. Chapter 3 of the Constitution is devoted to the Diet. See H. Ito, *Commentaries*, pp. 62-83.

² In 1892 the controversy over the claim of the Peers for equal powers over the budget was settled by an Imperial ordinance which definitely established equality of the two Houses.

³ Article 34.

⁴ Article 38.

More serious obstacles to democratic control were apparent in the position of the Cabinet which, though not mentioned by name in the Constitution, was referred to in Article 55, which provided that the respective Ministers of State should give their advice to the Emperor and should be responsible for it. The article did not state to whom the ministers are responsible, but Ito's *Commentaries* make it clear that ministerial responsibility to the Diet was never considered by those who framed the Constitution. "Ministers," Ito wrote, "are directly responsible to the Emperor and indirectly so to the people."¹ He appears to have added the qualification of "indirectly to the people" because in his opinion the Emperor, though he reserves the right to appoint ministers at his pleasure, takes into consideration the susceptibilities of the people at the time of the appointment.²

A third very serious rebuff to democratic control has appeared in those articles which concern the control of the national budget.³ Article 67 declared "that those already fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that pertain to the legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet

¹ H. Ito, *Commentaries*, p. 73.

² There has been much controversy over the question of ministerial responsibility. T. Miyaoka, R. Fujisawa and E. W. Clement claim that it was purposely left a political sphinx. All writers, however, agree that in practice the Cabinet has recognized responsibility to the Emperor.

³ Articles 66-69.

without the concurrence of the Government." The first category of these expenditures covers those which are based upon the sovereign powers of the Emperor, as set forth in Chapter One of the Constitution, and includes ordinary expenditures required for the organization of the different branches of the administration, the Army and the Navy, the salaries of all civil officials and military officers, and expenditures which may be required in consequence of treaties concluded with foreign countries. The Diet, however, has the power to oppose any increase over and above those appropriations once agreed upon. The second and third categories mentioned in the article include expenditures such as the expenses of the Diet, the interest on the National Debt, and civil expenses such as those for railways, temples and school subsidy. However, in the event that the Diet fails to vote the budget it is provided that the Government shall carry out the budget of the preceding year.¹ Count Ito in his *Commentaries* points to occasions in foreign countries on which budgets have been rejected, and declares that "such a state of affairs is only possible in countries where democratic principles are taken as the basis of political institutions; it is incompatible with a policy like ours."² This restricted budgetary control and the responsibility of the Cabinet to the Emperor sadly reverses the

¹ Article 71. Compare the action of Bismarck in 1862-1863, in which year he carried out the budget of 1861-1862, after appropriations had been refused. His action probably influenced Article 71 of the Japanese Constitution.

² H. Ito, *Commentaries*, p. 135.

Anglo-Saxon conception of democratic control of the machinery of State in which Cabinet responsibility and budgetary control are outstanding features.¹

There are other obstacles to democratic control apparent in the Constitution, and not the least is the ordinance power of the Emperor which covers the supreme command of the Army and Navy, and the declaration of a state of siege, and vests in the Emperor the power to issue not only all ordinances which are necessary for the execution of the laws and emergency and police regulations, but also all those which are necessary for the promotion of public welfare.² The Emperor is further vested with the power to fix the administrative organization, the standing size and organization of the Army and Navy, and the salaries of civil and military officials.³ It is evident, therefore, that the Constitution has seriously obstructed the fight for democratic control, chiefly for the reason that those who framed the Constitution never envisaged democratic control. Ito's *Commentaries* clarify his attitude, which was probably most efficiently summed up in his commentary on Article 71 which has been cited above.

¹ For a discussion of the Diet's budgetary control, see H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, New York, 1932, pp. 188-193; K. Colegrove, "Powers and Functions of the Diet, pt. 3," *American Political Science Review*, Feb. 1934.

² Articles 9, 11, 14.

³ Article 10. For the powers and position of the Emperor, see K. Colegrove, "The Japanese Emperor," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 26, pp. 642-659; T. Nakano, *The Ordinance Power of the Japanese Emperor*, passim, Baltimore, 1923.

Other obstacles to democratic control have resulted indirectly from the Constitution. Certain institutions, which have continued to exist, have militated against control of the national policy by the representatives of the people. One of these institutions, the Privy Council, the continuance of which was recognized by the Constitution, has drawn to itself certain powers which would otherwise have belonged to the Cabinet. Article 56 of the Constitution declared that "Privy Councillors shall, in accordance with the provisions for the organization of the Privy Council, deliberate upon important matters of State, when they have been consulted by the Emperor." Ito was convinced of the necessity for such a Council; "in performing their Heaven-sent mission, sovereigns must first take advice before they arrive at a decision. Hence the establishment of the Privy Council is just as necessary as that of the Cabinet, to serve as the highest body of the Emperor's Constitutional advisers."¹ The duties of that Council had been outlined in a pre-Constitution ordinance which was amended in 1890 to make the Council an advisory body for the Emperor in matters which concerned the provisions of the Imperial House Law, the Constitution, proclamations and ordinances issued by the Emperor under certain articles of the Constitution, international treaties and other matters submitted to its deliberation. The scope of Privy Council activity may, therefore, be directed over a great part of the field of legislation and treaty making. Moreover, since Privy Councillors are mentioned

¹ See H. Ito, *Commentaries*, p. 98.

in the Constitution, and changes in that Constitution are only made with the advice of the Council itself, it seems that it has been endowed with the power of self-perpetuation.

It is only natural to compare the Japanese with the English Privy Council, yet such a comparison reveals many discrepancies. In England the Cabinet has grown out of the Privy Council, the influence and powers of which have been transferred to the former, whereas the Japanese Council has no particular relationship to the Cabinet, except that Cabinet Ministers are ex-officio members of the Council. And since the supremacy of the Cabinet over the Privy Council has never been established Cabinet members may easily be outvoted in the Council by non-Cabinet members, and the decision be accepted by the Emperor.¹

Practically, as well as theoretically, the influence of the Privy Council has been very great, and the age and experience of the councillors, in a land in which age is revered, has gained for them added strength. Moreover, until 1919, in which year the political parties began to gain strength, there had been little strife between the Cabinet and the Privy Council. Certain Cabinets have, indeed, deemed it convenient to hide behind the Council and use it to revise or promulgate measures by Imperial ordinance, or to withdraw measures of which they disapproved. Thus the Tanaka Ministry one month

¹ K. Colegrove, "The Japanese Privy Council," *American Political Science Review*, August 1931, p. 593; pt. 2, p. 881 (Colegrove declares that the comparison should be made with the Councils of the Stuarts and Louis XIV). See also H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, New York, 1932, pp. 90-95; G. E. Uyebara, *The Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909*, London, 1910, pp. 146-149.

after the adjournment of the Diet did not hesitate to use the Council in order to add the death penalty, for thinking "dangerous thoughts," to the Peace Preservation Law.¹ The influence of the Council has, however, been of even greater importance when those at its head have been hand in glove with the Premier, or deeply opposed to innovations. And as there has been a tendency for Privy Councillors to be on the whole conservatively minded statesmen, the Council has been a reactionary influence. Yamagata's position as president was a guarantee that liberal or democratic ideas would meet with scant approval, whilst reactionary and militarist policies would be well supported. The sphere of the Council's influence has in fact accorded ill with the growth of democratic control, for the Council has possessed the power to make or break a ministry. Thus its refusal to approve the emergency Imperial Ordinance of the Wakatsuki Ministry for the relief of the Bank of Taiwan led to the subsequent resignation of that ministry and the appointment of the more positivist ministry of Baron Tanaka.²

The Privy Council is a constitutional institution, but another body, to which no reference was made in the Constitution, has played perhaps an even more important part in influencing the course of Japanese government.³ In a Western democratic

¹ H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, New York, 1932, p. 187.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

³ U. Iwasaki, *The Working Forces in Japanese Politics, 1867-1920*, New York, 1921, pp. 31-40; W. E. Griffis, "The Elder Statesmen in Japan," *North American Review*, vol. 192, pp. 215-227; H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, New York, 1932, pp. 95-97.

State a body such as the Genro, endowed with power similar to that of the Genro, would appear completely out of place, but in Japan the powers and position of the Genro have been bolstered by a reverence for their age and their experience. Moreover, the influence of that body, until 1922, at least, in which year Marshal Yamagata died, had been opposed to the growth of democratic control, since the Genro, with the exception of Prince Saionji, were clansmen who desired to perpetuate the clan government and clan influence. For the last ten years Saionji, the sole survivor, has favoured the growth of democratic ideas which he had championed in his youth.¹ His action lately has indeed assisted the democratic cause, for since 1931 he has set his face steadfastly against Fascist tendencies, and in his fight to prevent the abolition of the present system he has passed over such men as Hiranuma and Araki in favour of Admiral Saito and Admiral Okada, who were pledged to a national rather than a Fascist government. Though the Genro's action may have been moderately successful in the crises of the last few years, there has been considerable conjecture as to what procedure will be followed when Saionji dies. As yet no precedent has been set, although before the Saito Ministry was appointed Saionji conferred with Privy Councilors and the Ministers of the Army and Navy, and subsequently, when the Saito Ministry resigned, Saito himself suggested Admiral Okada as his successor.² Yet there can never be true democratic

¹ Y. Takekoshi, *Prince Saionji*, Kyoto, 1933.

² Tsunego Baba, "Problems of the Okada Cabinet," *Contemporary Japan*, September 1934, vol. 3, p. 212.

control so long as an outgoing Premier is succeeded by another who is not the leader of the parliamentary opposition, but is merely the appointee of an extra-constitutional body.

It is obvious, therefore, that the Genro has played a most important role, but one totally incompatible with true democratic control of the machinery of State. With the death of Saionji the influence of the Genro will pass away, but there is a possibility that its powers will pass to other bodies. The Privy Council, for instance, may assume the duty of advising the Emperor upon the choice of the Premier. This essay, however, is not concerned with the future, but with the past and present trends of Japanese government. And the activities of the Genro have clearly demonstrated that its influence has been very real not only in the choice of Premiers, but in shaping the whole trend of Japanese government. That influence has not by any means been always evil; the unsettled period when the country was being modernized called for a body of experienced advisers. The Genro has, indeed, done much to smooth the working of the Constitution and to tide over periods of crisis, but, on the other hand, its position as the supreme advisory body, although outside the limits of the Constitution, has served to perpetuate a system in which men or groups other than those elected by the voters of the country have been able to play a leading role in the formulation and direction of national policy.

The preceding summary of the Japanese Constitution, and of the organization of certain groups which play an important role in the conduct of

Japanese government, has been made not in order to analyse the articles of the Constitution or the functions of those groups, but to show that there is a very great opportunity for persons, other than those elected by the suffrage of the country, to formulate and direct national policy. There can in fact be no denial that the Constitution was framed without any idea of instituting democratic control, which was the antithesis of the Emperor's power. The Constitution, therefore, stipulated none of those democratic powers which have played so important a part in democratic control in Great Britain. The checks and balances of the American Constitution were absent. In effect, as Count Ito says in his *Commentaries*, the Constitution was a benevolent gift from the Emperor to enable his subjects to serve him the better by the assistance of Ministers of State and the advice of the people in the Diet.

It is no wonder, therefore, that for wellnigh thirty years after the promulgation of the Constitution the Diet and the political parties remained in subjection. The form of the Constitution allowed great scope for those who had been in control before its promulgation, and the low political intelligence of the people, who had never been accustomed to a share in their own governance, allowed the oligarchs to stay in control. From 1890 until 1918, therefore, with the exception of the Itagaki-Okuma Ministry of 1898, Cabinets headed by bureaucrats held sway, and even the Itagaki-Okuma Ministry relied upon the dissension between the civil and military faction of the oligarchs. When the military faction under Marshal Yamagata won supremacy,

the party ministry was quickly removed from office. In a later chapter the effects of oligarchical control will be discussed, but at the moment it is only necessary to point out that the particularly undemocratic character of the Constitution did allow the continued oligarchic control of the Cabinets and influence over the appointment of ministers.

Yet attempts were made to undermine the control of the oligarchs and to establish democratic control of the machinery of State. Political parties, which advocated democratic control, had been founded before the promulgation of the Constitution. In 1881 Itagaki had founded the Jiyuto (Liberal Party), which called for universal suffrage and a one chamber parliament, whilst, in 1882, Okuma had founded the Kaishinto (Reform Party), which favoured a parliamentary system akin to the English type, a limited suffrage, administrative reform and the rejection of a policy of imperialism.¹ The early political parties, however, suffered from severe laws which regulated public meetings and required the organization of all parties to be made public. These laws reached their zenith in 1887, in which year most of the leading party men were banished from Tokyo.

The history of the political parties falls into four periods. Between 1890 and 1898 parties were attempting to establish themselves, whilst the government was carried on by clansmen who were

¹ For the history of the growth of political parties, see H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, New York, 1932, pp. 201-251; U. Iwasaki, *The Working Forces in Japanese Politics*, New York, 1921, pp. 71-118; G. E. Uyehara, *The Political Development of Japan*, London, 1910, pp. 215-261.

predominantly Choshu or Satsuma. After 1898 there ensued a period of compromise between the oligarchs and parties, during which the strength of the latter increased gradually as a result of their participation in the ministries as compensation for their support of the oligarchs.¹ From 1918 to 1931 the power of the parties increased to the extent that except for a short period from 1922 until 1924 Cabinets became party Cabinets. However, since 1931 there has been a return to a system of compromise between parties and non-party groups, which has caused a considerable loss of that political power which the parties had gained during the preceding decade.

After 1900 the two most important parties which faced each other in the Diet were the Seiyukai, founded by Count Ito, and the Shimpoto. The former, however, reaped the plums of office, since as the largest group in the Diet it was of most use to the clan ministers, whilst the Shimpoto, which was never large enough to attract the advances of the Government, led a chequered career until it was merged, in 1915, in the newly formed Ken-seikai.² Yet the period up to 1918 proved very little as to the power of the parties, for the Cabinet posts which their leaders secured were for the most part of minor importance and gave them no control over the direction of national policy. Prince Katsura, though he depended upon the Seiyukai for support in the Diet, never filled his Cabinet

¹ H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, p. 207; E. W. Clement and E. Ueyehara, *Fifty Sessions of the Japanese Diet*, T.S.A.J., series 2, vol. 2, p. 20.

² "Constitutional party" of which Viscount Kato was president, and which supported the Okuma Ministry.

with party men; Prince Saionji promoted a very small number, and even Okuma, who was a party man himself, failed to inaugurate an all-party ministry. In 1918, however, with the appointment of Hara there was a definite move toward a party Cabinet; in his ministry the Cabinet posts, with the exception of those of Foreign Affairs, War and the Navy, were given to members of the Seiyukai. Yet not even this move established the principle of party government, for between 1922 and 1924 there was a return to non-party Cabinets, one with Seiyukai support, one without party support and one with moderate support from the Kenseikai. In 1924, however, party Cabinets were again recognized by the Genro's recommendation of Viscount Kato, president of the Kenseikai. Kato at first formed a coalition, since the Kenseikai was too weak, allotting three Cabinet posts to his own party, two to the Seiyukai and one each to the Kakushin Club and to the peers; Foreign Affairs, War and the Navy were still regarded as non-party posts. In 1927 the Kenseikai Ministry was succeeded by the Seiyukai under General Tanaka, which in turn gave way in 1929 to the Minseito, formed, in 1927, by a fusion of the Kenseikai and a majority of the Seiyuhonto, which retained its position until December 1931.¹ A Seiyukai ministry under Inukai followed, lasted for five months and then gave way to the national Governments of Admiral Saito

¹ London *Times*, January 16, 1932, p. 9. The fall of the Wakatsuki Ministry (Wakatsuki had taken Hamaguchi's place after his attempted assassination) was brought about by the defection of Mr. Adachi, the Home Minister. As the Minseito still retained a majority the proper democratic action should have been for Wakatsuki to form another ministry based upon that majority.

and Admiral Okada. Thus in 1932 the situation was similar to that which had existed before 1918. Non-party men headed the ministries, whilst party support was sought by the allotment of less important Cabinet posts to party men.

This short summary of the growth of the political parties, though it has not attempted to mention every party, the various coalitions and changes of name, has pointed to their evolution from a backward and suppressed state before the promulgation of the Constitution, to the compromise between the oligarchs and the parties, and to their position in the second decade of this century when Cabinet Ministers were appointed because they belonged to the party in power. Yet, though party strength had grown, it may seem strange that so little enthusiasm for them had been aroused. However, there appear to be reasons for this lack of faith. The history of the political parties reveals numerous changes of party names, many coalitions, constant movement of members from one party to another and incessant dissensions within parties which have led to the formation of new parties. Thus, in January 1926, after the death of Viscount Kato and the succession of Wakatsuki, a small group of twenty-one members of the Seiyuhonto, which held the controlling votes over the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai, seceded from their party and joined the Seiyukai; a year later the rest of the Seiyuhonto affiliated itself with the Kenseikai to form the Minseito. Another example of the waywardness of politicians appeared in the action of Mr. Adachi, Home Minister in the Wakatsuki Ministry of 1931, who refused to attend Cabinet meetings or resign, thereby forcing the whole

ministry to resign. Subsequently Adachi carried nine members out of the Minseito and founded the Kokumin Domei. These two examples, and there are others, show clearly that party leaders can never be sure of members of their own parties, and may at any moment find themselves deprived of their majority. This wanderlust of politicians has not only weakened the parties which they desert, but has affected the strength of the whole party structure in face of the organized front of the oligarchs and the military. Thus party growth has failed to bring with it a sense of solidarity, but has aroused a feeling of uncertainty which has lowered the worth of the political parties in the public estimation.

Moreover, the parties have, probably to a greater extent than in any other country, become the slaves of business interests to which they have been bound not only by financial support but by marriage ties.¹ It is significant that party Cabinets date from the period of the Great War, at which time the great business concerns had reached a very strong position. This affiliation was very apparent during Hara's administration, and increased during the following decade, although prior to the Hara Ministry Prince Katsura and the Okuma Ministry had had such affiliations. Viscount Kato's Cabinet of 1925 was popularly termed "The Mitsubishi Government," because Kato himself and Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, had both married into

¹ T. Tachibana, "The Influence of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi in Japanese Political and Economic Life," *China Weekly Review*, April 14 and 21, 1934; H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, p. 219; U. Iwasaki, "The Working Forces in Japanese Politics, 1867-1920," *Columbia Political Science Review*, vol. 97, pp. 98-107.

the Iwasaki family which controlled the Mitsubishi firm, and Mr. Hamaguchi, the Finance Minister, hailed from the native province of the Iwasaki.¹ In the 1931 Minseito Cabinet of Wakatsuki the Finance Minister, Inouye Junnosuki, was the son-in-law of Baron Iwasaki.² This affiliation with the financial and commercial interests has led to a distrust of the parties which has affected their popularity and support amongst the voters of the country, and has aroused the impression that political parties do not represent the true interests of the electorate, but merely carry out the wishes of a financial and commercial oligarchy.³

A further criticism has been levelled at the political parties for their lack of definite programmes. Party platforms have been vague to the point of vacuity, although in the past years the Minseito has appeared more liberal in its attitude toward manhood suffrage, the London Treaty and reform of the House of Peers. In the last fifteen years the Seiyukai has succeeded the Minseito or the Ken-seikai, or the Minseito the Seiyukai, without any very definite change of programme, just as in the heyday of clan government Satsuma succeeded Choshu, or Choshu Satsuma. In 1930 the platforms of the two major parties were very similar, although

¹ H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, note, p. 223.

² See M. Young, *Japan under Taisho Tenno*, chapter 27.

³ There has been considerable controversy over the fall of the Wakatsuki Ministry in December 1931, when it still had a large majority in the Diet. The Seiyukai Ministry on its accession to power immediately reimposed the gold embargo by Imperial Ordinance, thus allowing certain financial concerns to make profits upon their holdings of foreign exchange. See the *London Times*, January 16, 1932.

the Minseito, which was the party in power, championed financial retrenchment against the Seiyukai claim that the economy involved was excessive. In 1927 the Minseito programme was equally vague, including as it did demands for a more accurate reflection of public opinion in Parliament, racial equality, the Open Door and the reorganization of out-of-date institutions. In 1924 the Jitsugyo Doshikai (Business Men's Association), which called for manhood suffrage, the increase of legislation by the Diet and a decrease in naval and military expenditure, was described as the only party in Japan which could be said to have a programme.¹

It is obvious, therefore, that the parties have never filled their proper place, if they wish to win popular support for opposition to oligarchic control. Nor have the more recently founded proletarian parties remedied this deficiency.² True, the parties have encountered great obstacles in the form of the Constitution, but on the other hand their corruption, their affiliations with financial and commercial interests, their lack of loyalty within their own ranks and the absence of definite party programmes have led the people to hold them in evil odour. In times of crisis, therefore, there has been a tendency to consider that they are too weak and vacillating to conduct the affairs of State to the national advantage. In the 1931-1932 crisis they therefore lost many of the advantages which it

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, February 21, 1924.

² H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, pp. 236-246; K. Colegrove, "Labour Parties in Japan," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 23, pp. 329-363.

had taken them a decade to obtain.¹ In the face of aggression from non-parliamentary groups it might be thought that parties might make a common cause against such outside influences. Yet, although in the last year a *rapprochement* between the Minseito and the Seiyukai has been attempted, amicable relations have not been effected. The task of extra-parliamentary groups which desire to influence national policy is, therefore, made the easier by this conflict which prohibits a united front of parliamentary forces.

In an attempt to discern the absence of democratic control of the machinery of State, as it has been conceived of in certain European countries, the Constitution and the political parties have been considered with a view to realizing the gaps in the former and the defects of the latter. But before passing from this consideration of the political structure of Japan it seems pertinent, since this essay is primarily concerned with the conduct of foreign affairs, to inquire more deeply into the exact relationship of the Diet to the conduct of foreign relations. For once the limits of that relationship are established it is possible to realize the sphere which remains open for the activities of extra-parliamentary groups.

The Constitution is brief in its treatment of foreign relations, merely declaring that "the Emperor declares war, makes peace and concludes treaties."² Ito in his *Commentaries* says of this article that "in the diplomatic usage of the present day, it is a recognized principle in every country that a

¹ Dr. Minobe, "Bureaucracy and Party Government," *Japan Chronicle*, August 27, 1931.

² Article 13.

Minister of State should be made the channel of communication of matters relating to diplomatic relations and to treaties with Foreign Powers, except in the case of the Sovereign's personal letters of congratulation or condolence. The principal object of the present article is to state that the Emperor shall dispose of all matters relating to foreign intercourse, with the advice of His Ministers, but allowing no interference by the Diet therein."¹ Although the Cabinet, advised by the Privy Council, has taken responsibility for foreign affairs, there is, however, no implication that the Diet has played a Constitutional part in the conduct of those affairs. The Foreign Minister, who has invariably been a non-party man, does indeed deliver a speech to both Houses, in which he outlines the country's foreign relations, and upon which he may be interpellated, but interpellation is a weak weapon.² Nor has the Diet any Constitutional control over treaties, for, as Colegrove has pointed out, the Constitution is in regard to control over foreign policy even less democratic than the German Constitution at the time of Bismarck.³

The old school of jurists is unanimous in its support for an unlimited interpretation of the Emperor's power to make treaties without interference on the part of the Diet. Even Professor Minobe has expressed the opinion that the treaty-making power belongs to the Emperor uncondition-

¹ H. Ito, *Commentaries*, pp. 27-28.

² In the forty-sixth session, 1922-1923, diplomatic issues formed the topic of greatest interest in both Houses.

³ K. Colegrove, "Treaty-making Power in Japan," *American Journal of International Law*, 1931, vol. 25, p. 271.

ally.¹ But the new school of jurists rejects the theory of the identity of the Emperor and the State, and conceives of him as an organ of the State, the State as a legal personality and sovereignty as vested in the State although exercised by the Emperor. It holds, therefore, that the Emperor should be advised not by the Genro, the Privy Council and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy, but by a Cabinet responsible to the Diet. The opinion of the old school, however, has carried more weight because its influence is predominant in the Privy Council, the War Council and the House of Peers. And it was from the old school that criticism of the Kellogg Pact arose, because it was concluded by the High Contracting parties "in the names of their respective peoples."

In Article 56 of the Constitution, which stipulates that "the Privy Council shall, in accordance with the provisions for the organization of the Council, deliberate upon important matters of State when they shall have been consulted by the Emperor," there is no direct indication that treaties will be submitted to its scrutiny. In practice, however, since 1888 all treaties have been submitted to the Council, with the result that certain conservative statesmen, who have no responsibility to the Diet or the people, have been able to reverse the policy of the ministry by advising the Emperor against a treaty. This system, however, met with a

¹ See K. Colegrove, "Treaty-making Power in Japan," *American Journal of International Law*, 1931, vol. 25, p. 273. In view of Professor Minobe's latest declarations concerning the Emperor as "the organ of the State," it would appear that he is still whole-heartedly in favour of this interpretation so long as the Emperor is advised by the Cabinet. See *New York Times*, March 1, 1935.

rebuff at the time of the London Naval Treaty. Colegrove points out that even before 1930 the Japanese Diet had progressed toward a more actual influence upon foreign policy.¹ But in 1930 Premier Hamaguchi over the heads of the General Staff accepted the terms of the Reed-Matsudaira compromise, which reduced the Japanese claim for a ratio of 70 per cent of the American and British naval needs, for Hamaguchi was in the fortunate position that in the absence of the Minister of the Navy at the Conference he was temporarily acting for him. Immediately it was reported that the compromise had been accepted Admiral Kato, Chief of Staff, made a direct appeal to the Emperor on the grounds that since by Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution the Supreme Command had been accorded the duty of determining the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy, its preserve had been trespassed upon by the civil authorities and the Constitution had been violated. It appeared that the contentions of the Naval Staff might be supported by the Privy Council, certain members of which were well inclined towards the military, and that ratification of the Treaty would be refused.² Its ultimate ratification appeared to give grounds for holding that the Cabinet had at last established a right to conduct the foreign policy of the country.³ The ramifications of the London Treaty will be considered in a later chapter, but its ratification is of significance because

¹ K. Colegrove, "Treaty-making Power in Japan," *American Journal of International Law*, 1931, vol. 25, p. 294.

² *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, April 10 and 17, 1930.

³ The reasons for its ratification seem to have lain in the support which it was accorded by the Genro and the Imperial Household.

it marked the success of the Diet's claim to participate in the direction of foreign policy.

Yet that share in control had far to go. In 1929 it had been held that the Diet had no right to investigate correspondence regarding the Kellogg Pact. "As it belongs to the Imperial Prerogative to conclude a Treaty, it is the custom not to disclose the details of a Treaty before ratification has been effected. On the other hand, in view of the fact that under Article 54 of the Constitution the ministers can speak at any time in the Diet, it is highly desirable that there should be a close relationship between the Government and the legislature in such matters. The Government can make its negotiations public, if it so desires, but the President of the House cannot press for publication against the will of the Government."¹ The success of 1930 came after a long period of pressure to obtain such control, but it was a precarious success, in which there was an element of good fortune. It would have been impossible for Hamaguchi to act as he did, if the Minister of the Navy had not been absent from the country, without a Cabinet crisis. 1930 was, therefore, a landmark, but there were grounds for thinking either that the success attained might be only temporary, or that the political parties and the Diet would have to strive hard to consolidate their gains.

It has been the aim of this chapter to indicate those parts of the Japanese political structure, the gaps in the Constitution, the character of the political parties, their deficiencies and delinquencies, and the influential groups, such as the Genro and

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, April 4, 1929.

the Privy Council, which have obstructed the growth of democratic control of the machinery of State. For that lack of democratic control allows national policy to be influenced by certain groups which wish to guide it along the path they favour. Such groups are able to bring their influence to bear in countries where democratic control exists, but how much more in a country in which it has never been established. The Japanese Constitution never envisaged such democratic control, for it was framed with the specific object of establishing the supremacy of the Emperor. It was, therefore, modelled by Count Ito upon the German Constitution which without doubt represented the most outstanding example in Europe of an undemocratic Constitution. In such circumstances it was natural that the growth of the political parties should be slow, but other factors beside the undemocratic character of the Constitution have prolonged their infancy. It has been shown that the parties have never established themselves as the trusted representatives of the nation, that they have aroused no confidence and have failed to win a full measure of popular support. In times of crisis, therefore, the support of the people may waver, may be attracted to other groups which appear more worthy of that trust. This defect of the political parties opens the path to power to any group which, though it may, or may not, have the benefit of the people at heart, is able to create that impression, and win support for its policy. In Japan, therefore, it seems that opposition to the activities of any group from the representative body of the people which, under a democratic Constitution, should fight against the

influence of an extra-parliamentary group, is destined to be ineffective. For the purposes of this essay such a deficiency of democratic control is of the utmost significance because it shows clearly how chronically weak any opposition from democratic institutions must be, how vast a field is open for the activities of other groups, and, most important of all for the purposes of this essay, what a great opportunity there is for a militarist group, if it so wishes, to work its will.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POSITION OF THE MILITARY

It has been evident that the Constitution, though it recognized a certain measure of democratic advice, has interfered with democratic control of the machinery of State and with the growth of political parties, although the latter have caused injury to themselves by their own delinquencies, so that the field of Japanese government offers opportunities for the machinations of extra-parliamentary groups which are desirous of directing the national policy into channels which they favour. Yet in the preceding chapter no attempt was made to consider the peculiar position in the political structure which the military occupy. It seems pertinent, therefore, to inquire into that position, and to discuss the organization and ideology of the military, in order to ascertain whether they are in a position to take advantage of the deficiencies of democratic government, and, if they are, whether they make use of their opportunity.

In the United States, Great Britain, France and other democratic countries it has been customary to regard the Army and the Navy as the servants of the Civil Government by which they are controlled through the responsibility of the Ministers of War and the Navy and through parliamentary control of appropriations. In Japan the situation is dissimilar, since certain articles of the Constitution and certain Imperial Ordinances have allocated to the Services a peculiarly independent position.

Articles 11 and 12 gave to the Emperor the supreme command and the power to determine the organization and peace standing of the forces. This in itself was not unusual; monarchs in other countries possessed such powers. Yet there seems to have been an earnest desire on the part of those who framed the Constitution to remove control over the military far beyond the reach of the Diet. In his *Commentaries* Count Ito declares, in connexion with the Emperor's power to fix the organization of the forces, that "it is true that this power is to be exercised with the advice of responsible Ministers of State, still, like the Imperial Command, it nevertheless belongs to the Sovereign Power of the Emperor, and no interference in it by the Diet should be allowed."¹ It would be far too strong a statement to say that all hope of civil control over the military was surrendered by those two articles, but taken in conjunction with Article 67, which denied the Diet the right to reduce certain expenditures when once fixed, amongst which were the ordinary expenditures for the Army and Navy, they effectively checked any pretensions the civil authorities might have toward domination of the military. In his *Commentaries* Ito wrote: "Already fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor include all those expenditures which are based upon the Sovereign Powers of the Emperor, as set forth in Chapter One of the Constitution, to wit: ordinary expenditures required by the organization of the different branches of the Administration, and by that of the Army and Navy. . . ."²

¹ H. Ito, *Commentaries*, p. 26.

² Ibid., p. 128.

The customary democratic checks upon the military are, therefore, absent, for the Diet has no power to question or direct the organization of the military forces, it has no power to withhold appropriations save in the event of increased expenditure. The final check of the responsibility of the ministers is likewise absent, since the responsibility of Cabinet ministers to the Diet has never been established, and, even if it had been, the peculiar character of the War and Navy Ministers would nullify it. From the time of the earliest Cabinets both ministers have been officers on active service, although it was not until 1894, at the time of the Sino-Japanese War, that this practice was embodied in an ordinance at the instigation of Yamagata.¹ This ordinance, which stipulated that the Cabinet posts of War and the Navy should not be held by any but officers on active service of at least the rank of Lieutenant-General or Vice-Admiral, was modified in 1912 to allow officers of that rank on the retired list to hold those positions.² In fact, however, this has never occurred, so that there has been a natural liaison between the ministers and the General Staffs. Fundamentally this ordinance has meant that no Cabinet can retain control unless the Army and

¹ It is possible that Marshal Yamagata, who was the leader of the military faction, father of the modern Japanese Army and a confirmed foe of democracy, may have envisaged the approach of party government, which did in fact come to pass in 1898 under Itagaki and Okuma, and that he deemed it wise to secure the absolute independence of the Service Ministers.

On the other hand, his action may have been caused by fear of the civilian clansmen, such as Ito, who were much opposed to the military faction, and would have welcomed some control over it.

² Imperial Ordinance No. 165, 1912 (Army). Imperial Ordinance No. 168, 1912 (Navy).

Navy are so propitiated that they will furnish officers for the Cabinet posts. The Service Ministers have therefore become pawns with which the Army and Navy may bargain for the fulfilment of their demands, for if, after a Service Minister resigns, other officers are ordered not to serve, the Ministry must collapse.¹

This power of the Service Ministers would appear to give the whip-hand to the Army and Navy, but their power is further bolstered by their ability, and that of the Chiefs of the General Staffs, to report directly to the Emperor: "With the exception of military or naval matters of grave importance which, having been reported directly to the Sovereign by the Chief of Staff, may have been submitted by His Majesty for the consideration of the Cabinet, the Ministers of State for War and the Navy shall report to the Minister President."² Controversy has indeed raged over the exact powers of the ministers. Nakano has held that the Ministers of War and the Navy are the machines or representatives of the General Staffs, and that the supreme military command is exercised not through the Ministers of War and the Navy but through the Chiefs of Staff.³ H. S. Quigley, on the other

¹ In 1914 Prince Saionji's Ministry was forced to resign because General Uehara refused to serve after his demand that two divisions be sent to Korea was shelved. No other officer would take his place. It was rumoured that when Okada succeeded Saito, in 1934, General Hayashi made his service conditional upon the abolition of the Overseas Ministry. A compromise was arrived at by Okada himself taking that post.

² Notification 135 of 1889, para. 7. See H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government*, p. 88.

³ T. Nakano, *The Ordinance Power of the Japanese Emperor*, Baltimore, 1923, pp. 154-156.

hand, considers that Nakano errs in narrowing the exercise of this function, since ministers and Chiefs of Staff may report directly to the Emperor concerning matters within the limits of the Supreme Command.¹

Professor Minobe has attempted to reconcile the positions of the Cabinet and the Supreme Command by declaring that the military agencies advise the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief, whilst the Cabinet advises him as Emperor. That in consequence the Emperor as Emperor, being superior to the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief, may take the advice of the Cabinet instead of that of the General Staffs.² The distinction, however, seems vague and unsatisfactory. It seems impossible to ignore the power of the military agencies to go over the head of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and report directly to the Emperor. Whatever the position of the two ministers may be, whether their powers are constitutional or not, whether military decrees should be countersigned or not seem to be matters more for the constitutional lawyer than for discussion in this essay.³ On the other hand, the practical deduction may be made that the military authorities have a large sphere in which to operate unhampered by the civil authorities, who may only interfere when there is a demand for increased expenditure, opposition to which may be countered by the threatened withdrawal of the Service Ministers

¹ H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Politics and Government*, p. 88.

² Professor Minobe, *Cabinet and Camp*, translated from the Asahi, *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, May 15, 1930.

³ T. Nakano, *The Ordinance Power of the Japanese Emperor*, Baltimore, 1923, pp. 157-165.

from the Cabinet, which is then doomed to resignation.¹ Thus, though the declaration of war and the making of peace are placed under the control of the Emperor with the advice of the Cabinet, the military authorities may force war or peace by sending an aggressive expedition or by withdrawing troops, for they alone are competent to advise the Emperor in such a matter; it is their preserve.

Article 12 of the Constitution indirectly recognized the position of the General Staffs in its acknowledgment of the Emperor's power to fix the organization of the forces. In his commentary upon that article, Ito declares that "a General Staff office has been established for His Imperial Majesty's personal and general direction of the Army and the Navy."² Yet the influence of the General Staffs has been considerably strengthened by the existence of two advisory bodies which have been set up by ordinance. The "Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals," which is convened by the Emperor to give counsel upon important issues, is attended by a small number of generals and admirals who have seen active service. This body, augmented by a number of specially chosen naval and military officers, may also meet, at the

¹ An Imperial order has in the past been used to make a Service Minister take his post, by Katsura for instance in 1912, but the use of such an order has always brought unpopularity upon the user. The civil authorities have also been able to exert pressure upon the Services when one of the Service Ministers is absent from the country, for in that case the Constitution allows a civilian to hold the office temporarily. Hara was acting Navy Minister during the Washington Conference, and Hamaguchi held that post during the London Conference. It may be significant that Admiral Osumi, the present Navy Minister, did not leave Japan during the latest naval conversations in London.

² *Commentaries*, p. 25.

Emperor's pleasure, as the "Supreme Military Council."¹ Both these advisory bodies are of course outside the control of the Cabinet, although the Ministers of War and the Navy become members automatically. In the past this lack of Cabinet control, or at least, participation, was of less consequence, since there was a natural liaison, with certain exceptions, between the oligarchic Cabinets and the military advisory bodies. In 1898, for instance, the year in which the Supreme Military Council was formed, Marshal Yamagata was both Prime Minister and a member of that Council. Subsequently he became Chief of the General Staff and politically one of the Genro. After 1918, however, with the rise to power of Prime Ministers who were party men, antagonism between the Cabinet and the military advisory bodies was bound to grow, since the absence of a civilian in those advisory bodies prevented civilian advice on military matters from reaching the ears of the Emperor, whilst the independent position of the Service Ministers blocked the customary democratic approach. There would, therefore, seem to be ample opportunity for the military to bring their influence to bear, for, as it has been pointed out, advice in military matters can only come from Army and Navy officers over whom the Cabinet has no control. The Board of Marshals, the Supreme War Council, the General Staffs, the War and Navy Ministers all have the ear of the Emperor, and are likely to present the military point of view,

¹ Formed in 1898 at the instigation of Marshal Yamagata. Admiral Kato, who was overruled in connexion with the Naval Conference in 1930, and General Araki are both members of this Council.

whereas the Cabinet has no right under the Constitution to interfere with the organization of the Army and Navy, and is forced to confine itself to opposition to increased expenditure for the Services. Yet the danger of such opposition is that the antagonism of the Services will be carried to a point at which the Service Ministers resign and, thereby, cause the collapse of the Ministry.

From the foregoing summary of the independent position of the military agencies it is evident that the Services do hold an immensely strong position under the Constitution, and that the position has gained added strength from subsequent Imperial Ordinances. A great opportunity is, therefore, offered to them for influencing the direction of national policy, if they so wish, by bargaining with the civil authorities or by facing them with a *fait accompli*. Later chapters will attempt to discuss the occasions on which they have taken advantage of those opportunities, but before passing to such a discussion it seems necessary to ascertain more clearly the factors which spur the military to play so important a role in the political field, and to analyse the reasons for their support by certain sections of the people.

The opening of Japan to Foreign Powers found the country still organized as a feudal State and defended by a feudally organized army. Every clan had its fighting forces which, when combined, formed the only force which could be called the Japanese Army. Even after the Restoration the Japanese Expeditionary Force which was sent to Taiwan was a feudal force of Samurai rather than a national army. Men who went abroad to study

the institutions and organization of Western countries realized, however, the importance of a national army compared with a feudal force. Their contentions were conclusively upheld a few years later by the defeat of the rebel feudal force under Saigo by the newly organized national army. Thenceforth the necessity for a national force was recognized except by ultra-conservatives who clung to the idea that the Samurai alone were fitted to be warriors. Subsequently, however, under French and, after the Franco-Prussian War, German military instructors the Japanese Army assumed a shape similar to that of European forces.¹

Far more important, however, for the purposes of this essay, than the organization of the Army are the traditions, the breeding and the ideology of the men who rule it. From the beginning Choshu and Satsuma clansmen rose to dominant positions in the Services, until Choshu became predominant in the Army, and Satsuma in the Navy. Members of other clans were by no means excluded, but their appointment to high posts was dependent upon the goodwill of Choshu and Satsuma clansmen. The officers of both Services, who had been drawn from the Samurai class, had therefore been schooled in the ethical training of their class, and made the Army and the Navy an honourable profession revered by the people for its courage, its discipline and its successes. The clan connexions of the Services naturally made them hostile to the spread

¹ See M. D. Kennedy, *Some Aspects of Japan and Her Defence Forces*, London, 1928; *The Military Side of Japanese Life*, London, 1924. For the present organization of the Japanese Army, *Japan-Manchukuo Year Book*, 1935, pp. 116-135; *Japan Year Book*, 1934, pp. 216-249.

of democratic government, which they deemed to be aimed at the existing clan predominance to the detriment of the prestige and safety of Japan, and drew them closer to the oligarchs. Officers of the Army and Navy, who were amongst the best educated of the country and had clan connexions with the oligarchs, even won places for themselves in the governing institutions of the country and thereby carved out a place for military influence in the midst of the Civil Government.¹ Marshal Yamagata, the organizer of the Army, became Premier and the most influential of the Genro; Prince Katsura, who had played an important part in military administration and during the Chinese War, became Premier three times, and, similarly, many other generals and admirals have risen to pre-eminent positions in the Civil Government. It is only necessary to glance at the list of Premiers since 1900 to realize the part they have played. In the first decade Prince Katsura, in the second Katsura again, Admiral Yamamoto and General Terauchi, in the third Admirals Kato and Yamamoto and General Tanaka, and in the fourth decade Admirals Saito and Okada headed the Government.

Before the World War, therefore, officers of the Army and the Navy were drawn almost exclusively from the Samurai class, and represented an autocratic type with high ideals. That class also produced members of the oligarchy, so that there was a close connexion between military and oligarchy. However, the years following the World War saw great

¹ A. M. Pooley, *Japan at the Cross Roads*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1918, pp. 92-94. See above for the family connexions of Marshal Yamagata.

changes which affected not only the structure and technical organization of the Army and Navy, but the composition of the officer class and the General Staff.¹ This was more noticeable in the Army. Choshu and Satsuma clansmen were by no means completely eliminated from the positions which they had previously monopolized, but their influence was on the wane. Officers were no longer drawn from the Samurai class alone. Many rose from the mercantile and small landowner class, for, by a law of 1927, anyone who was able to maintain himself for a year of military service might gain officer rank. As it has been mentioned, these changes affected both the upper and lower officer ranks. Generals of the Choshu clan, and those who owed their position to Choshu support, began to give way to those from lesser known clans, who had risen to the top in spite of Choshu influence. This change is clearly demonstrated by the evolution of a new type of military leader. General Ugaki, who was probably the most outstanding officer of the decade following the war, although he was not a Choshu clansman, had connexions which bound him to the old Army leaders. New forces in the Army, which had risen with its reorganization, were, however, calling for fresh developments which Ugaki, representing the old order, was loath to permit. By 1930 these new forces were bitterly opposed to parliamentary government, which they regarded as incompetent and corrupt, and, after its victory over the naval authorities in the London Naval Conference controversy, detrimental to the

¹ The Army underwent a technical reorganization between 1922 and 1925.

national prestige and safety. This trend is apparent in Ugaki's supercession by General Minami, who, however, though he retained a connexion with the old Army group and at the same time earned the approval of the Young Officer group for his action in Manchuria, was not ready to go far enough to satisfy the latter's political demands. In 1931 Minami in turn gave way to General Araki, whose ideas were in conformity with those of the Young Officer group; he stressed the necessity for Army control of the Government in view of the incompetence and mismanagement of political parties.

By 1932, therefore, the group in power in the Army was radically different from that in power before the World War or even in the years immediately following it. The old group had had many connexions with the bureaucracy and with financial interests, whereas the new group, which has few ties with financial and commercial interests and represents a class of small landowners and traders, challenges the capitalist structure. Such a challenge might well be nurtured by those sections of the people from which the new Army group is drawn, for they have suffered from the action of the large capitalist concerns which have forced smaller enterprises out of business and monopolized the profits of industry and trade, and from the agricultural depression which has directly affected the landowning class through the inability of tenants to pay their rent.¹ On the other hand, the Army has

¹ *Problems of the Pacific, 1933*, "The Control of Industry in Japan," Chicago, 1934, p. 255. For the agricultural depression, see Shigeichi Mayeda, "Our Stricken Agriculture," *Contemporary Japan*, September 1932, p. 271; O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan*, New York, 1934, p. 150.

always opposed Communist ideas, and has advocated State supervision of capital rather than its total abolition.¹ This attitude of the Army has been especially interesting, because it is difficult to discern the depth of its sincerity. It is possible to say that the Army, in which, as it has been shown, there is a large group drawn from those sections of the people which have suffered most from economic disasters, really believes that State socialism would remedy the present-day evils.² On the other hand, it is equally possible to declare that the Army may have adopted that attitude to win support for itself. Whilst, in the third place, it has been suggested that the demand for State socialism is a propaganda measure which is the outcome of collusion between the military and the capitalist concerns.³ Yet it does not seem probable that collusion would have called for the outspoken criticism of capitalism which has appeared in the Army pamphlets and in the speeches of Army leaders. For from the time of his accession to office General Araki developed an extensive campaign against capitalism; he stressed the decline of the spirit of Japan, which he attributed to the frivolity and evil behaviour of certain classes; "capitalists are concerned only with their own interests and pay no attention to public life; politicians often forget the general situation in the country while absorbed in their party interests; clerks and students forget their duty, giving them-

¹ T. A. Bisson, "The Rise of Fascism in Japan," *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 26, 1932, p. 202.

² See pamphlet issued by the War Office on October 2, 1935. *New York Times*, October 2, 1935.

³ For this point of view, see O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan*, New York, 1935, *passim*.

selves over to merriment and pleasures."¹ He exhorted the people to return to the old spirit of Japan, which in his opinion the Army had always exemplified, in order to remedy this state of mind. The Army, he therefore concluded, was the only group fitted to lead the people out of the crisis which confronted them. For they alone had conserved the true Japanese spirit and had never involved themselves with the large capitalist concerns as the politicians had done. The politicians had been vacillating; their policy in China had led to nothing but insults to the Japanese people. Before 1931, he pointed out, the results of Japanese policy had been negative, whereas after the interference of the Army in Manchuria they had been positive.

In the two preceding chapters an attempt was made to portray the background against which a group eager for power and for influence over the people might appeal. It was seen that obstacles in the Constitution and the corruption and incompetence of the political parties had led to a lack of power in the Diet, of which such a group might take advantage. The independence of the military forces from control of the Diet has revealed that they are in a most favourable position to work their will if they so wish, and in addition that they have a strong background of ideology to which they may appeal. Moreover, the military have always been regarded with reverence by the people, so that if they do desire to work their will there is every probability that they will gain popular support.

¹ Sadao Araki, "Problems facing Japan in the Era of Showa," translation in the appendix of Tanin and Yohan's *Militarism and Fascism in Japan*.

For, more than any other group, the military have fostered the spirit of Japan by their allegiance to duty and to discipline; they have remained without open affiliations with financial and commercial interests and free from corruption.¹ Moreover, the activities of the military have been blessed with success. With the exception of the Siberian expedition, they can point to victories in the wars with China, Russia and Germany, and in the Manchurian adventure. After the opening of Japan in the last century it was felt that her national existence depended upon the possession of a modern Army and Navy without which there seemed a probability that so weak and youthful a nation might sink to the lowly and subservient position of other Eastern countries, such as India, the Philippines or China. That this did not occur, that Japan gained the abolition of the unfavourable treaties which had been forced upon her when she was too weak and unversed in Western methods to resist, and that she has conquered foreign territory, Formosa, Korea, Kwantung and Manchuria, has been credited to the successes of the military forces and has increased the reverence with which they are regarded. The opinion has been fostered that Japan's position in the world as a Great Power is dependent, and has been dependent, upon her military prestige.

¹ There have been exceptions. Admiral Yamamoto's Ministry of 1913 was wrecked by scandal caused by the corruption of naval officers in connexion with naval building contracts. In 1922 also there occurred the Siemen case as a result of which two admirals and a captain were imprisoned for bribery in connexion with the naval building programme. The secret sale of arms collected at Vladivostok during the Siberian expedition to Chinese generals by a Japanese major provides another exception.

These are the more general reasons that the military may count upon for popular support. But in the last few years with the rise of the new movement in the Army, which has been noted above, there are more particular reasons. It has been mentioned that the Army, lately, has stressed its anti-capitalist intentions; in so doing it has insisted upon aid to the peasantry whose claims, it declares, have been ignored in the capitalist scramble for profits. In 1932 the Agrarian crisis, which was increased by the fall in the price of silk and by the crop failure of that year, called forth the protestations of the military in favour of immediate Government aid. General Araki made it his duty to insist upon the alleviation which the political parties seemed loath to give.¹ He demanded Government purchases of rice and silk, credits on real estate and a curtailment upon rice imports. Yet there was no indication that the Services were willing to forgo part of their appropriations in favour of rural relief. There may be several interpretations of their protestations. Firstly, they may have been desirous of courting popular support; secondly, their action may have been caused by the influence of the predominantly country-born rank and file of the Army; thirdly, the influence of the new officer group, which is drawn to a large extent from the small landowner class which is seriously affected by the inability of the tenantry to pay rents, may have played an important part. Yet, on the other hand, those protestations may

¹ Yet it is significant that in June 1932 the Saito Government appropriated 193,000,000 yen to military expenditure, but postponed farm relief.

have been caused for an even more practical reason, glimpses of which may be seen in the debates of the Diet. It was said that General Araki regarded the security of livelihood amongst the rural population as the first need of national defence. When questioned in this regard Araki replied, "As the troops are largely drawn from the farming population the prosperity of Agrarian interests has important bearings on the Army. The military are, therefore, deeply concerned with Agrarian interests."¹ But whatever the reasons for their protestations—and they do seem perhaps more practical than ethical—the military's action won the support of the peasantry and weaned them from the political parties.

Yet support for the Services has not come from the agricultural section of the people alone. In the past, and at the present time, a significant section of the people which is keenly interested in patriotic schemes has aided the military. Mention has already been made of the Black Dragon Society and its associated societies which have always advocated the expansion of Japan abroad and the strengthening of Japanese foreign policy, and, more recently, the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations and the inauguration of a more bellicose policy.² The above groups, however, although connected with the military, have been organized by civilian patriots, and have given their support to the military, because they most closely champion

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, February 1, 1934.

² See K. Haushofer, *Dai Nippon*, pp. 320-323. For an account of the activities of patriotic societies between the Russo-Japanese War and the Great War. Also O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan*, pp. 63, 272-274 and 44-48.

their beliefs. On the other hand, there are certain societies which are definitely affiliated with the military, chief amongst them being the Reservists' Society, of which the counterparts in the United States and Great Britain are the American and British Legions, although its aims are considerably more militant than those of the latter organizations. Retired military and naval officers control this organization, whilst officers on active service hold posts within it. The Society, which was founded in 1910 and extended four years later to include naval reservists, has as its objective "the development of the military spirit and the promotion of military efficiency which in turn will promote social welfare, encourage virtuous customs and habits and guarantee the stability of national defence,"¹ and has grown to a membership in the region of three million. It has been loud in its advocacy of Japanese expansion, and, since 1931, has played an important role in explaining to the people Japan's position in Manchuria and in the world. Moreover, it forms an excellent machine if the Army wishes to enter the political arena or support the election of a certain political group which will look with favour upon its demands. The military have also brought their influence to bear upon the younger members of the population through the Young Men's League, which has a predominantly military tone and which is addressed at its meetings by a preponderance of military officers. The League caters to youths between the ages of thirteen and twenty-five, whom

¹ H. Vere Redman, "Japan Governed by the Camp," *Fortnightly Review*, March 1934. See also O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan*, pp. 63 and 272-274.

it instructs in "civic righteousness" and in the military spirit by the wearing of uniform and by the inculcation of the spirit of Bushido. There is, however, no implication that Japan is the only country which trains such bodies; there is only an implication that such bodies do exist in Japan and play a large part in support of the military.

The above-mentioned societies have all been extra-parliamentary, but the military have also drawn support from dissensions within the political parties, which have led members to desert to new parties openly favourable to the Services. Within the Seiyukai there has been formed a Group of Youth, some forty strong, with which Dr. Suzuki, the party president and founder of the Society of the Spirit of Great Japan, is closely identified.¹ Within the Minseito confusion has been caused by the defection of a group, headed by Mr. Adachi, which has encouraged super party government. Mr. Adachi would appear to have nursed the hope that he would be able to support the military by using the existing political structure. With this object he formed the Kokumin Domei (the People's League), which now numbers some thirty members in the Diet. Adachi's position is in fact typical of the mystery which surrounds the political alignment, for, on the one hand, as the campaign manager and Home Secretary of the Minseito Government of 1929, he appears to have been connected with Big Business interests, whilst, on the other hand,

¹ The Society of the Spirit of Great Japan was founded for the collaboration of capitalists and workers, to insure the welfare of the people and to foster in their minds the union of the people and the Emperor.

he has become, since 1931, an advocate of Japanese expansion abroad and a critic of the capitalist system. Mr. Adachi appears to be either a political opportunist, who foresees the overthrow of political parties, or else the servant of capitalist interests which desire to keep in touch with whichever party or group may gain control. For it is patently obvious at the present time that Big Business is in a most difficult position which makes its attitude to the military one-half of support, half of opposition. Since the Great War there have been many signs of unrest in the country. Communist doctrines, which, in spite of a strict police censorship and a suppression of dangerous thoughts, have been widespread, have influenced a large section of the population. Since 1920 strikes have been frequent, and the general dissatisfaction has been accentuated by the agricultural crises of the last few years.¹ Capitalist interests have, therefore, been nervous, yet they have had no wish to give the military complete control, since the temper of a certain section of the Army has been so distinctly anti-capitalist. On the other hand, they have feared to antagonize the military upon whose support they would rely in the event of internal dissension and from whose vast expenditure upon armaments they gain considerable profit.² But that financial and commercial interests are not absolutely hostile to the military, in spite of the latter's tirades against capital, has been evidenced by the existence of

¹ The Far Eastern Social Information (Tokyo Research Institute for Social Problems), June 1 and 11, 1934.

² The Mitsubishi, the supporters of the Minseito, are the pre-dominant arms manufacturers.

certain bodies such as the Kokuhonsha (The State Foundation Society), composed of military men and financial and commercial magnates, which has advocated a Fascist form of government. Moreover, it is probable that if the composition of the military command was still as it was in the days of Choshu leadership Big Business would not hesitate to give the military unqualified support, but the situation has been altered by the advent to power of a more radical element in the Army whose actions toward capitalism cannot be trusted.¹

In the second chapter of this essay an attempt was made to show that democratic control of the machinery of State had been baulked by the form of the Constitution and by the defects and delinquencies of the political parties; that the government of Japan was in consequence liable to be subject to the machinations of a group which was not elected by the people of the country, and which had some object in exerting its influence. In this chapter the position of the military has been discussed in order to show that they, if they so wish, may play an important part in influencing the direction of national policy. Yet no group will concern itself with such a matter, unless it is prompted by strong reasons. The Japanese military have always preserved a strict *esprit de corps* and have regarded themselves ever since their success in the Sino-Japanese War as the protectors of Japanese prestige. This has been an incentive to them to bring their influence to bear especially at times when the condition of the Civil Government

¹ The 1932 assassinations were directed not only against certain political figures, but against Baron Dan, head of the Mitsui firm.

has been so weak that the safety of the country seemed to be endangered. In the last few years another reason for their participation has grown out of the changed composition of the officer class in the Army, which has caused an outburst of feeling antagonistic to the interests which have hitherto supported the political parties to the detriment of that section of the people from which the new officer class is drawn. In this chapter, therefore, an attempt has been made to show not only that the Services are in a position to bring their influence to bear upon the formulation and direction of the national policy, but that there are reasons, and strong reasons, for their desire to do so.

Moreover, it has also been shown that there are a number of factors which have supported the military influence in the past, and new factors which support it now. Mention has been made of the powerful position of the Services under the Constitution, the weakness and corruption of the political parties under a Constitution which offers them very few opportunities, the consequent lack of popular faith in those bodies and the successful career of the Services and their support of the national prestige. Some attempt has also been made to distinguish certain groups, patriotic societies, Reservist associations, the peasantry, the small landowners and the small traders, which by their support in the past and in the present have strengthened the position of the military. Mention has also been made of the awkward position of the large capitalist concerns in their relations to the Services in order to show that the radical element in the Army has caused a certain mistrust to arise in the

minds of Big Business, which has prevented them from giving their whole-hearted support to the military. Yet even in spite of the lack of complete support from Big Business the Services do seem to have gained a strong body of support.

One of the most important checks upon the activities of the military would seem to be contained in the Imperial Edict of Meiji which clearly warned soldiers and sailors against meddling in politics.¹ Ito, in his *Commentaries*, uttered the same warning. Yet even that possible check seems to have been disregarded, for in the Diet session of January 1934 it was declared during the debate upon foreign policy that there was a general impression amongst the public that there was free discussion of politics in the Army and Navy. Upon interpellation Admiral Osumi, the Minister of the Navy, replied "that under Naval Criminal Law, naval officers and men are forbidden to submit petitions, hold meetings or make public their views upon the administration. But that he believed that they could discuss matters relating to national defence."² General Hayashi, the War Minister, in making a similar reply, added "that it was not absolutely wrong for soldiers to discuss national defence and armaments from unalloyed motives." A few days later it was pointed out in the Diet that the meddling of the military authorities in international affairs was injurious to Japanese interests, and it was suggested that the Army should desist from all acts of propaganda.³ To this attack War

¹ See *Japan Year Book*, 1934, pp. 215-219.

² *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, February 1, 1934.

³ *Ibid.*, February 8, 1934.

Minister Hayashi was quick to reply that the Army had never been involved in propaganda work, and at the same time he reminded the Diet that it was the duty of the Army and Navy to defend the State in times of emergency. He declared that the Army was apprehensive about certain social evils which he considered the political parties should make an effort to correct. Admiral Osumi, however, introduced a new line of approach to the question when he intimated that certain learned scholars were being consulted about the true interpretation of the Imperial Edict. He suggested that in certain circles it was believed that the right interpretation was that soldiers and sailors should not *addict* themselves to politics, rather than *involve* themselves in politics. The replies of both Ministers seemed to show that they considered that the check upon the interference of the military stopped short when the national defence was at stake, for, since the Services were entrusted with the defence of the country, anything which concerned that defence automatically concerned them. Such an argument would appear to bring into the sphere of influence of the Services the very foundations of the State, its moral life and its economic organization, any of which may either directly or indirectly affect the national defence. Such an interpretation would in fact appear to abolish the letter and the spirit of the Edict.

It seems evident, therefore, that the military occupy in Japan an extraordinarily influential position, that there are reasons which prompt them to make use of that position, and that they do gain support from various sections of the people

for varying reasons. So far, however, only indirect allusion has been made to the effect that influence has had upon the formulation and direction of national policy. There remains, therefore, the task of discussing those occasions since the Restoration upon which there are grounds for holding that the military influence has been apparent and instrumental in inveigling national policy into the path which it favoured.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RESTORATION AND AFTER

It has been the aim of the first three chapters to represent the opportunities which are offered to the military to make their influence felt upon the government of Japan, and in the formulation and direction of Japanese foreign policy. It has been shown that the ideology of the Japanese people is such that to them even more than to the peoples of Europe may a chauvinistic appeal be made, because their particular heritage has imbued them with faith in the Divine origin and mission of the Japanese people and their superiority over all other nations. To the intelligent European such a belief may seem strange and uncanny, but when it is realized that Japan only emerged from a state of isolation and medieval feudal organization, not unlike that of Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, some seventy-five years ago, that ideology appears less unnatural and less artificial. It has been shown also that Japan, unlike the majority of European nations, has never established a truly democratic control of the machinery of State, and that in consequence the government of the country even more than that of European countries, in which not even democratic control has obliterated exterior influences, may be a victim to the machinations of groups, other than those elected by the people, which are desirous of moulding the policy of the country in the direction which they favour. Finally it was shown that though there are, and

there have been, other groups which aspire to a predominant influence, the military have gained a position, both politically and in the minds of the people, from which, if they so wish, they are able to exert a stronger influence than any other group.¹ Yet the preceding chapters have merely pointed to the opportunities offered by the national ideology, by the gaps in the Constitution which have offset democratic control, and by the special position of the military; they have made no attempt to prove that the military have deliberately set out to defeat democratic control and to make their influence predominant. In the following chapters, however, an attempt will be made to trace the course of the influence of the military and to ascertain whether they have taken advantage of the opportunities which have been offered to them.

The prophets of the Restoration, men such as Yoshida Shoin and Moto-ori, had not only preached the overthrow of the Shogun and the resurrection of the Emperor's power, but had insisted that the Japanese people must expand beyond the seas. To many Samurai, therefore, the Restoration spelt immediate expansion, and the early years of the Restoration period witnessed the struggle between those who held such views and those who were convinced that Japan should set her house in order before such a course of action was even contemplated. Between 1870 and 1873 considerable pressure was brought to bear upon the Government by the former group, which was incensed by the affronts which it considered the country had received at the hands of China and Korea; in 1871

¹ Chapter Three, *supra*.

China had refused to send a punitive expedition against certain Formosans who had murdered some Loo-Choo fishermen, and in the same year Korea had refused to pay tribute. To a nation spoiling for a fight there seemed ample excuse for war, but, if amongst the statesmen who had carried through the Restoration there were some in favour of action, there were, on the other hand, others who were intent upon keeping the country at peace in spite of the bellicose demands of their fellow statesmen and the Samurai.¹ The year 1873 witnessed Japan at a fork in the road; one branch led to domestic consolidation, the other to immediate overseas expansion. That the Government chose the peaceful way was due in great part to the superior strength of Kido and Okubo, who in their wanderings abroad had realized that their country was in no condition to enter upon a career of foreign aggrandizement before internal order and strength had been established. The arguments of the advocates of peace were well summed up in Kido's memorial in which he stated that the weakness of her Army and her wealth made Japan unprepared for war; that she must first of all establish internal harmony if she was to become a great modern nation: "I have now given my reasons for thinking that our most urgent need at present is to establish the Constitution and the laws. A Constitution and laws are indispensable."² Yet though the statesmen who advocated a policy

¹ G. E. Ueyhara, *The Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909*, London, 1910, p. 75.

² W. W. McLaren, "Japanese Government Documents," *Translations, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, pp. 567-577.

of peace won their point and their opponents withdrew from the Council of State, it was by no means certain, in 1873, that they would retain control. The year 1874 witnessed various rebellions in the provinces, one of them led by the former Councillor of State, which, together with the outcry against the repudiation of the Samurai pension scheme, so harried the Government that it compromised with the militarist element by dispatching a punitive expedition to Formosa, but only after full permission had been obtained from China for such action.¹ Three years later the discontent of the pro-expansion and reactionary class of the Samurai found expression in the Satsuma Rebellion under the leadership of Saigo Takamori, who, though one of the leaders in the Restoration, had been a firm supporter of the policy of expansion. Yet the four years from 1873 until 1877, in spite of the antagonism to and the attacks upon the Government, did serve to establish the policy of peaceful internal reconstruction and to postpone insistence upon immediate foreign expansion for almost two decades.

Therefore, in spite of the expedition of 1874 to Formosa, it is impossible to declare that post-Restoration Japan embarked immediately upon a career of expansion and conquest. There were, indeed, those who wished to do so, but they were unable to put their desires into effect, so that Japan entered upon twenty years of peace during which internal reconstruction was carried forward toward the promulgation of the Constitution in

¹ Kido, who was opposed to any such compromise, resigned as a result of the Government's move.

1890, and an amicable policy toward China and Korea was pursued. By a treaty with Korea in 1885 that country was opened to Japanese trade, but, as similar treaties were signed with European countries, its importance was not great. In the same year, however, by a treaty with China Korean independence was acknowledged by both countries, which promised to withdraw their troops from Korea and, if it became necessary to dispatch troops in the future, to inform the other party to the treaty before doing so. Even if distant rumblings were heard against the seemingly weak policy of the Government in its relations with China and Korea and in its attempts to obtain revision of the treaties with the European nations and with the United States, it did seem that the advocates of peaceful methods had established their control and that the chauvinistic elements had been compelled to take second place.

The efforts of the statesmen who had advocated peaceful internal reconstruction bore fruit in 1890 when the Emperor made a magnanimous gift of a Constitution to his people. The form of the Constitution, however, and its lack of acknowledgment of democratic control immediately stirred up stronger antagonism from those groups which demanded that the people should have a greater share in their own government. Attack upon attack upon the Government occurred in the years which immediately followed the promulgation of the Constitution. Cabinets which had no support in the Lower House of the Diet were faced with demands for Cabinet responsibility to the people and for democratic control over the financial and

administrative organization of the country. Leaders of the oligarchic Cabinets attempted to solve the problem; Yamagata ignored the opposition, Matsukata attempted to crush it, and Ito by coquetting with one party in the Diet antagonized the other representatives and the House of Peers.¹ The old dualism which had caused revolutions in the England of the Stuarts and in the France of Louis XVI was apparent once more, and seemed to be leading in a similar revolutionary direction.

By 1894 Japanese government had reached a deadlock for which the solution appeared to lie in a modification of the Constitution to allow increased democratic control and participation of the people in the government. The only alternative was the entanglement of the country in a war which would arouse the patriotic feelings of the people to such a pitch that domestic quarrels would be forgotten. Faced with the deadlock, with the antagonism of the political parties and with incessant demands for the revision of the treaties, Ito, who in 1894 was at the head of the Government, chose the latter alternative, not because he considered that Japan should embark upon a career of expansion, but because he was convinced that no modification of the Constitution was possible. Once before, in 1874, the advocates of domestic reconstruction had been forced to compromise, and pander to their opponents, by dispatching an expedition to Formosa. But the Formosan expedition was a petty affair compared with the action which Ito took to distract attention from the

¹ W. W. McLaren, *A Political History of Japan*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., pp. 208-214.

problems of political progress. By one stroke the work of the advocates of peace in the two preceding decades was undone by one who had been a champion of reform. That Ito was never convinced that Japan had a militarist mission to perform was proved by his subsequent attitude, but his action in 1894 destroyed the supremacy which Kido, Okubo and he himself had established in 1873 and the four following years. For, though those who advocated for Japan a programme of immediate expansion had been compelled to take a second place, their ideas had never been eradicated, and if given the chance there were supporters of those ideas who were ready to put them into practice. Their chance came when Ito, to distract attention from other matters, plunged the country into war with China, and by his action lost the supremacy which the advocates of peaceful reconstruction had established for themselves twenty years previously.¹

It is then impossible to declare that the Sino-Japanese War was caused by the intrigue of chauvinistic groups. Undoubtedly they were keenly interested, but the Government, had it been willing, was in a strong enough position to avoid foreign conflict. In the years preceding the declaration of war there had, indeed, been dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of the Government, for its signature of the 1885 treaties with China and Korea and for its attitude toward the revision of treaties. Yet the chauvinistic groups had not obtained strength enough to force the hand of the Government, and there had been no insistent demand for

¹ W. W. McLaren, *A Political History of Japan*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1916, p. 229.

war. The China War, though, as Ito had hoped, it distracted the attention of the people from domestic affairs and problems, revived the inherent chauvinism of the people. But it did more than Ito had foreseen, for it made chauvinism more than a temporary state of mind. By conquering China, Japan in one year attained to a position far different from that which she had occupied during the twenty-five years of peaceful reconstruction. The result was fatal to the advocates of peace. By war it appeared that Japan was able to establish herself as a first-class nation which other nations were willing to recognize as their equal. By her success she was able to obtain the replacement of the treaties, which had been imposed upon her in the early years of the Restoration, by new ones which no longer treated her as a backward nation, whereas the Government's attempt to obtain their revocation by peaceful means had met with continuous failure. In the eyes of the people the Army and Navy had gained great credit, for on land and sea they had defeated the forces of a numerically superior nation and had established Japan on the mainland of Asia. In every way it appeared that war had done for Japan what twenty years of amicable diplomacy had failed to do. In the enthusiasm of success it was forgotten that the country had been in a position to fight a war, and gain success, as a result of twenty years of peace during which she had undergone internal reconstruction and her fighting forces had been built up to a level great enough to compete with the strength of another nation. Enthusiasm for the military was unbounded, and their services to the

nation were emphasized the more by their conquest of foreign lands, which the Civil Government saw fit to return to the defeated country.¹

Ito had undoubtedly counted upon an ability to stem the tide immediately the war had effaced the difficulties with which the Government had been confronted in domestic politics. Yet his optimism was unfounded, for he was soon to discover that by his action he had played into the hands of the group which he had always attempted to keep from power. From the end of the war until his death he found his path constantly crossed by the forces which had won prestige as a consequence of his own rash action in precipitating the war. The men who had consistently favoured a more militant policy for Japan were not slow to take advantage of the opportunities which success in war had brought them. They took care to establish themselves in positions from which their influence could most easily be brought to bear upon the Government. Soon after the war the Privy Council, with Yamagata as its president, secured the passage of an Imperial Ordinance which established military officers not only in the Colonial Administration, but in the military ministries of the Cabinet. It is true that formerly it had been customary to appoint Army and Navy officers as Ministers of War and the Navy, but, on the other hand, there had been no legal necessity for such selection. The new legislation, therefore, by making such appointment

¹ By the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki the Liaotung Peninsula was returned to China. The Japanese Government was aware of the pressure which Russia, Germany and France brought to bear; the Japanese people were not. For the terms of the Treaty, see J. V. A. MacMurray, *China Treaties and Agreements*, New York, 1921, pp. 18-22.

compulsory, gave the whip-hand to the Services in their relations with the Cabinet, whose policy they were thenceforth able to influence by threat of refusing to allow officers to serve as ministers. The importance of that hold over the Cabinet has been already mentioned in the third chapter, but it is significant that such a measure was made possible as a result of the China War which, though precipitated, in order to solve their problems, by those who had always advocated peaceful methods, launched Japan upon a career quite different from that which had been pursued prior to the declaration of war.

Just as the year 1873 marked the victory of the protagonists of internal reconstruction over those of immediate expansion; so 1894 marked the reversal of that position. Japan did not by any means embark upon a programme of immediate expansion, but the chauvinistic elements had been given their chance and thenceforth they clung to the advantage which they had won, to the detriment of those who held opposite views. The China War, therefore, is, for the purposes of this essay, of the utmost importance because, though it was not instigated by the chauvinistic expansionists, it gave them the chance to rise out of the second place which they had been compelled to occupy ever since 1873. After 1894 they were in a position to make their influence felt in the government of the country, whereas formerly such a situation had not existed. There was, therefore, a greater probability that Japan would pursue a policy more akin to that which had been advocated by the prophets of the Restoration.

The years following the resignation of Ito's

Cabinet in 1896 revealed very clearly the ever-widening breach between the civil and military faction of the oligarchy. During those years the military faction was consolidating the advantages it had obtained by the China War, whilst Ito was endeavouring to unearth some new weapon with which to fight it.¹ Such a weapon, however, was difficult to find, since the ordinance of 1894 had given to Yamagata and the military faction a lever with which to oust any Cabinet with which it was not in sympathy.

That the civil and military faction of the oligarchy had drifted far apart was evidenced by the accession to office of the Itagaki-Okuma Cabinet of 1898, and by its abrupt overthrow, followed by a Yamagata Cabinet, while Ito was abroad. Ito, it seems, was convinced that the only method by which to fight the military faction lay in an attempt to bolster up the strength of the political parties. Hence he gave his support to the Itagaki-Okuma Cabinet, which was based upon the newly formed Kenseito party, and, when that experiment failed, turned his attention to the formation of a new party of which he himself was the leader.² Yet his formation of the Seiyukai came too late, for the military faction, by pushing through the Diet a budget which devoted one-third of the ordinary and five-eighths of the extraordinary expenditures to the Army and Navy, had already accomplished what it had set out to do after the

¹ In 1898 the Supreme Military Council, composed of Army and Navy officers, was inaugurated, with the result that there was little possibility that advice upon military matters from persons other than the military would reach the ear of the Emperor.

² H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, pp. 211-213.

fall of Itagaki and Okuma.¹ By the time, therefore, that the main body of support in the Lower House had swung to the Seiyukai there was no longer any need for the Yamagata Cabinet to remain in office; it had accomplished what it desired, and, moreover, even when out of office the faction could still hold the threat of the resignation of the Ministers of War and the Navy over the head of any Cabinet which caused it offence.

It has been necessary to stress the events of 1898, because they were directly the result of the advantage gained by the military faction by the War of 1894. In 1873 the advocates of internal reconstruction and peaceful diplomacy had won supremacy over the advocates of a "positivist" policy. In 1894 the position was reversed, and by 1898 the military faction had established itself in such a position that, as it has been pointed out, Ito and his followers, who, in spite of their precipitation of the China War, were still opponents of a chauvinistic policy, were forced to change their tactics and give their support to political groups with which they had in the past been at odds. By the turn of the century, therefore, "the peace party" had been compelled to take second place, whilst the military faction, though it was without support in the lower House of the Diet, although Yamagata had received a measure of support during his tenure of office from 1898 to 1900, was in a position to bring its influence to bear upon the formulation and direction of national policy. It is of the utmost importance to note the change which had occurred within six years. In 1893 the group which had won

¹ G. E. Uyebara, *The Political Development of Japan*, p. 243.

supremacy in 1873 was still in power; the China War gave the military faction an opportunity which it was not slow to seize and consolidate in the last few years of the century.

McLaren states that the influence of the military was again evident in the events which led up to the fall of the third Ito Cabinet in 1901.¹ Ito's alliance with the Seiyukai had aroused the hostility of the House of Peers, which expressed its dissatisfaction by a wellnigh unanimous vote against the taxation bills which were presented to it. Its opposition was at length overcome, however, by an Imperial message which requested assent to the bills. Ito immediately accepted responsibility for the message, although it was evident that he had had no knowledge that such a course of action was to be followed. McLaren insists that the military faction had influenced the Emperor to send the message, not only because it wished the budget to be passed, but because it knew that the use of an Imperial message would discredit the Cabinet. Whether McLaren's supposition is true or false, the message had an immediate and disturbing effect upon the House of Peers. It passed the taxation bills, as it had been commanded, but raised obstacles to all other legislation which came before it. This action, accompanied by the dissension which had arisen within the ranks of the Seiyukai itself, made the task of the Cabinet so impossible that it resigned after only nine months in office. The real significance of the Cabinet's failure lies, however, in the inability of Ito, even when in alliance with a political party,

¹ W. W. McLaren, *A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1916, p. 275.

to defeat the military faction. That alliance had in fact been his last resort in the conflict, and his failure was evidenced by the subsequent formation of a Cabinet under General Katsura, a henchman of General Yamagata, and by his own appointment, at the instigation of the new Cabinet, to the Privy Council, which was regarded as a safe place for a dangerous opponent.

In the foregoing pages the course of the military faction's rise to power has been traced. In 1898 it had risen to Cabinet office, but its second tenure, under Katsura, had greater strength, since its outstanding opponent had been shelved. From 1901, therefore, it was free to direct the national policy into those channels which it favoured, and it is not difficult to discern a change in the orientation of policy. The meeting of the first Diet after Katsura assumed office bore witness that the military were determined to have their way. Previous to the opening both the Sieyukai and the Shimpoto had pledged themselves to oppose all increase of naval expenditure out of proportion to the country's financial position. Katsura, however, immediately outlined the programme of the Government as including most of the items, including naval expansion, which the parties had pledged themselves to oppose, so that the natural result was the dissolution of the Diet and the adoption of the budget of the previous year in accordance with the terms of the Constitution. Yet though Katsura was unsuccessful in his relations with the Diet he at least held them in check and prevented them from obtaining control over the machinery of State.

Meanwhile the scene was being set for a new

departure in national policy. Amicable relations were established with certain Powers which might interfere in the Far East; the United States were wooed by Japanese acceptance of the "Open Door" policy in China; Great Britain's friendship was guaranteed by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which was signed six months after Katsura had assumed office. It seems impossible not to see in this action that preparations were being made for the conflict on the mainland of Asia. Since 1898 the Government had called for increased supplies for the Army and Navy. No attempt had been made to establish more amicable relations with Russia, although Russia on its part had made no attempt to arrive at any agreement and its policy toward Manchuria and Korea had remained such that in face of the existing orientation of policy in Japan a conflict seemed inevitable. That the conflict broke out as the result of a minor incident in Korea was not unexpected. To the military the mainland of Asia was a happy hunting-ground upon which Russian interference could not be brooked; the memory of Russian action after the China War was yet very much alive in the minds of chauvinistic elements. Into the details of the outbreak it is impossible to probe, but, on the other hand, it is possible to point to a comparison between the war and the China War. The latter, as it has been pointed out, was an excuse with which to distract the attention of the people from domestic problems, for in 1894 it was no part of national policy, national policy as formulated by those then in power, to launch Japan upon a career of conquest upon the mainland; the statesmen of 1894 were still intent upon the stabilization

of domestic affairs. On the other hand, the Russo-Japanese War was truly a part of national policy, national policy as visualized by the faction which had gained power as a result of the China War. There is no intention to insist that any group which involves a country in war, that any group which opposes the conquest of the opposite coast by another Power, is necessarily militaristically inclined. Great Britain, whatever faction or party has been in power, has always opposed any Power which attempted to gain control of the Low Countries. But there is an intention to insist that the Russian War was motivated by reasons deeper than those which merely called for the *status quo* on the opposite coasts; that behind the motivation were the ambitions of the faction which had seized upon the chances offered it after the China War and whose ambitions were intimately connected with the expansionist ideas which had been suppressed by the civil faction of the oligarchy in 1873. It is possible to declare that Japan was bound to fight a war to defend her own coasts from the danger which an enemy on the opposite coast would have presented, but, on the other hand, it is impossible to deny that she was preparing for that war in the years which preceded it not only for reasons of defence, but because the chauvinistic ideas which had been engendered by the China War had aroused a faith in the persuasive powers of force and a firmer belief in Japan's mission.

Though the Katsura Cabinet emerged from the war in public disgrace, because it had failed to extract an indemnity, there was much to which a military faction might look back with intense

satisfaction. A foothold upon the mainland had been established, predominance in Korea had been secured, half the island of Saghalin had been ceded and leases of Liaotung, Port Arthur, Dalny and of the Chinese Eastern Railway, south of Changchun had been obtained.¹ In addition the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been reconstructed to provide that in case of unprovoked aggression against either Power, the other should come to its assistance, instead of making such assistance dependent upon the support of the aggression by a third Power. The military faction, therefore, could well afford to retire from direct control of the Government in order to allow public resentment against the treaty to subside.

That the military faction was by no means enfeebled by the post-war resentment was evinced by its return to office two years later, in 1908, in the second Katsura Administration, which, though it failed to effect any improvement in domestic affairs, was successful in obtaining a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the annexation of Korea. The course of Japanese action in Korea in fact throws much light upon the direction of national policy under the Katsura regime. Immediately after the signature of the Peace Treaty, a mixed regime, under which Japanese and Koreans shared the responsibility of government, had been inaugurated with Ito as Resident-General, and though by no means successful the system remained in force until a year and a half after Ito's withdrawal from his post at the time of the second Katsura

¹ J. V. A. MacMurray, *China Treaties and Agreements*, New York, 1921, vol. 1, pp. 522-526.

Cabinet's accession to power. With Ito's assassination in October 1909,¹ the chief opposition to annexation was silenced, and some months later with the appointment as Resident-General of General Terauchi, who had been continuously Minister of War since 1902, annexation was decided upon. It seems more than significant that annexation should have been carried out immediately Ito's advice, which, since he was a Genro, had continued to reach the ears of the Emperor, ceased with his assassination.²

It is interesting to look back over the first decade of the twentieth century to see the trend which national policy had taken since the military faction came into direct control. During the years Katsura had been in office, from 1901 until 1906 and from 1908 until 1911, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been formed and reconstructed twice, in 1905 and 1911; the Russian War had been declared, and peace signed, whereby Japan gained a foothold on the mainland; Korea had been changed from a protectorate into an annexed province. The days of domestic reconstruction had been left far behind, even though domestic problems remained to be solved. Japan had embarked upon a career which was bound to make any action of another Power towards China and the mainland of Asia one of prime importance to herself. That the military faction had committed Japan to such a course of action was significant, but it was as significant that when not in direct control that faction could

¹ W. W. McLaren, *Political History of Japan*, p. 319.

² The annexation of Korea was not ratified by the Diet until some months later.

still bring its influence to bear. Saionji's resignation in 1912 was caused directly by the action of the military which, crossed in its contention that there should be increased naval building and appropriations to defray the cost of two additional Army divisions in Korea, insisted upon the resignation of the Minister of War and prevented the succession of any other qualified military candidate.¹ Again, when Katsura, after his split with the military faction, attempted to form his third Cabinet in 1912, he was only able to obtain the services of an admiral as Minister of the Navy after recourse to an Imperial message.² Again, in 1914, when, after the fall of the Yamamoto Cabinet, there was an attempt to form a Cabinet under Viscount Kiyoura, the military faction refused to provide a Minister of the Navy.³

Up to the beginning of the World War, therefore, the military faction had preserved the supremacy which it had won after the China War. In 1912 it had still been able to bring its influence to bear in spite of the dissension within its own ranks caused by the estrangement between Yamagata and Katsura. That a more militant orientation of policy had accompanied the ascendancy of the military is a proposition difficult to refute, especially if a

¹ H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, New York, 1933, p. 214; W. W. McLaren, *A Political History of Japan*, p. 345; R. Fujisawa, *Political Development of Japan*, New Haven, 1923, p. 94.

² While Katsura was absent abroad Yamagata had secured his appointment as Court Chamberlain and Keeper of the Privy Seal, an action which amounted to the removal of Katsura from the political stage. This situation was overcome by an Imperial message which allowed Katsura to resign from those offices and re-enter politics.

³ R. Fujisawa, *Political Development of Japan*, p. 94.

comparison be made between the direction of post 1894 policy and that of the period prior to that date, during which the advocates of domestic reconstruction were supreme. Of course it might be argued in rebuttal that the military were merely carrying out the wishes of the Civil Government, but, on the other hand, the Civil Government was, during the first decade of the twentieth century, headed by a member of the military faction whose ideas were imposed upon it. In other words, it might well be said that the military were carrying out the wishes of the Civil Government, but on the other hand, since the military had gained control of the Civil Government, those ideas and desires were influenced and formulated by the military themselves. It might be thought, therefore, that there were good reasons for discerning the influence of the military faction behind Japan's next momentous move in her foreign relations, the Twenty-one Demands, which had in view many of the objectives which were dear to the military and chauvinistic groups. One writer has indeed seen in the Demands the attempt of a chauvinistic group to launch Japan upon a programme of expansion in China, while the European Powers were occupied elsewhere.¹ He bases his argument, however, upon a memorandum which, so he claims, the Black Dragon Society drew up in the autumn of 1914 and presented to the Government.² Yet the authenticity of that document, which he himself admits was sent to him anonymously with no indication as to its origin, can only be regarded with suspicion, even

¹ B. L. P. Weale, *The Fight for the Republic in China*, New York, 1917.

² *Ibid.*, chapter vii, *passim*, pp. 123-144.

though its articles bear a striking resemblance to those of the Twenty-one Demands. There is in fact no reason to believe, except for the unsubstantiated evidence of Weale, that militaristic or chauvinistic intrigue had any more to do with the formulation of the Twenty-one Demands than it did with the entrance of Japan into the Great War. True, Japan's support of the Allies was brought about by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had indeed been negotiated and twice renewed by Katsura Governments supported by the military faction, but, on the other hand, that faction had no enthusiasm for the war, except in so far as it offered an opportunity for revenge upon Germany for the part she had played immediately after the China War; on the contrary, Japan respected the military might of Germany, whose officers had trained the Japanese Army, and throughout the war nursed a suspicion, especially within the Japanese Army, that the strength of Germany would gain the victory. Yet though neither militaristic nor chauvinistic groups intrigued for the war or for the Twenty-one Demands, they did see in the war an opportunity for Japan to settle the Chinese question whilst the other Powers were engaged elsewhere and whilst China itself was still torn by the dissensions which followed the Revolution of 1911. For the purposes of this essay, however, it is of importance that the connexion of the military faction with the Twenty-one Demands was slight and that their conception was the work of another group working through the Okuma Cabinet.

Okuma had won his way to office by agreeing to

the Army's demand for two new divisions in Korea,¹ but there were no other signs that the Government had humbled itself before the military. On the contrary, Okuma's Government was based upon the support of the Doshikai which had been formed, in February 1913, by Prince Katsura in order to support him in his fight against the military Genro, Yamagata. Moreover, Baron Kato Taka-Akira, who became president of the Doshikai after Katsura's death and later president of the newly formed Kenseikai with which the Doshikai was merged, was outspokenly opposed to Genro government and heartily in favour of the party system. It seems, therefore, that the Government's affiliations with the military faction were slight, so that once again it is improbable that its action in regard to the Twenty-one Demands was influenced by such a group. It would seem, therefore, that commercial reasons, rather than those of purely chauvinistic expansion, motivated the Demands; it is significant that in them the greatest stress was laid upon the commercial privileges which should be afforded Japanese nationals.² This conclusion is the more reasonable when it is realized how closely Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister, and the Mitsubishi were connected. Kato as a young man had served in the Mitsubishi firm, and had married the sister of Baron Iwasaki, the head of the firm; his connexion was in fact so well known that his Government of 1924 was popularly known as the

¹ H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, New York, 1933, p. 217; A. M. Young, *Japan Under Taisho Tenno*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1928, p. 45.

² A. M. Young, *ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

"Mitsubishi Government."¹ Therefore, in spite of the influence which the military faction had exercised over the orientation of policy since 1894, there are grounds for stating that the Twenty-one Demands were conceived by a Government whose action was motivated by considerations outside the influence of a military faction. As it has been pointed out, there can be no doubt that the military and chauvinistic groups were enthusiastic about such a policy and gave it their support, but it is the purpose of this essay to point to those occasions on which the military influenced the Government, not to those on which they merely carried out their duty of giving support.

The fall of General Terauchi's Government, which had followed that of Okuma, led to the appointment of Hara, although it appears that Yamagata's approval was made conditional upon the appointment of General Tanaka as War Minister.² Hara's Government, which was based upon a parliamentary majority, and the ministries of which were conducted by party men, marked, as it has been pointed out, an important stage in the development of parliamentary government.³ Yet for the purposes of this essay, it is only possible to consider the part which it played, and the military played, in the Siberian Intervention. The idea of intervention had been initiated by the Allies, who brought pressure to bear upon the United States, which had been the sole opponent of the scheme. It is evident, however, from the two military agreements

¹ H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, New York, 1932, pp. 216 and 223.

² *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, July 13, 1935.

³ Chapter Two, *supra*.

which had been negotiated by the Chinese and Japanese military staffs in May 1918, before the United States had issued an invitation to Japan to join in an expedition, that the Japanese authorities had realized the possibility of bringing pressure to bear in Siberia. Those agreements merely arranged for the co-operation of Japanese and Chinese forces in case of military operations against Russia in Siberia, but the supplementary agreement of September 6, 1918, also negotiated by the military staffs, in making more specific arrangements provided for the dispatch of troops to the Transbaikial and Amur Provinces.¹ This supplementary agreement was negotiated after the United States had asked Japan to co-operate, but its spirit was not in accordance with the letter of the statements made by the two Governments. In its public statement the United States had declared that "Military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. . . . The only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may be subsequently needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defence. . . .

¹ Texts of the military agreements and the supplementary agreement of September 6th are given in J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China*, New York, 1921, vol. 2, pp. 1410-1413. See also H. K. Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923, pp. 70-71.

The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the Governments send a force of seven thousand men to Vladivostok with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, so far as it may, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented.”¹ The Japanese Government issued a statement citing similar reasons for intervention; “The Government being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government, and also to act in harmony with their allies in this expedition, have decided to proceed at once to the disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. . . . They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory.”²

In spite of its announcements Japan went far beyond the agreement that all Allied operations should centre in Vladivostok. On August 16, 1918, Japanese troops were landed at Nicolaievsk, 800 miles north of Vladivostok, at the mouth of the River Amur; troops were also sent to Manchuli, whilst still more were kept in reserve in Northern Manchuria. By the War Office’s own admission 73,400 troops had been dispatched by November 1, 1918.³ Thus the Government’s agreement to co-

¹ H. K. Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923, pp. 273–275. ² *Japan Year Book, 1919–1920*.

³ Quoted in *Current History*, April 1919, p. 121. See also H. S. Quigley, “Siberian Intervention,” *American Journal of International Law*, January 1924, note, p. 85.

operate had led to the dispatch of ten times the number of troops stipulated. For, immediately the United States' invitation had been accepted the dispatch of troops became a matter for the military authorities and not for the Civil Government. And, in view of the action of the military previous to the intervention, their negotiation of an agreement with China in May, and their subsequent action in regard to the supplementary agreement of September, it appeared that they had aspirations far in advance of those of the Civil Government. H. K. Norton states that the military were wholeheartedly in favour of making use of Japan's superior strength in the Far East to establish supremacy in Siberia while the other Powers were occupied in the West, but that the Hara Cabinet, which had not the confidence of the military in Germany's ultimate success, were opposed to such action; that the announcement of the Armistice on November 11th baulked the aspirations of the military, and led the Government to insist upon the withdrawal of over half the number of troops which had been dispatched.¹

On the other hand, Japanese activities in Siberia and the Maritime Provinces were continued long after the British, French and American troops were withdrawn at the beginning of 1920. The avowed reason for continued occupation was the protection of Japanese subjects and property, but it may be conjectured that there was a great unwillingness on the part of the military to withdraw before some success had been obtained for the maintenance of

¹ H. K. Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923, pp. 82-83. (52,000 were subsequently ordered home.)

military prestige. The military had never returned empty handed from any previous expedition. It was significant that immediately after the acceptance of the Japanese Command's terms of withdrawal by the delegates of Eastern Siberia, on April 4, 1920, "incidents" occurred in the Maritime Provinces, in Vladivostok, Habarovsk and Nikolsk which became pretexts for continued occupation.¹ The subsequent massacre of the Japanese garrison at Nikolaievsk in May was a further pretext for continued occupation, for the seizure of the Russian part of Saghalin, and a further incentive for the military to gain tangible success before withdrawal.²

In Japan the antagonism between the proponents and opponents of intervention grew stronger after the end of 1919. The period of artificial prosperity which Japan had enjoyed during the Great War had come to an end, thereby making Premier Hara antagonistic to further commitments and expenditure in Siberia, which may have accounted for the withdrawal, in August 1920, of troops from Eastern Transbaikial and from the Chinese Eastern Railway north-east of Harbin. In the Maritime Provinces, however, Japanese military occupation was maintained throughout 1920 and 1921, in spite of representations made by the United States Government against the continued occupation of strategic centres in Eastern Siberia. Yet the attitude of the United States, the economic depression in Japan and the shadow of the approaching Washington

¹ H. K. Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923, pp. 113-117. (Compare these incidents with the "Incident" of September 18, 1931.)

² *Ibid.*, pp. 118-120; A. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923*, p. 441.

Conference do not appear to have been without effect. Negotiations for a commercial and military agreement, which were begun at Dairen on August 26, 1921, dragged on for eight months and finally broke down over the Japanese insistence that the commercial agreement should be signed before that for military evacuation, whereas the Far Eastern Republic insisted that the agreements should be signed concurrently. Yet, in spite of the breakdown of the negotiations, Japan announced, on July 1, 1922, that all troops would be withdrawn by the following November and suggested that negotiations should be resumed with Soviet Russia participating in the Conference. The subsequent negotiations at Changchun also broke down; nevertheless, before the end of October, all Japanese troops had been withdrawn from Nikolaievsk and the Maritime Provinces.¹

It is difficult to discern the exact degree of influence which the military had upon the continued intervention. Yet there can be no doubt that immediately the Government committed the country to intervention the military authorities assumed an important role in consequence of their ability to dispatch troops in number far in excess of that which the Government had agreed upon and to shape the direction of Japanese action in Siberia itself. From the beginning there was a large and influential body of opinion hostile to such action, yet, in spite of that, opposition intervention, which had been specifically aimed at the rescue of Czecho-Slovak troops, lasted from August 1918 until November 1922. Japan had committed herself

¹ A. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923*, p. 444.

to a course of action which at the time of the withdrawal of the other Allied troops had brought no military glory, but merely vast expenditure for which no territorial gain could be shown. Withdrawal in such circumstances was unthinkable for the Army. Yet other factors, both economic and political, intervened in 1921 to cause that withdrawal. That lack of military success was important, because it prefaced the decrease of the military influence throughout the decade of 1920 to 1930. Their influence did not disappear, but the blow to their prestige left room for the growth of political parties and commercial influence.

Soon after the accession to office of Viscount Kato, in June 1924, a treaty was signed with Russia recognizing its interests in the East and obtaining for Japan an oil concession in the northern part of Saghalin.¹ Both Kato and his successor, Wakatsuki, were much in favour of a conciliatory policy towards China. Controversy, however, arose towards the end of 1925 when Marshal Chang Tso-lin was fighting for supremacy in Manchuria. H. S. Quigley states that a clash occurred between the Foreign Office and the War Office over a question of intervention.² Yet in spite of the dispatch of additional troops to guard the South Manchurian Railway against fighting Chinese factions, no attempt was made to interfere with Chang Tso-lin's victory. The "Mitsubishi" Government of Kato appears to have been convinced that a policy

¹ The treaty was signed on January 21, 1925. See *China Year Book*, 1925, pp. 788-796.

² H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, p. 115. For the movement of the military in favour of intervention, see *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, January 7, 1926; *Trans-Pacific*, December 19, 1925.

of conciliation was more profitable than one of force. A speech of Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, bears witness to the new orientation of policy: "It is of the utmost importance for us to concentrate our attention and energy upon the promotion of foreign trade without unjust infringement upon the interests of any nation. It is not alliances but economic solidarity that we seek in our foreign relations."¹

The fall of the Wakatsuki Government in April 1927 and the accession to office of Baron Tanaka was, however, followed by intervention in Shantung for the protection of Japanese interests. Troops were dispatched in May 1927 and again in April 1928. Yet in spite of this action, the subsequent assassination of Chang Tso-lin, with which the name of the Tanaka Government was linked, and the affiliations which Tanaka was known to have with the military faction it is impossible to declare that the latter had regained its power and position. The signature of the Pact of Paris was in itself an argument against such a conclusion.²

The period from 1894 until the end of the Great War had witnessed the acquisition by the military of a position from which they were able to influence, and from which they did influence, the course of national policy. They had, however, suffered a slight loss of prestige at the end of the Great War, they had sunk lower in the public estimation after

¹ A. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, p. 392.

² The Pact caused considerable controversy in Japan, not because of its intent, but because it was phrased as signed "in the names of their respective peoples," which was considered derogatory to the prerogative of the Japanese Emperor. See H. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, pp. 70-72.

the Siberian expedition and had lost power by the death of Yamagata. The third decade of the century had, on the other hand, seen the growth of the influence of commercial and financial interests working through the political parties whose policy had become one of peaceful penetration in search of markets. In 1930 the military were still strongly entrenched, yet the political parties had at their command stronger forces than ever before. Conflict was not far off, but the results of the conflict were yet in the balance.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE IMPLICATIONS OF 1931

THE setback in the predominance of the military faction which began at the time of the Siberian expedition came to a head, therefore, at the beginning of the fourth decade of the century. That the influence of that faction had not disappeared altogether has been evident from the preceding discussion, yet, on the other hand, the strength of the political parties had grown not only during the regimes of Hara and Kato, but in the first year of the Hamaguchi Government, so that they had come closer than ever before to supremacy in the direction of the national policy. The final test came over the London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Before the Japanese delegation headed by a civilian, Mr. Wakatsuki, departed for the London Conference, it received the instructions of the Navy Department outlining the minimum requirements for the security of the country.¹ So far the Navy Department and the Cabinet were in agreement. Controversy, however, arose after the deadlock which had occurred in the Conference had been eased by the Reed-Matsudaira Compromise, which reduced the Japanese claims and was accepted by the Cabinet.² The Cabinet's acceptance, however, was only made possible by the temporary tenure

¹ The Japanese delegation to the Washington Conference had been headed by a naval officer, Admiral Kato.

² K. Colegrove, "The Treaty-Making Power in Japan," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 25, 1931, pp. 271 seq.

of the Naval portfolio by Premier Hamaguchi in the absence of the Navy Minister, Admiral Takarabe. Thus although Vice-Admiral Yamanashi, Vice-Minister of the Navy, who attended the Cabinet meeting at which the compromise was accepted, voiced his own and the Navy's opposition, he was obliged to fall into line, since the acting Navy Minister, Mr. Hamaguchi, voted for the compromise; the Vice-Admiral in fact had no vote and was merely a witness.¹ Unprecedented action had been taken, for never before had the Cabinet taken matters of national defence into its own hands; the military authorities had always been consulted. During the Washington Conference Premier Hara had, indeed, acted as Navy Minister, whilst Admiral Kato Tomosaburo was absent, but on that occasion no decision comparable with that of 1930 had had to be taken by the Cabinet.

The immediate result of the Cabinet's acceptance of the compromise was a direct appeal by Admiral Kato Kanji, Chief of the Naval Staff, to the throne. Though the Admiral's appeal was rumoured to be merely a statement of Japan's position should the compromise be accepted, rather than a direct protest against the action of the Cabinet, it was obvious that the underlying question was one intimately connected with the position which the General Staffs had held with regard to the organization of the forces. Defeat in this matter meant to the Services the ever-increasing power of the Civil Government; the wider aspect of the controversy, which extended beyond the consideration of the Treaty, was stressed by the parliamentary Vice-

¹ *Trans-Pacific*, April 17, 1930.

Minister of the Navy, a civilian, in an interview in which he declared that in the past the naval staff had generally overridden the authority of the Government. "The present case," he said, "is an attempt on the part of the Administration to correct past errors. Any party which upholds the existence of a party Cabinet should support the Government."¹

The ensuing controversy raged around Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution. The Navy element interpreted the former to mean that the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces should act through the Chiefs of Staffs of the Army and Navy, to the exclusion of the Cabinet, in matters which affected national defence, whereas Article 12, which gave to the Emperor the power to determine the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy, was interpreted by supporters of the Civil Government to mean that as the Emperor customarily delegated his powers to the Cabinet in peace time, he similarly delegated to it the particular power to determine the peacetime organization of the forces. The exact interpretation of the pertinent articles is more a matter for legal discussion, but the importance of the controversy lies rather in the question, which lay behind the treaty conflict, of party government supremacy over the influence of the military. The Government had issued a challenge to the military when it accepted the compromise. But the real difficulty which lay before it after the return of the delegates was the possibility of opposition to and denunciation of the Treaty by the Supreme Military Council and the Privy Council, which would have

¹ *Trans-Pacific*, May 8, 1930.

assured the continuance of the influence of the military.

In spite of the removal of Admiral Kato and his second in command from the naval staff, the Supreme Military Council passed a scathing verdict on the Treaty; "the strength given to Japan in the London Treaty is defective as far as national defence is concerned. The defect cannot be adequately filled by any supplementary programme within the Treaty limits."¹ There had been no legal necessity to submit any treaty to the Supreme Military Council, but in view of the demand of the Privy Council that it must receive information as to whether the provisions of the Treaty were detrimental to the safety of the country, the opinion of the Supreme Military Council had been taken. Subsequently, the Privy Council took an endless time to discuss ratification, during which it was rumoured that approval would be withheld, unless the Premier was willing to admit that the Government had been at fault in accepting the Treaty in the face of the opposition of the Naval General Staff.² The subsequent unconditional approval of the Treaty by the Privy Council came as a complete surprise, since it had been generally expected that the most favourable verdict would be one of qualified approval in which the Government would be censured for its extraordinary procedure. The reasons for this unconditional approval are more difficult to discern, but it does seem that public opinion was favourable to the Treaty, and that Viscount Makino, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and Prince Saionji brought pressure to bear upon

¹ *Trans-Pacific*, July 31, 1930.

² *Ibid.*, September 11, 1930.

the Privy Council.¹ Whatever the reasons for unqualified approval, the ultimate ratification placed a new interpretation upon constitutional government in Japan. "The fact that the Government had escaped censure on the part of the Council over the much debated question of the Supreme Command produces the effect of a tacit agreement on the part of the Council, which has always regarded itself as the official interpreter of the Constitution, that the Cabinet acted within its rights. This sets an important precedent for the future which cannot but strengthen the authority of the Cabinet in dealing with matters affecting the military strength of the nation. Approval of the London Naval Treaty not only marks a victory for the Hamaguchi Government, but an advance for the cause of party government, and a recognition that public opinion in this country is to be reckoned with."²

The ratification of the Treaty was indeed another landmark in the political history of Japan, for, as the preceding extract has pointed out, the controversy of 1930 was much more than one over the Naval Treaty; behind it lay the complications of the problem of dualism. Just as in 1873, the problem of who was to control the policy of the country had come to the fore once more. The Hamaguchi Cabinet came out of the conflict victorious, but chance had favoured it. It is improbable that there would have been a similar result if the Minister of the Navy had been present at the Cabinet meeting in which the decision to

¹ The newspapers had given the Treaty their whole-hearted support.

² *Trans-Pacific*, September 25, 1930.

accept the compromise was made. For if he had been present and had opposed acceptance the hands of the Cabinet would have been tied, since a decision in such a matter contrary to the wishes of the Minister of the Navy would in all probability have led to the resignation of the Minister and the subsequent fall of the Ministry through its inability to carry on without a Navy Minister. With Admiral Takarabe absent in London, however, Premier Hamaguchi was legally able to become acting Minister of the Navy.¹ In effect, therefore, when the decision to accept the compromise was made by the Cabinet, Hamaguchi gave his approval both as Prime Minister and as the representative of the Navy. The history of the Treaty between the time of its signature in London and its ratification by the Privy Council shows very clearly how near it came to defeat. If the Government had foreseen that the Privy Council would demand the advice of the Supreme War Council, it is more than doubtful whether it would have allowed Admiral Kato to be appointed to the Supreme Council after his removal from the General Staff, for that appointment gave to him another opportunity to oppose the Treaty. That the Privy Council did not act upon the advice of the Supreme Council can only be attributed to the pressure which was brought to bear by those who immediately surrounded the Emperor. Thus the Treaty was approved without any qualifying clause, without any reprimand to the Cabinet for its action. Ratification, in fact,

¹ It is significant that there was no suggestion that Admiral Osumi, the present Minister of the Navy, should attend the Naval Conversations in London at the end of 1934.

amounted to support of the Cabinet's action by that body which regarded itself as the Emperor's adviser in matters which concerned the Constitution; it was tantamount to a declaration that in matters which concerned the peace-time organization of the Army and Navy the Cabinet, and not the General Staffs, had the right to advise the Emperor. By the end of 1930, therefore, party government had won an overwhelming victory, and was in a position far stronger than it had ever occupied before. But not only is the ratification of the Naval Treaty of great importance from that point of view, but, on the other hand, it shows how near the influence of the military came to defeating the Treaty and developing the policy of the nation along the lines which it favoured. It is perhaps foolish to discuss what did not occur, but it is of interest to conjecture what might have happened if the Genro had been represented by Yamagata, and not by Saionji, and if Premier Hamaguchi had not been Acting Minister of the Navy. For then the military faction would have been able to raise up obstacles before the Treaty was approved by the Cabinet, and the Treaty would not in all probability have reached the Privy Council in the form in which it did.

The London Treaty of 1930 is, therefore, an example of the military faction's failure to influence the national policy rather than of their success. Nevertheless, that failure was intimately related to the subsequent action of that faction, for it brought home to it the realization that the political parties were gaining strength, that they had in fact achieved their strongest position. It is impossible to estimate

how much influence that realization had upon the events of 1931, but it cannot be doubted that it was an important factor, even though there were others which had a strong influence. In the preceding years the Government's policy towards China had been regarded as weak, and its participation in international peace movements such as the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the preliminary disarmament conversations, had been viewed with disfavour by the chauvinistic elements. In addition there was the growing danger of Russian armaments in the north, which meant the proximity of another military Power close to the coasts of Japan, a situation which it had been the aim of Japanese policy to avoid.

In the light of this situation and of the events which occurred in Manchuria in the last months of 1931 it is interesting to note the attitude of the military in the first half of the year. It has already been mentioned that they were dissatisfied with the Government's policy towards China, but there were also constant threats that they proposed to take the matter up vigorously with the Government if they could avoid the accusation that they were indulging in dual diplomacy.¹ Meanwhile there were suggestions for troop movements to Korea which were hard to reconcile with peaceable intentions. In July it was suggested that the forces in Korea should be increased so that reinforcements could be rushed into Manchuria in case of emergency. General Minami, the War Minister, himself declared that "the dispatch of troops from Korea would not excite the Great Powers so much as if

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, April 16, 1931.

they were sent from Japan.”¹ The General Staff also advocated the increase of the Manchurian garrison to the strength of one division; General Ugachi, the new Governor of Korea, was insistent that another division should be sent out. It is hard to understand these demands, unless the military had already decided to take matters into its own hands, especially as the Cabinet was still pursuing a conciliatory policy towards China, and was striving to economize in spite of the military’s demand for an additional 800,000,000 yen.²

Throughout August there was increased restiveness in military circles. The Army refused to participate in the economies which the Cabinet planned to make, and there were further demands that reinforcements should be sent to Manchuria.³ The War Minister laid great emphasis on possible dangers in Manchuria and Mongolia, and branded the advocates of disarmament as “blind to the actual conditions and guilty of propaganda inimical to the Army and to the State”; he stressed the strategic importance of Manchuria and Mongolia, and impressed upon the Prime Minister that, though the Army had no wish to carry on dual diplomacy, the Foreign Office should take its wishes into consideration in shaping the course of national policy.⁴

This growing estrangement between the Government and the Army bore witness to the increasing dissatisfaction of the Army with Baron Shidehara’s policy toward China; the Army’s constant demand

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, April 16, 1931.

² *Ibid.*, July 9, 1931.

³ *Ibid.*, August 13, 1931.

⁴ *Ibid.*, August 6, 1931.

for reinforcement in Korea and Manchuria suggested the existence of plans which envisaged more than the mere defence of Japanese interests. Moreover, it is difficult not to read into the remarks made by the General Staff and by the War Minister during the early part of the year a desire to compel the Foreign Office to shape its policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia to the liking of the Army. For 1931 was a critical year, since in 1932 the Disarmament Conference, to which the Government was committed, was scheduled to take place. 1931, therefore, may well have appeared to the military as the last year in which it might be able to work its will in Manchuria. There is no intention to insist that the military's action may only be interpreted in this fashion; they may have been influenced by strategic considerations. Yet in view of the situation there do seem to be grounds for insisting that such thoughts were not absent from their minds. Regarded in such a light the incidents which occurred in Manchuria assume an added significance; they may well be interpreted, as they sometimes have been, as the means by which the Army hoped to gain control of the national policy. The murder of Captain Nakamura, and the publicity it subsequently received, then assumes an added significance. If the military were searching for some incident upon which to base a seizure of control in Manchuria the murder offered vast possibilities. And the controversy over the murder which took place between the military and the Foreign Office gives added support to the proposition that the military were eager to make an issue out of the affair.

The circumstances of Captain Nakamura's visit to Mongolia were, to say the least of them, strange. That an army officer, described in his passports as an educationalist making historical and geographical studies, should be carrying with him a sum of one hundred thousand yen, with which to further his educationalist researches, seemed somewhat inexplicable.¹ The Japanese Foreign Office appears to have realized the incongruity of the situation and to have wished that as the captain had been described as an educationalist the matter should be treated on that basis, and the murder be dealt with quietly through the usual diplomatic channels. The Army, on the other hand, wished to give the case full publicity. This difference of opinion caused a delay of three weeks, for although the murder occurred about July 27th, no announcement concerning it was made until August 17th.² From the time of the murder the military authorities took matters into their own hands on the plea that the civil authorities were adopting too weak an attitude; on the day upon which the murder was made public the special investigating Army officer, who had been sent out from Japan by the General Staff, had an interview with the Governor of the Chinese province in which the murder had occurred, and impressed upon him the military's deep concern over the affair. In Tokyo it was considered that the General Staff was keeping a watching eye on the situation in case signs of weakness in the attitude

¹ *Trans-Pacific*, September 10, 1931; *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, August 27, 1931.

² The first account of the murder was released by the military authorities in Mukden on August 17, 1931, and appeared in the *Manchuria Daily News* of that date.

of the Foreign Office might force it to take strong action.¹

On the other hand, the Chinese authorities were showing considerably more concern over the Nakamura incident than they had exhibited over many others. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had ordered an inquiry to be made immediately, and had sent two envoys to Tokyo, one to make it clear that he wished the matter to be settled in an amicable fashion, and the other to ascertain common ground upon which a settlement of the outstanding difficulties in Manchuria might be made. On September 16th the Second Chinese Commission of inquiry returned to Mukden, and two days later the Japanese Consul-General received assurances from the Chinese General in Mukden that Commander Kuan-Yuheng had been imprisoned charged with responsibility for the murder of Captain Nakamura.²

From September 10th there seemed to be a general feeling amongst the Japanese diplomatic officers in Manchuria that a settlement was in sight.³ On the other hand, there was still a belief amongst the Japanese military that the Chinese authorities lacked sincerity, although in a formal conference at Mukden on September 18th the responsibility of Chinese soldiers for the murder was officially acknowledged, and the hope was expressed that the case would be settled as quickly as possible by the diplomatic authorities.

In the past the Army had complained of the Government's weak policy with regard to other incidents, such as the riots at Tsingtao and Wanpao-

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, August 27, 1931.

² *Lytton Report*, pp. 64-65.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

shan,¹ the Chientao question, and the whole question of Japanese rights in Manchuria, but never before the Nakamura murder had a *cause célèbre* been made out of an incident.² As it has been pointed out, the Army took an immediate interest in the negotiations and endeavoured to spur the Government to strong action. On September 3rd it was reported that the military were attempting to make the Foreign Office name a date by which the Chinese authorities were to return a satisfactory answer.³ There seems to have been an earnest desire on their part to make capital out of the incident, and to impress upon the public the need for swift and strong military action, to which end mass meetings were held in both Manchuria and Japan for the purpose of framing public opinion in favour of such action.⁴ During the negotiations the Japanese Press repeatedly stated that the Army had decided that the solution ought to be by force.⁵ Propaganda was even carried on from the air by the dropping of pamphlets which impressed upon the people the necessity of being alive to national defence, and educated them as to the position and size of Manchuria by the dissemination of maps

¹ Shidehara tendered the Government's regrets for the affairs, and voluntarily offered compensation, but refused to accept responsibility. See *Foreign Policy Reports*, June 22, 1932. For the Chinese version of the incident at Wanpaoshan, see *China Weekly Review*, July 18, 1931, p. 252. For the Japanese version, see *Japan Chronicle*, July 23, 1931.

² For an account of some of the other incidents which had occurred, see *The Lytton Report*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., pp. 58-63.

³ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, September 3, 1931.

⁴ *Lytton Report*, p. 65.

⁵ *Osaka Mainichi*, English edition, September 6, 1931.

of that country.¹ Captain Nakamura, moreover, was made into a national figure, and the whole nation was invited to attend his funeral, which took place in Hibiya Park at the expense of the Army.

Looking back upon the action of the military from the time the London Naval Treaty was ratified until the outbreak in Manchuria, it is possible to give two interpretations to their action. First, that actuated by fears of Russian expansion they wished to be in a position to repel any invasion of nearby territory which might be caused by that expansion, and, secondly, that themselves fired by certain expansionist desires, which have been noted in their previous behaviour, they were desirous of strengthening the policy of the country, of forcing the hand of the Government which was committed to a more peaceful foreign policy. In support of the first interpretation it is possible to cite the increased strength of Russian armaments in the East, the further consolidation of nationalism in China and the growing hostility to Japan on the mainland of Asia. But, on the other hand, there seemed to be a particular significance in the activities of the military in the early months of 1931, which had a greater purport than mere zeal for defence. It is no outrageous statement to declare that the military faction had received a bitter blow as a result of the ratification of the London Treaty, a rebuff to which it was improbable that it would take very kindly. In such circumstances it is not unreasonable to conjecture that it would attempt to regain the

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, September 17, 1931; *New York Times*, September 9, 1931.

prestige and the position which had been lost. Yet there were obstacles which had to be surmounted. The Civil Government, which had enhanced its prestige by its victory in 1930, favoured a policy of international co-operation and of peaceful relations with China, even though the situation in Manchuria had been complicated by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's repudiation and reversal of his father's policy. Looming in the near future was the Disarmament Conference, which might lead to as heavy a rebuff to the military faction as the 1930 Treaty had done. In such circumstances it does not seem unreasonable to say that the second interpretation mentioned above is not made without reason. In the previous year the military faction had suffered perhaps the most calamitous reverse of its career, which had shaken its position. Quite naturally it may have felt that it had its back to the wall, and that the only chance for it to regain its lost prestige and position lay in its forcing the direction of national policy into a channel of which it approved before the party government had time either to consolidate the gains of 1930 or to commit the country to a policy far removed from the desires of a chauvinistic faction. In the light of such an interpretation the events of 1931 do indeed assume an extraordinary significance, for from them it may be reasonably inferred that the military faction was attempting to implicate the Government and the country in militant relations with China. In other words, it was attempting to upset the prevailing policy of the Government, to force its hand so that Japanese policy might correspond more closely to the wishes of a chauvinistic faction.

The zealous interest exhibited by the military in the murder of Nakamura, therefore, becomes more than the interest of an Army in the murder of an officer. The murder appeared as a weapon with which the Government might be coerced, and out of which capital might be made to persuade the general public to the military faction's way of thought. If these inferences are correct the uproar over the murder was, then, a strategic move in the military faction's campaign to work its will in Manchuria.

If the feasibility of the theory that the military were intent upon finding some way of directing national policy into channels which they thought fit be accepted, the events of September 18th assume added significance, following as they did immediately after the Chinese authorities in Manchuria had acknowledged the responsibility of Chinese soldiers for the murder of Nakamura. Those events of the night of September 18th, during which it was alleged that Chinese soldiers blew up a portion of the permanent way of the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway, are too well known to be recounted in full, but for the purposes of this essay and in support of the theory that the Japanese military authorities were intent upon finding some means of reversing the policy of the Civil Government it is of the greatest importance to inquire into those parts of the "Incident" about the truth of which there may be reasonable doubt.¹

That the Lytton Commission was sceptical of the "Incident" was evidenced in the Report itself in which it was stated that "an explosion undoubtedly

¹ *Lytton Report*, chapter 4, pp. 66-70.

occurred on or near the railway between ten and half-past ten p.m. on September 18th,"¹ and by the subsequent statement which Lytton himself made soon after his return to London, in which he declared: "The fourth chapter of the Report deals with the events of September 18 and 19, 1931. Again I would point out to you that throughout the Report, so far as I am aware, we have never referred to the 'Incident' of September 18th, and we have not referred to it because in our opinion it is very doubtful whether it ever occurred. We have referred to the events of September 18th, about which there is no doubt. . . ." ² Moreover, this uncertainty about the "Incident" is not without reasons to support it. Apart from the difference between the Japanese and Chinese versions which,³ as the Lytton Commission stated, "are clearly, and not unnaturally in the circumstances, different and contradictory,"⁴ there are parts of the "Incident" which are, to say the least of them, hard to believe. Not the least of them is the story that the southbound express from Changchun to Mukden passed over the section which had been blown up a few minutes previously. The lieutenant who was on the scene insists that the train wavered unsteadily to one side, but no evidence was supplied by passengers that they had felt a jerk, and a jar there must have been if the train did pass over the thirty-one inch gap. More-

¹ *Lytton Report*, chapter 4, p. 71.

² *International Affairs*, London, November 1932, pp. 737 seq.

³ For the Chinese version, see V. K. Wellington Koo, *Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission*, vol. 1, pp. 85-98. For the Japanese version, see *The Manchurian Question: Japan's Case as Presented before the League of Nations*, pp. 37-44.

⁴ *Lytton Report*, p. 70.

over, in spite of the lieutenant's evidence to the effect that his men placed detonators on the rails in order to halt the train, no attempt was made by the train crew to stop the train, and no evidence was forthcoming from the members of the crew to the effect that they had heard the detonators or felt a jerk. The part allotted to the train in itself casts doubt upon the truth of the "Incident"; that a heavy express train could have jumped a thirty-one inch gap in a rail was incredible. The lieutenant in his account insisted upon the passing of the train, but it is difficult to reconcile such an account with Lieutenant-General Honjo's official proclamation which stated that the explosion occurred at 10.30 p.m.¹ For in that case the train could not possibly have passed over the damaged rail, as the lieutenant declared it did, since it arrived in Mukden punctually at 10.30 p.m. In fact at the very moment at which, according to Honjo's proclamation, the explosion took place, the express train was in the station at Mukden. Such discrepancies between the lieutenant's account and the official proclamation of the military authorities are alone enough to throw doubt upon the "Incident."

Moreover, the action of the Japanese military authorities subsequent to the "Incident" tended to throw doubt upon the credibility of their account. In the first place, no foreigner was permitted to visit the scene of the "Incident" until September 23rd, four days after the explosion occurred; in the second place, the railway gang which repaired the damage, if damage there was, was composed solely of Japa-

¹ Ben Dorfman, "The Manchurian 'Incident' of 1931," *Harper's Magazine*, September 1934, p. 456.

nese nationals whose evidence coincided with the official Japanese version.¹ The scraps of iron, the shattered ties, the bent pieces of rail and fishplates and the thirty-one inch section of rail from which the upper flange had been partly blown off, which were collected by the Japanese authorities for exhibition, proved nothing, for they might easily have been found in any railway yard or have been made to order. It was also significant that though many photographs were taken of the track after it had been repaired, none were taken of it in its damaged condition. Nor did the presence of the bodies of dead Chinese soldiers near the scene of the explosion provide proof of the "Incident," since those bodies might easily have been carried to the scene and placed in position.²

It is significant too that the Japanese military machine worked so smoothly on the night of September 18th, and the morning of September 19th, even though the military had admittedly laid minute plans in case sudden action should be necessary. It seems more than significant that a Company was carrying out night operations 1,500 yards north of the place where the explosion occurred.³ But perhaps most significant of all, though it has not been pointed out in criticism of the "Incident," was the supposedly successful mission of the soldier dispatched by Lieutenant Kawamoto to the Company commander in penetrating the body of Chinese troops, "estimated at between three to four hundred" strong,⁴ which,

¹ Ben Dorfman, "The Manchurian 'Incident' of 1931," *Harper's Magazine*, September 1934, p. 454. ² *Ibid.*, pp. 454-455 and 458-459.

³ *Lytton Report*, p. 68.

⁴ *Ibid.*

according to the lieutenant's account, must have been in position between the lieutenant's patrol and No. 3 Company to the north.

It is possible to go deeper into the contradictions and discrepancies in the accounts given by the Japanese authorities, but so many critical analyses have been written that it seems useless to pursue the inquiry any further.¹ It does, however, seem pertinent to quote the conclusions of the Lytton Commission: "Tense feeling undoubtedly existed between the Japanese and military forces. The Japanese, as was explained to the Commission in evidence, had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of September 18th-19th this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese . . . had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorized attack on the Japanese forces and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 and 10.30 p.m. on September 18th, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military action of Japanese troops during this night . . . cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence.

¹ K. Colegrove, "The War Lords of Japan," *North American Review*, May 1932, pp. 390-409; A. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1931, pp. 438 seq.

In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence."¹

It is obvious, therefore, that the Japanese evidence in support of the explosion was intrinsically weak, and the various contradictions and discrepancies of the reports raised doubts of their credibility in the minds of most thinking people. It has been argued, however, that the "Incident" was of little importance, since a conflict was inevitable in any case. Such a statement must be challenged, for the Government, in spite of the many points of difference which were admittedly unsettled between Japan and China, had pursued a policy of conciliation up to the time of the September outbreak; resort to force was a very sudden reversal of policy. Yet during the latter part of 1930 and the early part of 1931 there had been ever growing disapproval of a conciliatory policy, because of the meagre results which it had achieved. The Army, as it has been pointed out, had been a centre of that dissatisfaction, and its activity in the early months of 1931 gave the impression that it was very willing to force the hand of the Government and take control itself; the uproar which the Nakamura murder occasioned conveyed that impression. Viewed in such a light the September 18th "Incident" might well be interpreted as another "Nakamura murder," as another opportunity to bring pressure for reversal of the Government's policy. Whether it was a mere figment of the military imagination, whether it was a subtle strategic move engineered by the Japanese military themselves,

¹ *Lytton Report*, p. 71.

whether the Chinese were guilty and the Japanese innocent of any underhand plot matters very little, since the "Incident" gave to the military the opportunity to reverse the Government's policy and pursue one more in accord with their own desires and designs.

There is no intention to insist that there were no other factors involved in such a change of policy. The *Lytton Report* itself drew attention to the dissatisfaction which existed in Japan before the "Incident." "Certain internal, economic and political factors had undoubtedly for some time been preparing the Japanese people for a resumption of the 'positive policy' in Manchuria. The dissatisfaction of the Army; the financial policy of the Government; the appearance of a new force emanating from the Army, the country districts and the nationalist youth, which expressed dissatisfaction with all political parties, which despised the compromise methods of Western civilization and relied on the virtues of Old Japan and which included in its condemnation the self-seeking methods whether of financiers or politicians; the fall in commodity prices which inclined the primary producer to look to an adventurous foreign policy for the alleviation of his lot; the trade depression, which caused the industrial and commercial community to believe that better business would result from more vigorous foreign policy; all these factors were preparing the way for the abandonment of the Shidehara 'policy of conciliation' with China which seemed to have achieved such meagre results."¹ But there is an intention to insist that, apart from

¹ *Lytton Report*, pp. 66-67.

these movements from which it may have received additional support, the Army had been the most vociferous element in demanding a resort to force. Thus in view of its demands, its activities in the early months of 1931 and the peculiarly mysterious circumstances of the "Incident," in which it was deeply involved, it is difficult not to visualize the Army as the leading actor; subsequent events tended to uphold that opinion. It seemed in fact that a military machine was directing, rather than enforcing, a national policy.

The events of September 18th led to attacks upon Mukden, Changchun and Kirin and the subsequent seizure of those cities by Japanese forces.¹ Meanwhile in Japan news of the outbreak had been followed immediately by a meeting of the Cabinet, at which the War Minister's proposal that reinforcements should be sent to Manchuria was opposed by the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and the Foreign Minister. The War Minister was blunt in his demands, reminding the Cabinet that such action could be decided upon by the military authorities alone in their capacity of advisers to the Emperor upon military matters, but that it had been thought advisable to approach the Cabinet on the subject.² The opposition of the Cabinet was, however, unavailing, since General Minami was able to confront it very shortly afterwards with a *fait accompli*; in answer to the demands of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army troops had been dispatched to Manchuria

¹ *Lytton Report*, pp. 70-71 and 67.

² *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, October 1, 1931; *Trans-Pacific*, October 1, 1931.

by the Commander-in-Chief in Korea, who, though he had received no orders from Tokyo, accounted for his action by a plea of emergency action. A few days later General Minami stated that all military action ceased on September 24th, and that matters had passed into the hands of the Foreign Office.¹ That this statement was far from the truth was evidenced by the bombardment of Chang Hsueh-liang's temporary capital, Chinchow, on October 8th and by the release of pamphlets in that city which informed the people that the Japanese troops did not recognize the existing Government and were taking action to overthrow its headquarters.² The *Lytton Report* states that the military operations, of which the bombardment of Chinchow was the first, were attributed by the Japanese military to "Chinese provocation. An anti-Japanese demonstration on September 20th, the destruction of a railway station at Lung-chingtsun and the explosion of some bombs, which did no damage, on Japanese premises at Harbin on September 23rd, are mentioned as examples of such provocation. Complaint is also made of growing banditry and of the activities of disbanded soldiers. All these things, it is claimed, finally forced the Japanese to new military action against their will."³ But whatever the reasons for the new operations, there is no doubt that matters had not yet passed out of the hands of the military into those of the Foreign Office. It was significant that the proposed mission of General Oshima, an ex-War Minister, to draw the Army and the Government

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, October 15, 1931.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Lytton Report*, p. 72.

at home closer together was cancelled as a consequence of Army opposition.¹ The antagonism of the Cabinet to the military activities was further evidenced by Baron Shidehara's criticism of General Honjo's invasion of the field of diplomacy.²

The offensive of which the bombardment of Chinchow had been the first operation was carried forward in the following months. Throughout October and part of November there were skirmishes with Chinese troops on the Nonni River, which ended on November 19th with the occupation of Tsi-tsihar by Japanese troops.³ In December 1931, after the arrival of reinforcements, concentration was made in preparation for attack upon Chinchow. In spite of offers made by the Chinese to withdraw all their troops within the Great Wall, provided that four Foreign Powers were willing to guarantee the maintenance of a neutral zone north and south of Chinchow,⁴ the drive towards the Great Wall and Chinchow was continued. By January 3, 1932, the Chinese forces had been driven inside the Great Wall.⁵ In the north, in January and February 1932, an advance was made towards Harbin, where it was reported the lives of Japanese nationals had been endangered by the presence of rival Chinese forces; Harbin was occupied on February 5th.⁶ Further skirmishes followed in the ensuing months in the regions north of Harbin. It is,

¹ *Japan Chronicle*, October 15, 1931.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Lytton Report*, pp. 72-75. (The Nonni Bridge was 300 miles from the railway zone. The ultimatum sent to General Ma demanding his withdrawal was framed by the War Office. See *League of Nations Official Journal*, December 1931, p. 2575.)

⁴ *League of Nations Official Journal*, December 1931, p. 2531.

⁵ *Lytton Report*, pp. 77-78.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

however, unnecessary to chronicle all the military operations which followed the "Incident" and effected the rounding out of the boundaries of Manchukuo. It is of much greater importance to realize that the Civil Government had lost control of the Japanese forces in Manchuria which acted as they saw fit in spite of the opposition of the Government and the Japanese protestations to the League of Nations that there would be no further hostilities.

Yet it has been deemed necessary to enter upon a somewhat lengthy discussion of the events in Manchuria, because they do provide evidence upon which to maintain that Japan's action in that country was precipitated by the military and that the Civil Government was from the first greatly perturbed. The Foreign Office became in fact merely a propaganda department which ensured that the action of the military should be interpreted abroad as favourably as possible.¹ By the end of 1931, even by the end of September of 1931, it was apparent that the military had once more taken advantage of its special position to direct national policy along a path which it favoured. For the purposes of this essay the events in Manchuria, and to a lesser extent those in Shanghai in 1932,² are of the greatest significance, because they

¹ Japan *Weekly Chronicle*, December 24, 1931. For the communications sent to the Secretary of the League of Nations by the Japanese Government throughout 1931, see *League of Nations Official Journal*, December 1931, pp. 2451-2592.

² A. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1932, pp. 470 seq.; *Lytton Report*, pp. 84-86. For the Japanese Navy's version, see two pamphlets issued by the Navy Department: *The Shanghai Incident and the Japanese Navy*, Tokyo, 1932; *On the Shanghai Incident and the General Sino-Japanese Situation: A Collection of Interviews and Addresses*, Tokyo, 1932.

do show clearly that the military in the space of a few days were able to reverse the policy which the Civil Government had been pursuing and to launch Japan upon a course of action which had world-wide implications. Of course, it may be argued that the Civil Government had given its tacit consent to a military coup, but as yet no evidence has been produced to substantiate such an argument. On the contrary, all the evidence points to the opposition of the Civil Government to the action of the military and their desire to adhere to a policy of conciliation. If there was tacit consent it may only be concluded that the duplicity of Japanese diplomacy is beyond the imagination of the Occidental.

CHAPTER SIX

THE REVIVAL OF MILITARY INFLUENCE

THE "Incident" of September 18th, whether it really occurred or was merely a figment of a very willing military imagination, therefore afforded an opportunity for the military to reverse the conciliatory policy of Baron Shidehara and direct Japan along a path of action which they favoured. Yet intervention in Siberia which had offered a chance for the military to deviate from the course which the Civil Government had envisaged had placed them once before in a very similar position. Events in Siberia, however, instead of leading to favourable results to which the military could point with pride, had bred a feeling of discontent amongst the people that so great a financial expenditure had led to so negligible and disappointing a result. On the other hand, events in Manchuria in 1931 had produced overwhelming success, and public opinion, weary of the meagre results attained by the conciliatory policy of Shidehara, was enthusiastically appreciative. The example of the Siberian expedition showed, however, that temporary control of the national policy was not tantamount to permanent control. It is pertinent, therefore, to consider how the military have fared since the "Incident," to discern whether they have maintained their control, and, if they have, to ascertain in what fashion they have employed it.

In Japan itself the domestic policy of the Minseito

Government raised up as much, if not more, hostility than the meagre results obtained by its policy of conciliation and international co-operation. The deflationary process adopted by the Finance Minister at the peak of the 1929 economic boom led to calamitous results when the world depression settled down upon Japan. By the middle of 1931 prices had fallen to the level of 1916.¹ In 1930 exports had declined by 31 per cent and a year later by a further 22 per cent; the resulting drop in purchasing power was reflected in a 30 per cent drop in imports in 1930 and by a further drop of 20 per cent in 1931. Moreover, contemporaneously with the outbreak in Manchuria, Great Britain abandoned the Gold Standard, and thereby it became possible for British merchants to sell more cheaply in the Chinese market, in which Japanese merchants were already suffering from the boycott of Japanese goods. The Seiyukai Cabinet which came into office after the resignation of the Minseito immediately reimposed the gold embargo, but its action only inflamed public opinion when it was realized that the abandonment of the Gold Standard had chiefly benefited financial interests which had indulged in dollar-buying speculation, whilst the Government had suffered a loss on account of the foreign obligations of the Yokohama Specie Bank, amounting to 170 million gold yen which had to be paid in depreciated currency.² Economic depression was rampant. Industry and agriculture suffered

¹ A. Andreades, "Japanese Finance Since the World War," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 493.

² *New York Times*, December 21, 1931; *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, December 31, 1931.

together, the latter even more perhaps than the former, for the average price of rice had fallen from the equivalent of four dollars a bushel in 1928 to one dollar and forty cents in 1932, and the price of raw silk from six hundred and ninety dollars a bale to one hundred and fifty dollars.

Economic depression, and the discontent which it engendered, fostered a tendency to blame the existing form of government and the corruption and incompetence of the political parties. Even before the Manchurian "Incident" rumblings of discontent had been heard not only with the meagre results achieved by the Government's foreign policy, but with the entire system of government. The *Lytton Report* had pointed to the "appearance of a new political force emanating from the Army, the country districts and the nationalist youth, which expressed dissatisfaction with all political parties, which despised the compromise methods of Western civilization and relied upon the virtues of Old Japan, and which included in its condemnation the self-seeking methods whether of financiers or politicians."¹ Yet after the Minseito Ministry, which had been thwarted and its policy abroad reversed by the military, had resigned in December 1931, the precedent which had been established towards the end of the last decade was followed, and the leader of the opposition, even though he was without a majority in the Diet, was called upon to form a Cabinet. The Sieyukai, however, even though they had in the past advocated a stronger foreign policy and had supported the claims of the Navy in the con-

¹ *Lytton Report*, p. 66.

troversy over the London Treaty, were no more successful in re-establishing confidence in the leadership of political parties and in the existing form of government. The assassination of the Premier, which followed that of Mr. Inouye, the former Finance Minister and president of the Minseito, and of Baron Dan, the head of the Mitsui firm, demonstrated that the replacement of one party by another had not calmed the discontent with the whole system of government.

By the end of September 1931, it was patently obvious that the military had successfully reversed the conciliatory policy of the Government towards China. Success abroad, however, merely increased their demand that the whole political system should be cleansed. For, as it has been pointed out, not only were the rank and file of the Army drawn for the most part from the country districts, but there had come into prominence a new officer group which represented the interests of small traders and the owners of small landed property who had suffered considerably from the ramifications of the fall in agricultural prices. The strength of this group, which was bitterly opposed to the political parties, since it considered them as the slaves of the large commercial and financial interests, was evidenced in December 1931 by the appointment, as War Minister, of General Araki, who was in sympathy with its views.¹ It would seem plausible, therefore, to discern in the assassinations of 1932 the hand of this group which was predominant in the Army. It was rumoured that officers of staff rank had been involved in the abortive *coup d'état*

¹ Japan *Weekly Chronicle*, December 24, 1931.

of October 17th and November 1931,¹ and young officers and cadets of the Army and Navy most certainly participated in the assassination of Mr. Inukai on May 15, 1932. Yet in spite of ample proof that the military were involved in the 1931 and 1932 activities against the existing system of government, it is impossible to saddle them with the entire responsibility; there were other reactionary groups, branded as Fascist, which were as desirous of the overthrow of the political parties.² On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the military had spread abroad much propaganda against the existing form of government and that the chauvinistic speeches of General Araki, in which he insisted that the Imperial Principle of the Japanese nation should be propagated "over the Seven Seas and the Five Continents" and that anything or anyone that hindered its progress should be done away with by force, were not without effect upon those other groups and upon the people.

The assassination of Inukai, however, although military leaders denied that they had countenanced the action of the army cadets and junior naval officers who had participated, resulted in a situation which they regarded with favour. It had been amply proved that the political parties lacked the country's confidence, and a situation had arisen which demanded a strong national Government.³ Several alternatives, however, might be followed. Either the Seiyukai could remain in office under the leadership of its new president, Dr. Suzuki, the

¹ New York *Herald Tribune*, April 26, 1932.

² *Foreign Policy Reports, 1932-1933*, p. 201.

³ New York *Times*, May 17, 1932 (quoted from the *Asahi*).

Minseito be recalled to office, or an extra-parliamentary Government set up. In the crisis of May 1932 the first alternative appeared far from satisfactory. In the five months of its existence the Seiyukai Government had antagonized certain groups in the country by its apparent pandering to the financial interests, by its attempt to secure control of the South Manchurian Railway organization, and by its opposition to the dispatch of additional troops to Shanghai.¹ The second alternative, the recall of the Minseito, was equally unsatisfactory, since that party had lost its leaders as a result of the death of Hamaguchi, the assassination of Inouye and the retirement of Shidehara. Moreover, it held some hundred and seventy-five fewer seats than the Seiyukai in the House of Representatives and the chance of increasing that number appeared small in view of the discredit heaped upon it during its last tenure of office. In such circumstances the third alternative, which the military favoured as a result of their antagonism to political parties, appeared to be a possibility. Baron Hiranuma, the vice-president of the Privy Council and organizer of the Kokuhonsha, a reactionary society upon which General Araki looked with favour, was a candidate for the leadership of an extra-parliamentary Government. But the Genro was opposed to any appointment which would lead to the abrogation of parliamentary government. At the time of the controversy over the

¹ *New York Times*, February 6 and 7, 1932. It is significant that Baron Dan, who was soon afterwards assassinated, had been deputed by the Cabinet to inform the military authorities that the country was financially incapable of undertaking new military operations in the Shanghai area.

London Naval Conference he had shown his preference for the political party system, and in the crisis of 1932 he once more set his face firmly against delivering the government of the country into the hands of a dictator, whether military or Fascist, whose tenure of office would spell the destruction of all the progress parliamentary government had made in the preceding decade. Yet, on the other hand, the military were firm in their refusal to countenance a continuation of a one-party or even a coalition form of government.¹ Out of the crisis, however, there arose a Government which satisfied both the Genro's insistence upon the continuation of parliamentary institutions and political parties and the military's demand that there should be neither a single party nor a coalition Government; Admiral Saito, a non-party man, headed the new Government, whilst the Seiyukai received three Cabinet posts, the Minseito two and non-party men six. In other words, there was a return to the system of the pre-1918 period in which non-party men controlled the Cabinets and party men were compensated for their support by small Cabinet posts. The negotiations and the compromise which led to the appointment of Saito are significant because from them it may be seen that the discontent of which faint rumblings had been heard before the Manchurian "Incident" had increased in strength. The appointment of Saito is, however, as significant because it suggested that either the Army was not yet fully convinced of the necessity of a dictatorship or else that there were still certain forces which were able to bridle its ambition.

¹ *New York Times*, May 17, 1932.

The Saito Government was accepted by the military. General Araki remained as Minister of War, and Count Uchida, who had been president of the South Manchurian Railway, became Foreign Minister with the approval of the Army. It appeared in fact that the compromise had given the Army control over the nation's foreign policy and had left domestic affairs in the control of non-party and party men. Complete overthrow of the political parties and parliamentary government had not, therefore, been accomplished, whether because of an unwillingness on the part of the Army to take such a step, or because the Genro's opposition had been too strong, or because the interests behind the political parties had exerted too much pressure it is difficult to discern. The military were therefore in a peculiar position. They had successfully opposed another one-party Government, but they had acquiesced, or had been compelled to acquiesce, in the substitution of a national Government in which, although it was led by a non-party man, the political parties, the continuance of which they had deplored, had a share. Moreover, such a Government might still obstruct the designs of the military by its control over increased expenditure. The first few months of the Government's existence showed clearly that there was no complete understanding between it and the military. Throughout June, July and August 1932, there were constant reminders that the Army was impatient with the Government's failure to recognize Manchukuo.¹ And even after virtual recognition by the Treaty of Alliance which was signed in September 1932 the

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, June 30 and August 18, 1932.

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Army continued to impress upon the Government that it was impossible to co-operate with the League of Nations if it refused to understand the Japanese point of view.¹ This attitude towards the League was by no means new. It had been one of the accusations against the political parties that they had prostituted Japan to international co-operation through the League of Nations, which was oftentimes interpreted as an agency through which the white races were attempting to control the world.² Yet the Saito Government had withstood the demands of the Army with regard to recognition probably because it was unwilling to go to such lengths before it had received some intimation of the view taken by the Commission of Inquiry. It is perhaps significant that twelve days after the *Lytton Report* was signed by the Commission at Peiping, Manchukuo was virtually recognized by the Treaty of Alliance.³

The year 1932, therefore, witnessed a resurrection of the system which had existed before the inauguration of the party Cabinets of the third decade. The form of a parliamentary Government remained, but within it only compromise could keep together men of such divergent views as General Araki and Mr. Takahashi. The military's position within the Government was strong, but it was not all powerful. Yet the Government, though tardily in the eyes of the military, upheld the policy which the Army had inaugurated in Manchuria; Manchukuo was

¹ General Araki's speech in this connexion. *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, October 6, 1932.

² H. E. Wildes, *Japan in Crisis*, New York, 1934.

³ The *Lytton Report* was signed on September 4, 1932.

recognized on September 15, 1932,¹ and in March 1933, the Government served notice of its determination to withdraw from the League of Nations. On the other hand, not all the demands of the military were acted upon. Farm relief, which they had insisted upon, was postponed from June until August 1932, when 170,000,000 yen were appropriated for that purpose for one year.² Relief appropriations subsequently fell to 159 millions in 1933 and 79.4 millions in 1934.³ Yet it is significant that though the military had not set up a Government in which they were all powerful they had found one which catered to their financial needs. The military budget of 1931-1932 had been 45.46 million yen, but in 1932-1933 it rose to 697.2 millions and a year later to 851.8 millions.⁴ In view of the support which the political parties had shown for recognition of Manchukuo and the widespread indignation which the League of Nations' attitude had engendered, acceptance of the Army's demands was not perhaps surprising.

The condemnation of Japan by the League of Nations had stirred up the indignation of the whole nation against the members of the League. Japan's withdrawal had given the Ministers of the Army and the Navy the opportunity to impress upon the military forces the necessity for them to uphold the prestige and moral of the Japanese people in face

¹ In June 1932 the Seiyukai and the Minseito had issued a joint resolution advocating immediate recognition. *New York Times*, June 14, 1932.

² Only 42 per cent of that amount was to be spent on farm relief. *New York Times*, August 26, 1932.

³ *Trans-Pacific*, January 26, 1933, and January 25, 1934.

⁴ *Armaments Year Book*, 1934.

of European antagonism, and had brought about the re-establishment by the Army of the four divisions which had been disbanded during the period of economy. Yet in spite of the nation-wide antagonism to the League, and the unity caused thereby, clouds began to gather on the horizon in the latter part of 1933; a contest between the civilian and military element of the Government appeared not far off. Count Uchida had been succeeded by Hirota at the Foreign Office, and the attention of the diplomats ever since Japan's withdrawal from the League had been focused upon the inauguration of amicable relations with other nations. The Government's policy had become one of what Admiral Saito termed "Concordant diplomacy" which the military feared meant one akin to that of 1921. General Araki was loud in his protestations; "We do not want to have that bitter experience repeated."¹

On the other hand, the Civil Government was greatly disturbed by suggestions which had been put forward, towards the end of 1933, by the Kwantung High Command advocating a re-organization of the South Manchurian Railway. This scheme, by which it was proposed to place the s.M.R. under the control of a bureau within the High Command, was naturally repellent to the Government, since a large amount of capital had been sunk in the railway by the Government itself and by financial concerns, and the presidency of the s.M.R. had been regarded in the past as a political preserve. That all was not well within the Cabinet was evidenced by the Conference of five Cabinet

¹ *Trans-Pacific*, January 4, 1934.

Ministers which was held in October after conversations had taken place between Mr. Takahashi, the Finance Minister, and General Araki. From the statements made after that Conference it was evident that the question of military appropriations in the next budget had not been the only or most important matter discussed. General Araki had concerned himself not only with questions of appropriations and technical matters of defence, but with the whole field of finance, industry, agriculture, education, in fact with all those matters which concerned the Government and only very indirectly the problem of defence.¹ A month later the military authorities exploded another bomb-shell. General Araki publicly announced proposals for a conference, to be held in 1935, which all Powers interested in the Far East should be invited to attend, the agenda of which was to be concerned with the recognition of Manchukuo and with the revision of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact.² His announcement was the more astonishing since the Foreign Office, upon whose preserve he had obviously trespassed, disclaimed any knowledge of such proposals.³ Quite naturally there was alarm amongst the political parties. Since 1932 they had suffered a depletion of power, but in the latter part of 1933 there had been a movement towards a united front of the Seiyukai and the Minseito, the necessity for which was more fully realized as a result of the stand taken by General Araki at the conference of the five ministers and the proposal made by the military for the reorganization of the

¹ *Trans-Pacific*, October 6, 1933, and January 4, 1934.

² *Ibid.*, November 9, 1933.

³ *Ibid.*

South Manchurian Railway. By the end of 1933, therefore, a clash between the Civil Government and the military seemed imminent.

In January 1934, however, General Araki resigned on the grounds of ill health. There is no doubt that he was prevented from performing his duties, but, on the other hand, there was every possibility of his recovery within a short period. Yet his illness came at a very critical period when the budget was about to be presented to the Diet. His resignation was, therefore, perhaps more significant than it appeared on casual observance. The military had before them a very recent example of what might occur when either the Minister of the Navy or War was unable to attend Cabinet meetings. The success of the Minseito Government in the London Naval Treaty had been partly attributable to lack of representation of the naval point of view in the Cabinet.¹ The military authorities, therefore, may have realized the consequences which might follow from General Araki's incapacity, especially at such a time when the Cabinet was engaged in pushing its budget through the Diet and opposition to the military appropriations was certain to be raised by the political parties. Whether the military were or were not moved by such considerations, General Araki was immediately replaced by General Hayashi, and it was immediately evident that there would be no break in the continuity of the military's policy. General Hayashi made it clear that he would uphold his predecessor's principles and defence proposals and would insist upon further relief measures for agriculture.² "The

¹ See Chapter Five, *supra*.

² *Trans-Pacific*, January 25, 1934.

Army with Hayashi as War Minister will constitute as much a warning and a threat to the political parties as it was under the former War Minister."¹ Further proof that the pressure of the military upon the Cabinet was being maintained was revealed by the Premier's warning to Dr. Suzuki, the president of the Seiyukai, that any provocation of the military by the political parties would be dangerous. For in the last week of January 1934 there had been a veritable onslaught upon the military by members of the Diet, who pointed out to the Ministers of War and the Navy that there was a growing impression amongst the people that the military were transgressing the Imperial Edict of Meiji, which clearly warned soldiers and sailors against meddling in politics, and were injuring Japan's international position by their meddling. In reply the Service Ministers declared that the Services had no wish to meddle in politics, but that as they were responsible for the defence of the country they felt it their bounden duty to call the attention of the Government to certain matters which were sapping the strength of the country and endangering its safety.²

Although the Foreign Office came to the fore in April when its spokesman delivered a speech promulgating a Pan-Asiatic doctrine and insisting that Japan must act and decide alone what was good for China,³ the military continued to play an important part. At the end of March it was reported

¹ *Trans-Pacific*, February 1, 1934.

² See Chapter Three *supra*; *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, February 8, 1934; *Trans-Pacific*, February 1, March 8, 1934.

³ C. C. Wang, "Pan-Asiatic Doctrine of Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1934, p. 60.

that General Hayashi, who was desirous of crystalizing the will of the whole Army before taking any matter up with the Government, had decided to set up an organ of inquiry within the War Department to study domestic and international questions, and to present the findings to the Government.¹ A few days later at a conference of Army commanders Hayashi declared that there were many domestic matters calling for reform, and that though there had been a vigorous growth of racial and national unity since the Manchurian affair there was yet need for further fostering of that spirit. He exhorted the Army to cultivate the martial spirit; "The whole Army must be solidly united, and devote itself to the cause of loyalty."² In spite, therefore, of the belief amongst certain groups in Japan that Araki's resignation had marked a change in policy, there was still great military activity.

Yet more obvious signs of the military's activity in the domestic field became apparent in October 1934. On October 2nd the Press section of the War Department issued a pamphlet which set forth the views of the Army not only on defence, but on all domestic questions. General Hayashi, who was absent from Tokyo on a tour of inspection, when questioned about the pamphlet was cautious in his reply, stating that he had no knowledge of the pamphlet and that it did not represent the views of the Army as a whole, although the Army had been studying "problems of national defence in a broader sense."³ On the other hand, the Vice-

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, March 29, 1934.

² *Ibid.*, April 5, 1934.

³ *New York Times*, October 3, 1934.

Minister of War stated frankly that the pamphlet did represent the Army's views and that it had been issued in order to acquaint the people with those views in the belief "that the people would support those who are sincerely concerned with the nation's welfare." The part of the pamphlet, however, which caused most concern was that which intimated that all poverty was caused by capitalists and that economic reform must lie along the lines of State socialism.¹ In view of the approaching budget it was perhaps natural that the military should desire to prepare the people for large military appropriations by hinting at threats of trouble from Soviet Russia, but the delineation of economic reform by the establishment of State socialism was a sudden move even though in the past such a process had been advocated. The object of such a statement may of course have been to remind the political parties of the fate which awaited political institutions if the Diet rejected the military's budgetary demands. Whether that be true or not the Cabinet acquiesced in the military's demand for an appropriation of over one billion yen, yet only after General Hayashi had threatened resignation and Admiral Osumi had insisted that the international situation had to be considered.² On the other hand, in the Diet the military's demand for almost half the national budget met with strong opposition.³ In February 1935 the Army, in spite of the public criticism aroused by its last pamphlet, issued

¹ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, October 11, 1934.

² *New York Times*, November 24, 1934.

³ *Ibid.*, February 1, 1935. (The military had demanded an appropriation of 1,550,000,000 yen out of a total budget of 2,000,000,000 yen.)

another in which it set forth a creed of nationalism, deplored the injury suffered by Japanese civilization at the hands of hastily imported democracy and capitalism, and stressed the need for an immediate remedy of the evils which afflicted politics, economics, education, social conditions and public thought, in order that the country might be strengthened at a time of such national emergency. Finally it insisted that the Army itself alone stood for the development of Japan's unique civilization based upon the principles of the Imperial Way.¹

It is obvious, therefore, that General Araki's replacement by General Hayashi had marked no change in the policy of the military. In domestic affairs Army concern and interference had continued and after October 1934 had developed along a course of public appeal for support of the Army's policy. The stress which those appeals laid on the state of national emergency and the crisis was explicable in the light of the appropriations which the military were demanding, but the further stress laid upon the responsibility of the capitalists for the existing economic and financial troubles is more difficult to understand. For that insistence upon capitalist responsibility was stressed far beyond the lengths to which collusion between the military and the capitalists, which some writers have insisted did exist,² would have permitted it to go. Yet, on the other hand, if the Army truly represented anti-capitalist feeling and championed the agricultural classes, as it professed to, its attitude towards farm

¹ New York Times, February 25, 1935.

² Compare O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan*, New York, 1934, passim.

relief was as remarkable. For its demands for vast military appropriations had led inevitably to a comparatively diminutive appropriation for relief.¹ However, whatever the reasons for the attitude of the military, the acceptance of their budgetary demands in the face of opposition from the Cabinet and the Diet and the insistence of Admiral Saito that the political parties should refrain from annoying them proved that their influence over the Government was undiminished.

Yet it was not in such matters alone that the military had been successful and that their influence was apparent. That influence was the most important factor in shaping the Government's attitude toward the approaching Naval Conference. Ever since 1930 the terms of the London Naval Treaty had been anathema to the Navy, a strong section of which led by Admiral Kanji Kato and Admiral Suyetsugu had continuously voiced its disapproval.² The young naval officers who murdered Premier Inukai had pleaded the disgrace of the Treaty in extenuation of their crime, and the assassin of Premier Hamaguchi had made a similar plea. Naval agitation against the Treaty and insistence upon its abrogation were widespread at the beginning of 1934. In June a statement of a Foreign Office spokesman declaring that abrogation should be Japan's last card was received with violent protests in the Navy. In the middle of July representative authorities of the Navy drew up a memorial, signed by some sixty officers of the rank of captain upward, which demanded abrogation of

¹ 15,000,000 yen compared with over a billion yen appropriation for the military.

² *Trans-Pacific*, September 20, 1934.

the Washington Treaty.¹ And in September their action bore fruit when abrogation was decided upon by the Cabinet, whose hand was forced by the attitude of Admiral Osumi, the Navy Minister, who had consented to remain in the Cabinet only on condition that Japan should be freed from the shackles of unequal treaties, that national defence should be strengthened, the naval estimates approved and the South Sea Mandates retained.² On December 30th the Cabinet's decision to abrogate the Treaty was followed by an announcement to that effect to the other signatories.³

The influence of the military was likewise amply demonstrated by the results of the controversy over the reorganization of the administration in Manchuria. Hitherto the offices of Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, and Ambassador to Manchukuo and Governor of Kwantung Province, though held by one man and that man a soldier, since a civilian was incapable of becoming Commander-in-Chief, had been under the control of three separate departments of the Cabinet, the War Department, the Foreign Office and the Overseas Ministry. In August 1934, however, the Army began to agitate for a reorganization to be based upon the Commander-in-Chief and the Ambassador, who was to be under the direct control of the Premier.⁴ The Commander-in-Chief was to attend to all matters relating to the maintenance of peace in Manchuria and to Japan-

¹ *Trans-Pacific*, July 12, 1934.

² *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, July 26, 1934.

³ *London Times*, December 31, 1934.

⁴ *Trans-Pacific*, August 16, 1934.

Manchukuo joint defence, whilst the Ambassador, whose office was to be combined with that of the Commander-in-Chief, was to have control over all police rights, matters of taxation and economic organization, and over the South Manchurian Railway.¹ In effect the Army's reorganization plan meant that all Manchurian affairs would be placed within the control of the military subject only to the Ambassador's relation to the Premier and to his direction by the Foreign Minister in purely diplomatic matters; the participation of the Overseas Ministry in administrative and economic matters was to be abolished altogether.² This plan was greeted with a storm of protest from the political parties which envisaged Manchuria becoming a closed military preserve, and their opposition was increased by the knowledge that in the past the Army had been antagonistic to capitalist exploitation and had declared its intention to set up a planned economy in Manchuria.³ Negotiations between the War Department, the Foreign Office and the Overseas Ministry proceeded throughout the latter part of August and the first part of September.⁴ Yet no compromise could be reached. The military were adamant, and it was rumoured that General Hayashi had threatened resignation if the plan of reorganization was not accepted.⁵

¹ *International Gleanings from Japan*, September 15, 1934.

² A similar plan had been suggested by the military at the end of 1933, but its consideration had been dropped probably because their whole attention at that time was focused upon obtaining acceptance for their budgetary demands.

³ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, August 16, 1934.

⁴ *London Times*, September 13, 1934.

⁵ *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, September 13, 1934; *China Weekly Review*, September 13, 1934.

Ultimately the military were victorious and Manchuria fell virtually under the control of the Army. The reorganization scheme set up a Manchukuo Bureau within the Cabinet with an Army Officer at its head; the offices of Ambassador and Commander-in-Chief were to be held concurrently, with the Ambassador under the control of the Premier, who was of course advised by the Manchukuo Bureau, and the Governor of Kwantung Province under the Ambassador. The latter was to supervise the South Manchurian Railway, the railway zone, the courts, the communication offices and even the Technical University of Port Arthur. In addition the office of Chief of Police Affairs was to be held concurrently by the Commander of the Gendarmerie.¹ Thus the Foreign Office was compelled to be content with a shadow of controlling influence over the diplomatic functions of the envoy, whilst the Overseas Ministry was completely neglected in the reorganization scheme.² Control in Manchuria, therefore, fell completely into the hands of the military through the power of the General Staff to appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, who was also the Ambassador, and through the predominating influence of the military in the newly formed Manchukuo Bureau by which the Premier was advised.

The immediate result of the reorganization was

¹ *Trans-Pacific*, September 27, 1934; *China Weekly Review*, September 29, 1934.

² It was suggested in some quarters that upon assuming office Admiral Okada had pledged himself to reorganization in exchange for the support of the Army. It was significant that by failing to appoint an Overseas Minister he had left the Overseas Ministry without a leader to fight its cause. *Trans-Pacific*, September 27, 1934.

the resignation of five thousand police in the Kwantung Territory in protest against the Government's plan which made the Commander of the Kwantung Gendarmerie head of the civilian police. Subsequently all the Kwantung Government officials, the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Overseas Affairs and the Counsellor of the Overseas Ministry resigned in protest.¹ The Premier promised reconsideration of the plan, but it was rumoured that General Hayashi objected to any alteration.² Subsequently the agitation was quieted, and once more the military had had their way.

The Manchurian "Incident" had afforded the military the opportunity to reverse the policy of the Government, to revenge themselves for the set-back in their influence which had begun after the Siberian expedition and culminated in the reverse suffered by the Naval authorities in the controversy over the London Naval Treaty, and to re-establish their influence and their prestige. Yet the cursory summary which has been made of the events of the three and a half years which followed the military's seizure of initiative in Manchuria has demonstrated clearly that their renewed influence did not stop short in Manchuria nor cease with the establishment of Manchukuo. Its continuance was apparent in the events which led up to the termination of government by political parties and in the acquiescence of the non-party Governments in such demands of the military as the vast appropriations of the period, the reorganization of the administration in Manchuria and the

¹ New York *Herald Tribune*, October 19, 1934.

² *Trans-Pacific*, October 26, 1934.

abrogation of the Washington Treaty. Yet the new movement in the Army, though noticeable before the "Incident" occurred, had become more pronounced in the three succeeding years. The Army was dissatisfied with Governments which would only grant its demands because they feared the consequences of refusal. It, therefore, took advantage of the prestige which it had gained by success in the Manchurian adventure, of the economic afflictions of the country and of the crisis which it insisted Japan would face in 1935 to establish itself as the champion of Japan against the evil influences and corruption which contact with the rest of the world had engendered. It declared that the economic structure of Japan must be reformed before the well-being and security of the country could be assured. There are ample grounds, therefore, for holding that at the beginning of 1935 the influence of the military, which had been resuscitated by the "Incident," was a force which had to be reckoned with not merely in its former field, but in a new and larger field which included every aspect of Japanese government.

CONCLUSION

THE ideology and the past experience of the Japanese people have formed a background to which a group intent upon directing the national policy along a path of militarism and chauvinism may appeal. Yet no group can make such an appeal with any success, unless it either has political power or is able to bring pressure to bear upon those who have. In England, in the United States and in all countries in which a true form of democratic government exists the military have failed to attain to a supreme position. Stronger forces have controlled them. They have been the servants of the Government. Though they may have given advice, though they may have exerted pressure, they have in the final analysis enforced, rather than directed, the national policy. Their hands have been tied and the scope of their authority has been limited by the checks which democratic control of the machinery of State has fastened upon them. Yet in Japan the military have held a supremely independent position. Limitations upon their powers have been few and insignificant. The failure of democratic institutions to gain control of the machinery of State, due in part to the undemocratic character of the Constitution, in part to intrinsic mistakes of those who aspired to leadership in a democratic regime, has simplified the task of the military should they desire to influence national policy.

The last years of the nineteenth century proved that the military were indeed eager to influence the

policy of the country. The advantages which the Sino-Japanese War had gained for them were consolidated. Their rival, the civil faction of the oligarchy, was discredited. In the twentieth century members of the military faction rose to power in the Government; military men led the Cabinets and directed the national policy. When not in power the military brought their influence to bear upon the Government by threatening to withdraw their co-operation without which no Government could continue. Throughout the first and second decades of the century they made Cabinets which would grant their demands and unmade them when they outlived their usefulness or threatened opposition. They took advantage of their own independent position, the weakness of the forces opposed to them and the favourable background for the appeal of militarism to guide the foreign policy of the country in a direction acceptable to themselves. In that policy were apparent many of the ideas which had been advocated by the patriotic prophets of the Restoration; ideas from which there had sprung the division amongst the Restoration statesmen between those who supported a policy of immediate expansion and those who favoured one of internal reconstruction. Even when the growth of democratic institutions and the decrease of their own prestige compelled the military to play a less prominent role, their influence did not disappear. It remained quiescent, only to rise with renewed strength after the severe reverse of 1930.

This essay has stressed the part which the military have played in the government of Japan and in the direction of the national policy. Yet there has

been no intention to create an impression that they alone have been responsible for the orientation of Japanese foreign policy. On the contrary, other groups have played an important role and other factors beside rabid militarism and chauvinism have motivated Japanese action abroad; geographical and economic conditions, the problem of the opposite coast, the threat of over-population and the proximity of Russia have had just as much effect as similar factors have had upon the foreign policy of other countries. Though those factors cannot be overlooked, though the intricacies of the Japanese governmental system are difficult to analyse, and though the interrelations of different groups which aspire to control are hard to discern, yet it is clear that the Japanese military have occupied a supremely independent position, that their prestige has been high in the estimation of the people and that the forces opposed to them have been weak. The events of the last forty years prove that they have used that position to launch the country upon a particular course of action rather than advise its adoption, and to formulate and direct, rather than enforce, the policy of the Government.

THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN¹

PREAMBLE

HAVING, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the Throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favoured with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors: and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support, We hereby promulgate, in pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript of the 12th day of the 10th month of the 14th year of Meiji, a fundamental law of State, to exhibit the principles, by which We are to be guided in Our conduct, and to point out to what Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform.

The rights of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in future fail to wield them, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby granted.

We now declare to respect and protect the security of the rights and of the property of Our people, and to secure to them the complete enjoyment of the same, within the extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and of the law.

The Imperial Diet shall first be convoked for the 23rd year of Meiji, and the time of its opening shall be the date, when the present Constitution comes into force.

When in future it may become necessary to amend any of the provisions of the present Constitution, We or Our successors shall assume the initiative right, and submit a project for the same to the Imperial Diet. The Imperial Diet shall pass its vote upon it, according to the conditions imposed by the present Constitution, and in no otherwise shall Our descendants or Our subjects be permitted to attempt any alteration thereof.

¹ As in H. Ito, *Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan*. Tokyo, 1889.

Our Ministers of State, on Our behalf, shall be held responsible for the carrying out of the present Constitution, and Our present and future subjects shall forever assume the duty of allegiance to the present Constitution.

(His Imperial Majesty's Sign-Manual)
(Privy Seal)

The 11th day of the 2nd month of the 22nd year of Meiji.

CHAPTER I

The Emperor

- i. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.
- ii. The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law.
- iii. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.
- iv. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution.
- v. The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.
- vi. The Emperor gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and executed.
- vii. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives.
- viii. The Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial Ordinances in the place of law. Such Imperial Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.

- ix. The Emperor issues, or causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws.
- x. The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration and salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions especially provided for in the present Constitution or in other laws shall be in accordance with the respective provisions (bearing thereon).
- xi. The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.
- xii. The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.
- xiii. The Emperor declares war, makes peace and concludes treaties.
- xiv. The Emperor declares a state of siege.
The conditions and effects of a state of siege shall be determined by law.
- xv. The Emperor confers titles of nobility, rank, orders and other marks of honour.
- xvi. The Emperor orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments and rehabilitation.
- xvii. A Regency shall be instituted in conformity with the provisions of the Imperial House Law.
The Regent shall exercise the powers appertaining to the Emperor in his name.

CHAPTER II

Right and Duties of Subjects

- xviii. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be determined by law.
- xix. Japanese subjects may, according to qualifications determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military or any other public offices equally.

- xx. Japanese subjects are amenable to service in the Army or Navy, according to the provisions of law.
- xxi. Japanese subjects are amenable to the duty of paying taxes, according to the provisions of law.
- xxii. Japanese subjects shall have the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits of law.
- xxiii. No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or punished, unless according to law.
- xxiv. No Japanese subject shall be deprived of his right of being tried by the judges determined by law.
- xxv. Except for the cases provided for in the law, the house of no Japanese subject shall be entered or searched without his consent.
- xxvi. Except in the cases mentioned in the law, the secrecy of the letters of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate.
- xxvii. The right of property of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate.
Measures necessary to be taken for the public benefit shall be provided for by law.
- xxviii. Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.
- xxix. Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.
- xxx. Japanese subjects may present petitions, by observing the proper forms of respect, and by complying with the rules specially provided for the same.
- xxxi. The provisions contained in the present Chapter shall not affect the exercise of the powers appertaining to the Emperor, in times of war or in cases of national emergency.
- xxxii. Each and every one of the provisions contained in the preceding articles of the present Chapter, that are not in conflict with the laws or the rules and discipline of the Army and Navy, shall apply to the officers and men of the Army and of the Navy.

CHAPTER III

The Imperial Diet

- xxxiii. The Imperial Diet shall consist of two Houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives.
- xxxiv. The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the Ordinance concerning the House of Peers, be composed of the Members of the Imperial Family, of the orders of nobility, and of those persons who have been nominated thereto by the Emperor.
- xxxv. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the Law of Election.
- xxxvi. No one can at one and the same time be a Member of both Houses.
- xxxvii. Every law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet.
- xxxviii. Both Houses shall vote upon projects of law submitted to it by the Government, and may respectively initiate projects of law.
- xxxix. A Bill, which has been rejected by either one or the other of the two Houses, shall not be again brought in during the same session.
- xl. Both Houses can make representations to the Government as to laws and upon any other subject. When, however, such representations are not accepted, they cannot be made a second time during the same session.
- xli. The Imperial Diet shall be convoked every year.
- xlII. A session of the Imperial Diet shall last during three months. In case of necessity, the duration of a session may be prolonged by Imperial Order.
- xlIII. When urgent necessity arises, an extraordinary session may be convoked, in addition to the ordinary one.
The duration of an extraordinary session shall be determined by Imperial Order.
- xlIV. The opening, closing, prolongation of session and prorogation of the Imperial Diet shall be effected simultaneously for both Houses.

In case the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, the House of Peers shall at the same time be prorogued.

- XLV. When the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, Members shall be caused by Imperial Order to be newly elected, and the new House shall be convoked within five months from the day of dissolution.
- XLVI. No debate can be opened and no vote can be taken in either House of the Imperial Diet, unless not less than one-third of the whole number of the Members thereof is present.
- XLVII. Votes shall be taken in both Houses by absolute majority. In a case of a tie vote, the President shall have the casting vote.
- XLVIII. The deliberations of both Houses shall be held in public. The deliberations may, however, upon demand of the Government or by resolution of the House, be held in secret sitting.
- XLIX. Both Houses of the Imperial Diet may respectively present addresses to the Emperor.
 - I. Both Houses may receive petitions presented by subjects.
 - II. Both Houses may enact, besides what is provided for in the present Constitution and in the Law of the Houses, rules necessary for the management of their internal affairs.
 - III. No Member of either House shall be held responsible outside the respective Houses, for any opinion uttered or any vote given in the House. When, however, a Member himself has given publicity to his opinions by public speech, by documents in print or in writing, or by any other similar means, he shall, in the matter, be amenable to the general law.
 - LI. The Members of both Houses shall, during the session, be free from arrest, unless with the consent of the House, except in cases of flagrant delicts, or of offences connected with a state of internal commotion or with a foreign trouble.

- LIV. The Ministers of State and the Delegates of the Government may, at any time, take seats and speak in either House.

CHAPTER IV

The Ministers of State and Privy Council

- LV. The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. All Laws, Imperial Ordinances and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of State, require the countersignature of a Minister of State.
- LVI. The Privy Councillors shall, in accordance with the provisions for the organization of the Privy Council, deliberate upon important matters of State, when they have been consulted by the Emperor.

CHAPTER V

Judicature

- LVII. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name of the Emperor. The organization of the Courts of Law shall be determined by law.
- LVIII. The judges shall be appointed from among those who possess proper qualifications according to law. No judge shall be deprived of his position, unless by way of criminal sentence or disciplinary punishment. Rules for disciplinary punishment shall be determined by law.
- LIX. Trials and judgments of a Court shall be conducted publicly. When, however, there exists any fear that such publicity may be prejudicial to peace and order, or to the maintenance of public morality, the public trial may be suspended by provision of law or by the decision of the Court of Law.
- LX. All matters that fall within the competency of a special Court shall be specially provided for by law.

- LXI. No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the administrative authorities, and which shall come within the competency of the Court of Administrative Litigation specially established by law, shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.

CHAPTER VI

Finance

- LXII. The imposition of a new tax or the modification of the rates (of an existing one) shall be determined by law.
However, all such administrative fees or other revenue having the nature of compensation shall not fall within the category of the above clause.
The raising of national loans and the contracting of other liabilities to the charge of the National Treasury, except those that are provided in the Budget, shall require the consent of the Imperial Diet.
- LXIII. The taxes levied at present shall, in so far as they are not remodelled by a new law, be collected according to the old system.
- LXIV. The expenditure and revenue of the State require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual Budget.
Any and all expenditures overpassing the appropriations set forth in the Titles and Paragraphs of the Budget, or that are not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently require the approbation of the Imperial Diet.
- LXV. The Budget shall be first laid before the House of Representatives.
- LXVI. The expenditures of the Imperial House shall be defrayed every year out of the National Treasury, according to the present fixed amount for the same, and shall not require the consent thereto of the Imperial Diet, except in case an increase thereof is found necessary.

- LXVII. Those already fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet without the concurrence of the Government.
- LXVIII. In order to meet special requirements, the Government may ask the consent of the Imperial Diet to a certain amount as a Continuing Expenditure Fund, for a previously fixed number of years.
- LXIX. In order to supply deficiencies, which are unavoidable, in the Budget, and to meet requirements unprovided for in the same, a Reserve Fund shall be provided in the Budget.
- LXX. When the Imperial Diet cannot be convoked, owing to the external or internal condition of the country, in case of urgent need for the maintenance of public safety, the Government may take all necessary financial measures, by means of an Imperial Ordinance. In the case mentioned in the preceding clause the matter shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet at its next session, and its approbation shall be obtained thereto.
- LXXI. When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year.
- LXXII. The final account of the expenditures and revenue of the State shall be verified and confirmed by the Board of Audit, and it shall be submitted by the Government to the Imperial Diet, together with the report of verification of the said Board. The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law separately.

SUPPLEMENTARY RULES

- LXXIII. When it has become necessary in future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project

to that effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.

In the above case neither House can open the debate, unless not less than two-thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members present is obtained.

- LXXIV. No modification of the Imperial House Law shall be required to be submitted to the deliberation of the Imperial Diet.

No provision of the present Constitution can be modified by the Imperial House Law.

- LXXV. No modification can be introduced into the Constitution, or into the Imperial House Law, during the time of a Regency.

- LXXVI. Existing legal enactments, such as laws, regulations, Ordinances, or by whatever names they may be called, shall, so far as they do not conflict with the present Constitution, continue in force.

All existing contracts or orders that entail obligations upon the Government, and that are connected with expenditure, shall come within the scope of Article LXXVII.

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[It has been found convenient to divide the bibliography into four sections: Historical, Social and Ideological, Political and Economic.]

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